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Abstract 
Keywords: Kurdistan Region, Media System, Political System, Media and Politics, Political 
Parallelism 
This thesis studies the political system in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), specifically in 
what is related to the media system and the interplay between both. The research is one of the 
very first attempts to present comparative study of politics and press in the KRI to understand the 
dynamics of the media systems and participate in the theoretical discussion of media and politics.  
A triangulation of methods and different sources are employed, such as qualitative analyses of 
current and archived laws, party and media documents, as well as personal semi-structured 
interviews and anonymous questionnaires conducted as part of this research. The framework 
adopted for studying the case was of the Hallin and Mancini’s (2004, 2012). The attempt was not 
to fully apply this framework, but to use the variables to help deepen the understanding the KRI 
media system.  
The results show that political parallelism is high which explains full party ownership of the 
media. The interdependence of  media and politics is inevitable and one is not able to easily 
survive without the other. In addition, the journalists do not necessarily meet the professional 
requirements and being a member of one of the dominant parties which owns the media is 
sufficient. The state plays an important role in controlling and media related legislations remain 
mostly on paper rather than being fully implemented. Due to the party ownership, finding a 
market is the least priority for the majority of the press in the KRI.  
This thesis employs categories and dimensions used in comparative studies. It uses the 
theoretical framework developed on the basis of Western cases which makes it possible for a new 
case to be available on the map of comparative scholars, a case that otherwise would not be 
studied.  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Abstract in Portuguese  
Resumo 
Palavras-chave: Região do Curda do Iraque, Panorama dos Media, Sistema Político, Media e 
Política, Paralelismo Político  
Esta tese estuda o sistema político na Região Curda do Iraque (RCI), especificamente no que 
toca ao sistema de media e à interação entre media e política. Esta investigação constitui uma das 
primeiras tentativas no sentido de avançar com um estudo comparativo sobre política e media na 
RCI, de modo a compreender a dinâmica dos sistemas mediáticos e contribuir assim para a 
discussão teórica sobre media e política. A abordagem metodológica desta tese faz uma 
triangulação de métodos e fontes diferentes, tais como análises qualitativas de leis atuais e 
arquivadas, documentos partidários e de media, entrevistas pessoais semiestruturadas e 
questionários anónimos levados a cabo no âmbito desta pesquisa. A estrutura da tese é adotada a 
partir do estudo do caso de Hallin e Mancini (2004, 2012). O caso de Hallin e Mancini não foi 
adotado aqui para ser aplicado integralmente neste contexto, mas sim de modo a podermos usar 
as suas variáveis e aprofundar assim o conhecimento do sistema de media da RCI. Isso ajuda à 
análise do contexto e a proceder a essa mesma análise de forma comparativamente mais 
relevante.  
A novidade no que toca ao estudo deste caso num um cenário como a Região do Curdistão do 
Iraque é a principal razão pela qual o âmbito desta tese é essencialmente exploratório e 
descritivo. Isso pode ajudar também a definir o tom para pesquisas futuras que possam centrar.se 
na região e / ou em questões relacionadas com os media e a política.  
Esta tese estuda também o sistema de partidos políticos e particularmente a sua relação com os 
media. Este estudo contribuirá também para a compreensão da dinâmica dos sistemas mediáticos 
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no Médio Oriente, assumindo-se como um contributo para a discussão teórica sobre media e 
política. Recorre a categorias e dimensões usadas em estudos comparativos. Usa o quadro teórico 
desenvolvido com base em casos ocidentais, permitindo deste modo a disponibilização de um 
novo caso no mapa de estudos comparados e garantido assim que este mesmo caso será 
estudado. 
A unidade política desta tese é a Região Curda do Iraque. Uma área com experiência continuada 
de construção da democratização num cenário sem experiência democrática e que podemos 
chamar de nova democracia não estatal desde 1992. Uma das principais limitações deste tipo de 
estudos reside no fato de a maioria dos estudos na área dos media e política se centrarem 
sobretudo nas realidades ocidentais, não existindo qualquer estudo sobre a relação entre media e 
política no Curdistão e tentando preencher assim uma lacuna sobre esta região do Iraque 
particularmente no que toca aos media. De referir que não existem estudos sobre partidos e o seu 
sistema, exceto estudos sobre os recursos limitados de sobrevivência, sobre o movimento político 
e revolucionário e luta dos curdos por um estado independente. Assim é importante efetuar 
pesquisas sobre sistemas políticos e suas formas nestes contextos. Como investigadora, tenho 
vindo trabalhar esta questão como jornalista e mais tarde, como política, o que me ajudou a 
compreender melhor as coisas.  
Para aprofundar o conhecimento sobre a principal questão desta investigação, nomeadamente 
qual o sistema de media na Região Curda do Iraque, desenvolvi uma série de questões com base 
nas dimensões desenvolvidas por Hallin e Mancini (2004, 2012).  
Para além destas quatro dimensões, o desenvolvimento histórico dos media e da política na 
Região Curda do Iraque foi estudado e adicionado como uma nova dimensão. Assim, o conjunto 
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de questões desta tese resulta principalmente de cinco dimensões: Desenvolvimento Histórico, 
Mercado de Media, Paralelismo Político, Profissionalização e Papel do Estado. Para recolher 
dados sobre essas dimensões foram usados diferentes métodos. Para compreender a evolução 
histórica, consultámos arquivos de partidos, documentos, arquivo de jornais e media e efetuámos 
uma série de entrevistas presenciais:  
Qual o contexto geral histórico, social e político que presidiu à criação desses dois fenómenos; 
partidos e imprensa na RCI e até que ponto as características económicas, sociais e profissionais 
no contexto deste território moldam a relação entre política e imprensa?   
Para melhor compreender essa dimensão dos mercados dos media foram usados arquivos de 
jornais, sua distribuição geográfica e tiragem, entrevistas, regulamentações governamentais 
aplicadas a essas publicações como principais fontes de recolha de dados para analisar a 
dimensão mercado. Foram recolhidos também dados através de questionários com base 
sobretudo nas seguintes questões: 
Qual mercado da imprensa na RCI? Qual a circulação de jornais? 
Foram levados a cabo dois questionários para recolha de dados referentes à dimensão do 
Paralelismo Político. Um desses questionários foi realizado junto de políticos e outro junto de 
jornalistas. Além disso, foram levadas a cabo entrevistas presenciais semiestruturadas frente a 
frente com políticos e decisores na área dos media. Eis as principais questões que foram 
apresentadas: 
Qual o grau de envolvimento dos jornalistas na política ativa, que relações têm com os partidos 
políticos e qual o envolvimento dos partidos políticos na tutela de jornais? Até que ponto as 
condições os partidos políticos controlam o conteúdo dos jornais e existe algum envolvimento 
direto ou indireto em termos de censura nos jornais por parte dos políticos e qual o grau de 
independência e de liberdade dos jornalistas na sua atividade diária? 
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A pressão que os jornalistas enfrentam no exercício da sua profissão e as restrições políticas são 
tidas como os principais obstáculos neste campo. Os dois questionários realizados para este 
estudo também foram utilizados para abordar questões relativas ao grau de profissionalização 
dos jornalistas, sua formação e nível de escolaridade e as principais questões nesta preocupação 
foram:  
Qual o grau de profissionalismo do jornalista e que nível de educação, formação têm os 
jornalistas? Até que ponto a sua experiência é suficientemente formativa para apresentar notícias 
imparcialmente?   
No que toca ao Papel do Estado como a última dimensão foram preparadas uma série de questões 
para as quais procurámos resposta em entrevistas com políticos e jornalistas, arquivos das leis 
existentes e dois questionários. Entre as principais questões, destacam-se as seguintes: qual o 
papel das instituições estatais e de governo na formação e desenvolvimento da imprensa na RCI 
e o estado aprovou disposições legais suficientes para promover um jornalismo independente e 
fiável na RCI? Em caso afirmativo, essas disposições legais oferecem liberdade suficiente aos 
jornalistas para darem informações, ou essa legislação limita a liberdade e a atividade da 
imprensa e dos jornalistas? 
Os resultados mostram que a imprensa na RCI entrou em sintonia com a política partidária. De 
revolucionária ao porta-voz da guerra civil, de imprensa para o cidadão a imprensa eleitoralista, 
em suma, a sua agenda varia de acordo com a agenda partidária. 
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No que toca ao mercado dos media no RCI a mesma não depende do mercado, pois encontrar um 
mercado é a menor das prioridades da maioria da imprensa na RCI. A dependência dos media da 
tutela política e dos recursos fornecidos pelo partido tornou-os independentes do mercado. Os 
media têm um dono político e, apesar de se considerarem independentes, são economicamente 
dependentes de um partido. As diferenças multilíngues e de dialeto da RCI afetaram o mercado e 
os leitores. 
O paralelismo político é alto, o que explica a tutela dos meios de comunicação por parte dos 
partidos. A interdependência entre media e política é inevitável e não  sobrevivem facilmente 
uma sem a outra. Por outro lado, os jornalistas não cumprem necessariamente aos requisitos 
profissionais e ser membro de um dos partidos dominantes que detém os media é suficiente. O 
estado desempenha um papel importante em matéria de controlo e a legislação relativa aos media 
continua no papel em vez de ser implementada. Em virtude da tutela partidária, encontrar um 
mercado é uma prioridade menor para a maioria da imprensa na RCI. Os partidos criaram um 
espaço para media sem partidários. Não tutelados diretamente por um partido mas porte do seu 
departamento de media. 
Em relação ao profissionalismo, os media são fundados pelos partidos e são tratados 
principalmente como um dos departamentos do partido. Os jornalistas eram tradicionalmente 
membros do partido e nomeados como jornalistas e ainda acontece termos decisores nos media 
que são sobretudo figuras sénior do partido. A maioria dos jornalistas trabalha para os mesmos 
órgãos de imprensa relacionados com o mesmo partido e isso abre espaço para a autocensura, 
como já foi referido “Sou membro do partido e sei o que é bom e o que não é bom para o meu 
partido”. A região não é um lugar seguro para os jornalistas e registam-se diariamente mortes e 
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assassinatos e tortura de jornalistas. Para além da pressão do partido, laços e normas tribais 
também desempenham um papel importante na autocensura dos jornalistas. Também não há 
formação suficiente e esta área em muito nova tendo em conta o nível de ensino em jornalismo.  
Quanto ao papel do Estado, as leis e regulamentos são importantes para o estabelecimento e 
desenvolvimento dos media no local. No entanto, as leis não ajudaram a desenvolver uma melhor 
prática de jornalismo devido à sua fraca implementação. Somado a isso, a intervenção do estado 
com presentes e os subsídios levaram ao controlo e manipulação de jornalistas, colocando-os sob 
a égide de sindicatos como capacidade de controlo como é o caso do Curdistan Journalists 
Syndicate to Control. Restringir a liberdade dos media ao abrigo das regras de segurança 
nacional ou dos valores nacionalistas por parte de partidos e do estado é uma prática corrente, 
não se percebendo muito bem que valores são esses e o se entende por segurança nacional.  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INTRODUCTION: THE AIM OF THE STUDY, 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND STATE OF THE ART 
The aim of this study 
The aim of this thesis is to study the relationship between the press and politics in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). We approach the KRI as a case study, as an example of the 
struggle between authoritarian and democratization efforts at the same time. It is an area 
with no democratic experience, that since 1992 could informally be called a ‘new non-state 
democracy’. The scope is mostly exploratory and descriptive, setting the tone for future 
research that could focus on the region and/or on issues related to media and politics.  
This research area is novel and there has been no study on the relation between the media 
and politics in Kurdistan. This thesis is an attempt to fill the gap in the field of politics in 
the KRI specifically as related to the media. In addition, this study will contribute towards 
understanding the dynamics of the media systems in the Middle East and participate in the 
theoretical discussion of media and politics. Periodically written press outlets issued and 
published in Kurdistan are chosen for study throughout this work. Research outcomes will 
show which parts of the press, how many of them and for what length of time the press in 
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the KRI has been owned/controlled by political parties. This research will also study the 
system of political parties and particularly as related to the press. There are also no 
previous studies on the parties and their political systems in the KRI. The majority of the 
research done in the KRI is ‘survival research’: and recently some pieces of research cover 
the issue of the struggle towards an independent state. Therefore, currently it is important 
that research is carried out on the press and political systems and their structure. This 
research takes place while a political system is in the formative process. 
Research questions  
While centering on the relationship between the press and politics in the KRI, four main 
research themes drive this study. These are as follows: 
Historical development: Political parties and the press have both emerged and developed in 
the KRI in the twentieth century. What is the general historical, social and political context 
that created these two phenomena - parties and press in the KRI - and to what extent did the 
economic, social and professional characteristics of the context shape the relationship 
between politics and the press? What events and historical developments have impacted the 
general state of affairs of the politics and press in the KRI?  
Press market: What market does the press have in the KRI of newspapers? Wha? What is the 
circulation of newspapers? What is the impact of the regional and linguistic segmentation of 
the KRI society on the emergence and development of the newspaper circulation? 
Political parallelism: What is political parallelism and how is it expressed in the KRI? To 
what extent are journalists involved in active politics and what relationships do they have 
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with political parties? What involvement do the political parties have in the ownership of the 
newspapers? To what extent and in what conditions do political parties control the content of 
newspapers and is there any direct or indirect newspaper censorship involvement by politics? 
How much independence and freedom do journalists have in their daily activities? What role 
do syndicates of play in the KRI, and how much independence do they have as related to the 
other political institutions? 
Professionalization: What is the level of journalist professionalism? What level of education, 
training and specialization do journalists have? To what extent is their experience sufficiently 
formative in order to present news impartially? 
Role of the state: What is the role of the state and government institutions in the formation 
and development of the press in the KRI? Is the state providing sufficient legal provisions to 
foster independent and reliable journalism in the KRI? If yes, do these legal provisions offer 
sufficient freedom to journalists to provide the information, or is this legislation limiting the 
freedom and activity of the press and journalists? To what extent are the legal provisions 
implemented and what are the gaps that allow the immixture of politics into the press?  
According to the development and analysis of these research questions, the thesis is 
structured as follows:  
Chapter 1 presents the theoretical framework. The literature review, research design and 
methodology employed are detailed in this chapter. This chapter will specify the 
methodology of the thesis, explaining the variables and indicators analyzed.  
Chapter 2 presents the general characteristics the KRI as the case study for this research. 
General accounts regarding the region’s political system describe approximately a century 
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of political and social development. Chapter 3 will continue describing the development 
of the region’s political parties in more depth along with the development of some 
elements of the media and press. Chapter 4 will present the four dimensions of the media 
system in the KRI after the enactment of the journalism law, after 2007.  
Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis deal with the empirical analysis and are intended to 
provide evidence of the unfolding relationship between the press and politics in the KRI. 
Chapter 5 will present the aspect of censorship and self-censorship of journalists, based 
on evidence collected by the author through interviews and questionnaires addressed to 
journalists in the KRI. Chapter 6 will present the relationship between press and politics 
from the point of view of politicians. Finally, the concluding part will generalize results 
from the previous analyses and will refer to the main conclusions and future research 
suggestions regarding this subject, pointing out the strengths and some weaknesses of the 
analysis and possible issues subject to further research.  
Intended contributions of this study to the state of the art 
The intended contributions of this study are many. First of all, this research will contribute 
to the ongoing debate on theories and practice of media and politics. Secondly, it will add a 
novel case study to the scholarship of comparative accounts of roles, expectations and 
impact of the media on the process of democratization in developing countries and non-
Western world. Not least, this research offers first hand evidence that can be used in other 
studies related to politics in the KRI. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The framework and main expectations of this thesis are based on current broad theories of 
comparative politics and comparative communication, along with the author’s experience 
of the case under study.  
The theoretical framework, research design and methodology employed are detailed in this 
chapter. The theoretical framework is based on four main research dimensions drawn out of 
mainstream research on media and politics. These dimensions are: media market, political 
parallelism, professionalization of journalists, and the role and intervention of the state in 
the media system. These dimensions are then broken down to measurable indicators for 
which it was possible to collect data and draw conclusions based on empirical evidence. 
The data was obtained by the author from one-to-one semi-structured interviews and 
questionnaires with acting politicians and journalists from the KRI. The research is 
completed by qualitative data and analysis of legislation, official documents, and other 
available archive resources.  
This thesis offers mainly descriptive and exploratory accounts of an almost non-studied 
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case, that of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the intricate development of its press and 
politics. Far from being exhaustive, this thesis does not offer any explanations or causal 
links for any of the described phenomena. In order to be able to determine an accurate 
causality mechanism in the relationship between media and politics in this region, more 
replication of research is needed with further evidence and lessons drawn. Whenever the 
quantitative data allows, correlations and some logical inferences are made. 
1.1. Literature review: The relationship between politics and media  
The core concern of this thesis is the development of, and relationship between, media and 
politics in the KRI. Before embarking on an analysis of the case, the results of the current 
literature on media and politics across the world will inform the research design and 
theoretical expectations for this study.  
1.1.1 The research problem: Politics and media  
In a classic text about government, Lasswell (1936) has defined politics as the study of 
‘who gets what, when, and how’. From this perspective, politics involves a range of actors 
engaged in a process of gaining and maintaining power in an organized society, through a 
range of rules accepted by a majority. Developments of theory and practice of government 
have put political parties at the core of the government process, as being the 
‘inevitable’ (Bryce 1921: 119) though ‘necessary evil’ (Tocqueville 1831). Parties are the 
carriers of aggregated social values in the model of representative democracy, that arrive in 
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power through competition with a clear agenda to hold power. These are the basic 
definitions that this thesis is starting from, while developing the theoretical framework and 
research design for this thesis.  
Expanding on the process of gaining and holding power by political parties, media appears 
as a main interface between power institutions and the citizens. It is a medium of 
communication of information and messages between the society and the governing 
institutions. In an ideal world, media would have an independent and impartial role in the 
process of information transfer, providing truthful content free of bias. However, the real 
world experience proves that as much as political parties may be ‘evil’ but ‘necessary’, the 
media can be more often than not biased by partisan agendas. Just as the process of gaining 
power can be altered by hidden interests in most of today’s societies, the media can be a 
tool used and abused in the political process to influence voters, convey partisan messages 
and ultimately alter the ideal democratic process. This is the nutshell of prominent current 
theories studying phenomena directly or indirectly related to politics and the media.  
Media is one of the main characteristics and tools in empowering and consolidating 
democracies. Civil participation occurs when flows of information are accessible to 
citizens and cause them to participate in the process of decision-making. Scholars agree 
upon the fact that media has direct and indirect involvement in promoting and assisting 
democratic processes especially in less democratized regimes (Curran et al., 1991; Kellner 
2004; McQuail 2005). Meanwhile, there is scarcely a case of a functioning success story of 
a democracy where free and diverse media are not there to provide citizens with the 
information that assists them to form opinions based on making rational decisions. McNair 
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(1999: 21) approves the latter by defining the media in a democracy as ‘a platform of 
public and political discourse that creates an informed citizenry’ . According to Delli, 
Carpini & Keeter (1996: 1), ‘a broadly and equitably informed citizenry helps assure a 
democracy that is both responsive and responsible’. For this purpose, the diversity of the 
media and a variety of viewpoints, as well as freedom of the press, is appreciated as a vital 
principle of democracy that allows citizens to make their choices of information. 
Moreover, O'Neil (1998) theorises that the success of democratic processes depends much 
on the access of the citizens to a varied flow of information in order for them to be able to 
participate, chose, and make decisions in an informed way. And, conversely, politicians 
also find the media can be a platform to present their views to the citizens. In fact, the 
media is the fundamental channel through which are formed the relations between politics 
and citizens.  
1.1.2 Four theories of the press 
In-depth studies concerned with the media and politics date from the early 1950´s, where 
development and interrelation between political systems and media systems are analyzed. 
The book Four Theories of the Press by Siebert et al. (1956: 1) is considered one of the 
first attempts at comparative analysis of media systems, where four theories of press are 
introduced: Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, Soviet Communist, theories. 
Siebert and his colleagues argue that the formation of the press depends on the political and 
social structure and is characterized by the historical conditions of the development of 
media, politics and society.  
The first theory, Authoritarian, refers to the type of media/press developed in the late 
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Renaissance based on the belief that ‘truth is not the product of a great mass of people, but 
of a few wise men’ (Siebert et al., 1956: 2-12). They propose 3 main characteristics of this 
theory as: 1) the press supports the state 2) the press is licensed by the state 3) the press 
cannot criticize acts of the state. The second theory is that of the Libertarian press. This 
theory of the press is linked with the beginning of the age of enlightenment at the time of 
famous thinkers such as Milton, Locke, Rousseau, Voltaire, Jefferson. This press theory 
depends on the belief that truth and information are the natural rights of a man. The 
theory’s 4 main characteristics are: 1) the press is a means of informing 2) the press 
provides man with the truth 3) the press gives space to the free ideas of individuals with no 
intention of offence to the private individual or the public 4) the press observes the 
government. The third theory is the Soviet Communist one, which somehow has the same 
characteristics as the authoritarian theory, but with more refined methods of operation. Its 
main characteristics are known as: 1) the press must be a support to state actions and plans 
2) the press is a product of state/party registered members only, and only they have the 
right to publish 3) the state, politicians, and party have influence over the press 4) the press 
does not criticize the state. The fourth theory is Social Responsibility. This theory accords 
the press a heavy responsibility towards society to be being accurate, objective, and 
balanced. The press is self-regulated, free and accessible to everyone, and all politicians are 
treated equally. 
  
One of the core conclusions conveyed by the authors is that the press and other media will 
reflect the ‘basic beliefs and assumptions that the society holds' (p.1-2). Here, different 
cultures may have different principles and priorities.  
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1.1.3. The media as a competitive market in the political process by state and political 
parties  
When it comes to the interplay between media and politics, two contradictory positions are 
delimited by the scholarship in this field. One refers to the media as a main supplier of 
reliable information in a diverse and pluralistic system of power-sharing (Davison, 1970: 
22-24). While the other introduces the media as in competition with varied information 
providers bringing an emergence of diverse ownership that competes in favor of different 
groups (Curran et al., 1982: 16). From this point of view, it can be concluded that media 
might be seen as a market, where as a rule the information has to be reliable, but mostly is 
used to manipulate and out-do the competition. Here, media can be seen as a product that 
any interested party can acquire and own, with subsequent self-interested use.  
In her study on the case of Finland, Francis Millard (1998) describes the ownership of 
media by different political parties as problematic, concluding that allowing different 
parties to operate their own media outlets could foster political divisions and instability. 
Millard anticipates possible clashes between parties caused by the ownership of the media, 
especially when each media outlet may deny the coverage of the other or might be used as 
a means against the other groups.  
Political actors tend to be quite successful at using media in favor of their interests. The 
importance of sending information to spread agenda and ideology motivates political 
powers to create direct and indirect links with the media. This does not mean that media is 
free of dependency from politics, but in turn, the media also needs politicians to inform 
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citizens of the process of decision-making. In other words, as Mancini (1993: 36) puts it: 
‘politicians use media to leak information with an aim to deliver the message to the 
administration or to undermine their rivals’.  
Above all, a state can play three major roles as challenging policies towards media as 
referred to by Randal (1998: 38). First, is the ownership, subsidising, and management of 
the media; and second, is the regulation of patterns of the media; while the third, is the 
control over content and messages of the media. As has been mentioned, the correlation 
and interdependence of media and politics is undeniable and as Curran et al. (1992: 21) 
states: ‘while media are dependent on the central institutions of society for their raw 
material, these institutions were at the same time dependent on media to communicate their 
viewpoints to the public’. Eventually, within the legal environment there have been 
discussions that legal rules and regulations can also assist media to advance democratic 
goals. Monroe E. Price and Peter Krug (2006: 100) suggest an environment ‘in which 
citizen preferences are a key to the long-term operability of the rule of law and a system of 
laws that facilitate the contribution the media can make to the democratization process’.  
1.1.4 News theories and research into media and politics  
Studies of media and politics are mainly focused on Western world realities: most existing 
studies have at their core assumptions and expectations built on Western democracies 
(Nerone, 1995: 70). The main limitations of these studies are that the non-Western realities 
are overlooked, and expectations are overstretched to political, social, and cultural settings 
that have different characteristics and that can hardly be applied to existing theoretical 
models. The most oft-quoted theoretical framework that analyses the relationship between 
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the media and political systems belongs to Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini with their 
‘Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics’ (2004: 21-30). The 
authors analyze media systems by adopting four dimensions. First, Media market and its 
development focusing on the circulation and readership of the press. Second, they propose 
Political parallelism as a concept for testing the relationship and connections between the 
media and political parties. Their focus on political parallelism is that the differences in 
media systems in different countries rely very much on differences in their political 
systems. The third dimension they use is Journalistic professionalism, and the fourth is the 
way that the state is involved in the media system.  
1.1.5 Media in the Arab world  
Most mainstream studies on media and politics in general are based on, and relate to, 
Western democracies. Theories and findings are confined to these known cases and, to a 
certain extent, the expectations that scholars have built on these cases are becoming 
normative for non-Western countries. An unfulfilled expectation in this context is that he 
regionalism and globalization process would cause a convergence in content and practices 
of media, where the export of democracy and Western values would inevitably reproduce 
the media systems in a broader geographical context.  
Referring to the Middle East where political and social conflicts finish in bloodshed and 
war more often than not, caution is needed in applying Western-based theories. Political 
and social contexts are uneven across the globe: far from being homogenous, they reflect 
disparate realities and social norms. This is mentioned as a general problem in the Arab 
world by Ambassador William A. Rugh (2004) in his book on Arab mass media.  
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The studies of Rugh result in the advancement of three ideal types of media system based 
on similarities of cases from the Arab world, mainly informed by the Four theories of press 
developed by Siebert et al. These ideal-types are: mobilization, loyalist and diverse types.  
First, the mobilization type of media system is characterized by strict direct or indirect 
control by a small, aggressive ruling group that faces no significant opposition. There are 
no competing political parties or elections; a regime monopolizes power, making sure that 
the press does not criticize the leaders or the basic policies of the government. In addition, 
the media is used as a tool to mobilize popular support for the political programmes of the 
regime. The regime and its agents do not necessarily own all the media directly, and may 
allow newspapers and magazines to remain in private hands. Control is exercised through 
political parties, through the personnel appointed, and clear political guidance. Moreover, 
the control is facilitated by self-censorship and a restricted political environment. 
The loyalist type is found in countries where there are no political parties or competitive 
elections and there is no encouragement of dissent against the government. But the regime 
adopts a more passive attitude towards the media and does not pursue media mobilization 
in specific political purposes. Private owners of media exist, on condition that the most 
important policies of the government are supported by the media. Indirect means of control 
are used, such as strictly regulated laws, non-compliance sanctions, and government 
authorities whose task is to monitor the media and enforce regulations. Some criticism is 
allowed, strictly avoiding certain areas, such as the head of state, religious leaders, issues 
deemed ‘national security’, even friendly governments.  
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A third type would be the diverse media system, where different opinions are expressed by 
political parties or groups. The few restrictions on freedom of expression are regulated by 
specific laws, but these are not strictly applied. Ownership of newspapers is diversified 
among private actors and there is substantial competition in editorial policies, with open 
criticism towards the government.  
An important pillar in the thesis of Rugh is that these media types change in time, 
whenever the political system changes its characteristics. Given the high volatility of 
political systems observed in the Arab world (e.g. Syria, Libya, Egypt), media systems 
change accordingly. Expanding on this idea, the media systems here are highly dependent 
upon the political environment: professional capacities within the media establishment 
come second to the political will and winds of change. In addition the economic instability 
of the media makes it to be dependent mainly on the support of government and other 
political actors and interests. 
Resuming our literature review, the press-type theories will inform the analysis of the 
general political and media setting of the case study of the KRI, while the framework 
detailed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) will be employed for a more in-depth exploration of 
the details and characteristics of the relationship between media and politics in the KRI.  
1.2 Theoretical framework and research design: the four dimensions of media system  
Four analytical dimensions developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2012) are employed as 
a research model in this work, in order to define the existent media system in the KRI. 
There are various caveats when applying this model of four dimensions to a system 
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different from the one it was originally applied to in a Western context (Shen, 2012). 
However, it is argued that almost all existing media around the world meet the four 
dimensions of media market, state-media relationships, political parallelism, and 
journalistic professionalism (Voltmer, 2008). Therefore, the model is adopted here with 
close attention to the nature of the political system and the cultural, historical and social 
reality of the KRI.  
The four dimensions proposed by Halin and Mancini (2004, 2012) are as follows (see 
table):  
Dimensions Indicators 
1. Media market • Newspaper circulation 
• Regional and linguistic segmentation of media markets
2. Political  
parallelism
• Party membership of journalists (political affiliation); 
affiliation of journalists to political parties 
• Ownership of newspapers by political parties 
• Control of parties over press, censorship and issue 
control; receiving directions from political party  
• Degree of perceived independence by journalists  
• Journalist Syndicate as a form of political control from 
the political parties 





• Experience in journalism: years of work in journalism 
• Training and courses undertaken/ specialization  
• Self-censorship
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Table 1: Four dimensions of media and their indicators 
Dimension #1: Media market 
The media market is related to the expansion of media to a more general public. It takes the 
news from a limited group of chosen sources to a broader diffusion to ‘everybody who is 
ready to listen’. The concept of media market has been developed and used analytically by 
Hallin and Mancini in their study of Western Europe and N. America (Hallin and Mancini 
2004: 21). These concepts found huge support among the comparative scholars, due to the 
relative ease of operationalization. This lead to the break down of the concept of the 
circulation of newspapers, as well as the regional or linguistic segmentation of the 
readership market. The dimension ‘media market’ recalls easily the economic theories of 
the market and sends us to the well-known idea of the ‘demand and supply’ side of the 
market. Here, ‘supply’ would be represented by the total number of available information 
outlets, while ‘demand’ would be determined by such factors of individual level of 
readership like gender, geographical belonging, education, social, political divides that 
determine the potential and actual capacity of the readership.  
The total number of news outlets plus the geographical and linguistic characteristics of the 
4. Role of the state
• Law No. 10/1993  
• Press Law 
• The law No. 17/1993  
• Law of political parties 
• Law No. 4/1998,  
• Law of Journalists Syndicate of Kurdistan-Iraq 
• Law No. 13/2001,  
• Journalists retirement law 
• Iraqi Constitution. Ratified in a national referendum in 
2005.  
• Law No. 35/2007 Journalism Law 
• 7. Law No. 11/2013 The law of access to information
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news outlets are used in this research. 
Dimension #2: Political parallelism 
Political parallelism is a characteristic of the media systems and ‘refers to the character of 
links between political actors and the media and more generally the extent to which media 
reflects political divisions’ (Hardy, 2008). Daniel C. Hallin and Mancini used the term to 
reveal the links between media and politics, adapting a concept coined by Colin Seymour-
Ure in his 1974 research, who applied the concept of political parallelism to the links 
between the press and political parties (Seymour-Ure, 1974). 
The dimension of political parallelism has been among the core variables in the 
comparative analysis of the Hallin and Mancini framework. Taking the nature of the 
political system into account, the indicators used are: political affiliation and party control 
and ownership of media; the level of the relationship; connections; affiliation and ties 
between media and political parties; ownership of newspapers by political parties; control 
of parties over press; censorship and issue control (e.g. receiving directions from a political 
party); and the overall degree of independence felt by the journalists (Hallin and Mancini, 
2004: 21). The journalists´ opinions on the role of the journalists syndicate in the KRI are 
analyzed, asking to what extent the syndicate represents the interests of its members. The 
political membership of journalists is another indicator used here, asking journalists 
working at media outlets in Kurdistan about their involvement in politics and activity 
within political parties.  
We ask if party-affiliated journalists work for the paper supported by the same party. Self-
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censorship is another indicator used here, with the intention of determining to what extent 
journalists are aware of, or induced to be aware of, issues that are better to avoid exposing 
in the media. 
Dimension #3: Journalistic professionalism 
The professionalization of journalists refers to the degree the practice of journalism can 
stand as an independent profession, with its own skills, norms and rules, and the ability to 
offer practitioners the needed support for a decent standard of living. Journalists’ 
experience, number of years working, courses and training, and prior career routes, are all 
taken into account.  
Dimension #4: Role and intervention of the state in the media system  
The state has an undeniable role in regulating the media system directly and/or indirectly. 
The degree of the presence and intervention by the state can determine the room for 
manoeuvre of those involved in the production and delivery of media products and their 
circulation and reconversion. In this section, the following are analyzed: state control and 
any imposed restrictions and rules for the sake of national security, as well as statements 
and press releases by state officials. State control and/or intervention, is made mainly 
though special laws directed at the media. Not least, the state is responsible for the 
conditions of freedom of choice, freedom of speech for journalists, their protection and 
security. In general, Hallin and Mancini’s (2004, 2012) suggested four dimensions 
covering variables in the study of media and politics, are relevant to the case of the KRI.  
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1.3 Theoretical expectations  
Existing studies of press and politics are mainly descriptive in character, based on analyses 
of secondary data from public statistics or findings of other research. These kind of studies 
do not offer room for the creation of preliminary hypotheses to be tested, at least not in the 
manner of quantitative research. Moreover, there is no previous study or collected data on 
the political system in the KRI and almost no attention has been paid to the interaction of 
press and politics. Therefore, the results of this thesis will contribute towards a better 
understanding of the case, even if they do not employ general testable hypotheses and 
models for that related to press and politics, which would create a more robust case which 
could be replicated in the future.  
Taking into account studies and theories from other cases, the following expectations and 
propositions regarding the media system in the KRI can be formulated: 
1 Weak media market: press in the KRI mostly depend on their owners for revenue, budget 
providers who are mainly political parties. This puts them in the position of being less 
concerned about the market and its revenues. 
2 Low-level professionalization of journalists: due to the young age of regional institutions 
and low availability of professional training in the region, it can be expected that press 
personnel lack professionalism, freedom and independence.  
3 High political parallelism:  
3.1 There is a geographical polarization of media outlets across the society, according 
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to the political party system.  
3.2 The press is owned by political parties and subject to political control and has 
limited freedom.  
3.3 There are a high number of journalists with declared affiliation to a political party.  
3.4 There are strong clientelistic and patronage connections between the outlets and 
journalists with the political parties.  
  
4 Inefficient application of the state laws: 
 4.1 Despite the existence of good law texts, there is no implementation of them on the 
ground, nor control of their application.  
 4.2. The budget and finances of the state are used by the clientelist political parties, 
which offer subsidies and financial help in an uneven and non-transparent manner.  
5 A set of general propositions regarding the entire political system, according to the 
classic study of the four theories of the press: Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social 
Responsibility, Soviet Communist (Siebert et al., 1956: 1).  
  5.1 All these models can be found in the region. A non-consolidated system.  
  5.2 The practices of the press in the KRI could be categorized as authoritarian 
due to the direct and indirect control and ownership that politicians have over the press. 
This is complimented by the inability and impossibility, in some cases, of the media to 
criticize the state and the politicians in power.  
  5.3. A Soviet communist model could also be applicable with the kind of a 
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media that serves as the mouthpiece of the state, politicians or the party.  
  5.4. Both libertarian and social responsibility models can be found within the 
structure of the media. These would be supported by tendencies of liberalization in part of 
the market, along with strong control from the side of the state-like institutions that are 
under construction, and, in addition, the influence of regional and global changes in media-
society-politics relations. 
1.4 Data and research methods  
This research uses a triangulation of methods and employs different sources, such as 
qualitative analyses of current and archived laws, party and media documents, as well as 
personal semi-structured interviews and anonymous questionnaires conducted as part of 
this research.  
1. Archives: Archives are used mainly to describe the historical evolution of the region 
and the changes that have taken place in relation to the development of the political 
system and media. The following archives were available to the author: party archive 
department of KDP and PUK, radio tapes from the 1990s, Parliamentary laws and 
resolutions.  
2. Documents: Non-archived current documents are used in order to add qualitative data 
regarding the context and dynamics that otherwise are not visible in the current press.  
  3. Laws: A number of laws related to the press have been consulted. These are:  
- Law 10/1993: The Press Law; 
- Iraq Constitution 2005 (Article 38, the right to freedom of expression is guaranteed); 
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• Law 21/2011 adopted by the Iraqi Council of Representatives. This law is also known 
as Journalist Rights Law; 
- Law 35/2007: The Journalism Law, passed in the Kurdistan Parliament in 2007; 
-  Law 11/2013: The Right of Access to Information adopted in 2013. 
4. Printed daily newspapers published in the KRI: Kurdistani Niwe, Evro, Hawler, 
Khabat, Waar, Awena, Rudaw 
5. Semi-structured elite interviews: As already mentioned, there are virtually no studies 
related to the subject of this thesis. The semi-structured interviews were one of the 
main means of gathering data and obtain as many different points of view, as was 
practically possible (Deacon et al., 1999: 291). Six interviews were held personally by 
the author with individuals who are/or were directly involved in the events, and/or 
those linked directly to the subject of the study. Among the interviewed respondents 
there were: politicians (leaders and simple members of political parties, 
parliamentarians) and: journalists (media decision-makers, such as owners of outlets 
and journal directors, along with chief-editors and other categories of journalist).  
The interviews were held face to face. All the interviews were held in Kurdish and 
translated into English by the author. Please refer to Appendix 3 for the complete list of 
the interviews and the dates when these were held. All the interviews are transcribed. 
6. Questionnaires with politicians and journalists: Two main categories of respondents - 
parliamentarians of the legislature 2013-2017 and journalists of daily newspapers 
published in the KRI - were targeted with specially-designed questionnaires. The 
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questionnaires were anonymous in order to obtain answers that would be as reliable as 
possible. As for the content of the questionnaire, the questions were designed by the author 
with the intention of capturing the aspects and characteristics of the four dimensions of the 
media system, used as a framework. The results are analyzed using a mixture of descriptive 
and inferential statistics, illustrated by graphs. The analysis was performed using the SPSS 
software. The full version of the questionnaires can be found in the Appendices.  
• Journalists’ questionnaire  
The total population of journalists that work for press in KRG is unknown, as there are no 
official lists of registered journalists. The exact number of outlets that are registered with 
the Syndicate of Journalists is available (please see Appendix 6 for more details): there 
were 765 outlets of different types (such as daily, weekly and monthly publications). 
However, 150 forms were distributed in the period June-July 2014 among the journalists of 
the three provinces of the KRI, 50 for each province. There were 131 returns: 49 forms 
from Duhok, 44 from Erbil, and 38 from Sulaimani. Out of the total respondents, 75% 
work for daily newspapers and the other 25% work for weekly newspapers.  
• Politicians’ questionnaire  
The questionnaire dedicated to politicians has 57 returned answers, which is about 48% out 
of the total number of 111 parliamentarians currently in office. The questionnaire was 
distributed and responses collected from October-November 2014.  
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1.5 What is this study and what is it not?  
This is a comparative study of politics and press in the KRI. Despite presenting a case 
study, there is a comparative character underlying this research. First, it employs categories 
and dimensions used in comparative studies, making it easy for it to be inserted into the 
family of the larger comparative studies. By using the theoretical framework developed on 
the basis of Western cases, a new case becomes available on the map of comparative 
scholars, a case that otherwise would not be studied. Second, even if the of this scope of 
this study is limited, a historical perspective is adopted in this research, allowing for 
chronological comparison of the events and the evolution of these phenomena over time. In 
the first part of the thesis the development of the press and politics in the KRI over a few 
decades is traced, offering the possibility to use a ‘before and after’ outlook. Third, 
political parties and news outlets are the units of analysis to which the comparative 
approach is being applied. Finally, this research may be seen as interdisciplinary, as it lies 
among the comparative communication studies, with the use of insights from comparative 
media studies. However, there is a strong component of comparative politics as well, as the 
relationship between political parties and the press is taken into account. This reveals 
aspects that are somewhat understudied in the comparative politics scholarship with regard 
to media and politics.  
  
The term media refers to a system of media communication, which generally covers a large 
range of communication channels, mechanisms and actors. The scope of this thesis is to 
concentrate on the press aspect of the media system in the KRI, leaving aside the other 
media aspects that compose and define the general and broad system of media. Separate, 
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extensive studies would be required for other aspects such as audio and video broadcasting, 
social media, media and electoral politics, mediatization of political issues, political parties 
and leaders. These issues are outside the scope of this thesis, due to obvious limitation of 
resources.  
1.6 Research ethics  
The author has received the written permission of the interviewed respondents to quote and 
make public their answers. The questionnaires are anonymous and no names can be 
disclosed. Most of the consulted documents are still public and can be accessed on 
websites or on demand. 
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CHAPTER TWO: KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ: 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT  
BEFORE AND AFTER 2003 
Introduction  
2.1 Historical and political Background of Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
The KRI borders Turkey to the North, Syria to the West, and Iran to the East covering 
40,643 square kilometres. The population of the region is estimated around 5.2 million as 
15-20 % of total Iraqi population. The KRI is the only official status of a Kurdish 
administration from the four parts of the area where Kurds are mainly living in Turkey, 
Iraq, Iran and Syria. The history of these  territories being divided into four parts goes back 1
to the days after the fall of Ottoman Empire following the WWI. On 10 August 1920, in 
  See more at Kurdistan Regional Government’s official website, http://www.gov.krd/p/page.aspx?1
l=12&s=050000&r=303&p=213 , Retrieved on 5 July 2016
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Sèvres , France, a peace treaty between the Ottomans and the allies of WWI promised 2
Kurds a state of their own (Wagner, 2004: 53-62). This promise was never kept but instead 
three years later on 24 July 1923, another treaty in Lausanne  divided the Kurdish 3
territories between the four states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria (McDowall, 1996: 
115-151). An Independent Kurdish state was denied mainly because of the predominant 
geopolitical conditions in the region and the conflicts of interest among the world powers 
(Bulloch & Morris, 1993). Ever since, in these four areas there are ongoing revolts, 
disagreements and demands for freedom and the right of self-determination and a state for 
the Kurds. Most of these attempts were suppressed and silenced by the governments but 
the most successful out of these revolts was that of the Kurds in Iraq. Since 1920, there 
have been numerous attempts by the Kurds to rebel in these four states. The more serious 
uprising against the Iraqi government started in the 1930s under the command of their 
national leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani (Yildiz, 2004). In Iraq the Kurdish rebellion was 
more widespread. As a result, the regime’s suppression was more brutal against them. As 
well as the attempts at rebellion, the Kurds in Iraq have attempted numerous times to find a 
way to attain autonomy and self-rule in their populated areas. This was mainly because 
there has been no confirmed place for the Kurds in the establishment of Iraq, as Romano 
(2010:1345) stated:  
As leaders in Baghdad (whether under the monarchy before 1958 or the 
republican regimes that followed) sought to legitimize their rule, forge a new 
  Section III, Articles 62-64 of Sèvres Peace Treaty: http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1920/2
TS0011.pdf 
 Retrieved on 5 July 2016
   The full treaty in English is available at: http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Lausanne_ENG.pdf 3
 Retrieved on 5 July 2016 
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state, and unite Shi‘is and Sunnis via a discourse of Arab nationalism, the 
Kurds’ place in Iraq remained ever uncertain. 
The revolts in Iraq entered a more organised partisan resistance after the formation of KDP 
led by Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Barzani founded Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and 
became the first leader of this in Iraq on 16 August 1946. The establishment of this 
political party played an important role in progressing and ‘promoting Kurdish 
nationalism’ organising, leading and directing revolts against the Iraqi government’s 
suppression. The party led the Kurdish national revolution, and demanded rights for the 
Kurdish people since its establishment (Stansfield, 2003: 61).  
Iraq as a state was established in the aftermath of World War I. From its establishment in 
the early 1920s until the early 1990s the Kurds attempted numerous uprisings and revolts 
against successive Iraqi governments. Suppression was imposed on the Kurds of Iraq 
starting from the time of the monarch up to the time of the republicans. In other words, all 
the successive governments in Iraq have committed crimes against the Kurds and have 
systematically oppressed these people. Heavy wars have been imposed against the Kurds in 
Iraq and the Kurdish areas have been subject to destruction and continuous attacks. There 
have been few agreements between Baghdad and the Kurds. The very first agreement 
between both sides was established on 11 March 1970, known as 11 March Agreement. 
According to Marr (2012: 152) this agreement was to guarantee the representation of the 
Kurds in Iraq and in the Iraqi government by protecting their legal rights and recognition of 
their cultural rights: 
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[‘… It provided for Kurdish autonomy (the first official use of the word), and it 
guaranteed proportional representation of Kurds within a future legislative body, the 
appointment of a Kurdish vice president at the national level, the expenditure of an 
equitable amount of oil revenue in the autonomous regions, and the recognition of 
both Kurdish and Arabic as official languages in Kurdish territory’. ] 
The most illustrated and serious accomplishment of the Kurdish movement in Iraq could be 
considered as the Autonomy Agreement of 1970 . This agreement reached a functional 4
stage after the uninterrupted war started by the Kurds in 1961, fighting for their rights 
against the Iraqi government, had lasted for almost a decade (Harris, 1977). The harsh 
results of war and ongoing partisan fights brought the Iraqi government to the negotiation 
table. As a result both sides came up with the Autonomy Agreement of 1970. According to 
this agreement, which was as well-known as the March Agreement, the Iraqi government 
was mandated to grant a broader freedom for Kurds. One of the most notable achievements 
of this agreement was that for the first time the Kurds were allowed to take part in the 
formation of the government (Stansfield, 2006). After years of war and disputes between 
Iraqi government and Kurdish rebels’ national movement, the March 1970 autonomy 
agreement is considered the foundation stone for the establishment of Kurdistan Region 
(Mills and Sen, 2016). The agreement was the result of a negotiation between the Iraqi 
government and the leader of Kurdish National Movement Mulla Mustafa Barzani. 
According to the agreement the Kurds would be granted more freedoms such as the right to 
self-government, education in the Kurdish language and political participation (Bulloch & 
Morris, 1993). 
  See more at Iraq and Kurdish Autonomy https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3011338.pdf?4
_=1467734862366https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3011338.pdf?_=1467734862366 
 Retrieved on 5 July 2016 
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However, this agreement did not last long and failed to be implemented. The failure of its 
implementation led to another wave of conflict between the Kurds and Iraqi government in 
1974. A year after, the support that was granted to the Kurdish armed resistance stopped. 
This basically came about because of the signing of the treaty of Algiers between the Shah 
of Iran and Saddam Hussein. After this agreement, Iranians stopped supplying the Kurdish 
revolutionary movement with ammunition and arms. This halted the armed resistance of 
the Kurdish rebellions against the Iraqi government. Immediately after, the Iraqi 
government started a series of brutal attacks against the Kurdish areas aimed not only at the 
Peshmerga rebels but also the villagers and the Kurdish cities. As a result, hundreds of 
thousands of Kurdish families in the North of Iraq were displaced and sought refuge in 
Turkey and Iran. These attacks continued: they were known later as the process of 
Arabisation, an ethnic cleansing operation committed by the Ba'ath Party against the Kurds 
in the North of Iraq. As a result of tyrannical suppressions by the Baath regime, thousands 
of Kurdish families fled to Iran and Turkey in 1975. The year 1975 was a crisis year for the 
Kurdish nationalism movement in Iraq. Despite the collapse of the revolution after the 
Shah-Saddam agreement, a major breakup occurred in the Kurdistan Democratic Party at 
the same time. This happened when Jalal Talebani founded the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan and a significant number of KDP members joined the newly established party. 
The 1979 revolution in Iran and removal of the Shah from power was the end of the 
Algiers Agreement. Two years later, Iran and Iraq entered an armed conflict that lasted for 
eight years. By the occurrence of the war, Iran resumed its support for the Kurdish 
resistance. Both sides, the Iranians and the Kurds of Iraq, now had a common enemy and 
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they formed a coalition to fight side by side against the Iraqi army.  
This war lasted for eight years and during this time the Baath regime under the leadership 
of Saddam Hussein committed many crimes against the people in the North of Iraq. During 
this time, the Kurdish area of Iraq became a stage for war and genocide. The Baath regime 
officially declared an operation against the Kurdish people. The operation, Al-Anfal 
Campaign, started in the early 1980s and was aimed at the ethnic cleansing of the Kurds in 
Iraq. This campaign against the Kurds in the North was motivated by the military 
assistance given by the Kurdish Peshmergas to Iranian forces during the war. Al-Anfal 
campaign caused the killing of approximately 182,000 Kurds between the 1987 and 1988. 
More than 4,000 villages were destroyed. Over 5,000 civilians died in a matter of hours 
when unconventional weapons were used against civilians (Anderson & Stansfield, 2004; 
Human Rights Watch, 1993). According to O’Leary (2002, 18): ‘Its [the campaign’s] 
specific aim was to cleanse the region of saboteurs - who included all males between the 
ages of 15 and 70. Mass executions were carried out in the targeted villages and 
surrounding areas’. 
2.2 Kurdistan Regional Government 1991 - 2003 
2.2.1 The Gulf War and the Uprising 
After eight years of war with Iran and eventually entering another war with Kuwait, the 
Baath regime in Iraq became weaker. This gave a chance to the Kurds to rise up against the 
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Baath regime and establish their autonomous government. The Uprising of Spring 1991 is 
considered to be among the most important events in the history of the Kurdish national 
movement. Under the support and the shelter provided by the international community a 
no-fly zone was established which provided the Kurds with autonomous status inside Iraq. 
In February 1991, the United States and its allies intervened in Iraq and Kuwait, 
responding to the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein which occurred in 1990. As a 
result, Saddam was pushed back and Kuwait was liberated. The uprising in the North then 
started in early March, 1991. This was a revolt by the people inside the Kurdish cities again 
the tyrannical and brutal acts of the Baath regime. The uprising was backed by the Kurdish 
Peshmergas who joined the civilians in overthrowing the Baath and pushing them out of 
the Kurdish cities. This started in early March 1991 and lasted for almost one month. By 21 
March, the Kurdish people and Peshmergas had managed to expel the regime from Erbil, 
Duhok, Kirkouk and Sulaimani (Meiselas & van Bruinessen 2008). Apparently, the 
liberation of the oil rich city of Kirkouk through the Kurdish Uprising was not tolerated by 
Saddam. As a result, on 29 March Saddam’s Republican Guard received an order from him 
to retake the Kurdish region and in one day all cities were back under the control of 
Saddam’s Baath Regime (McDowall 2005). This counterattack of the Baath regime caused 
the displacement of the entire population of the Kurdish region, who had already had the 
bitter experience of brutal chemical gas used against them in 1988. They fled towards the 
Turkish and Iranian borders (Meiselas & van Bruinessen 2008). This displacement of 
hundreds of thousands was a serious humanitarian disaster as the majority of those fleeing 
had no choice but to remain for months on the border between Turkey, Iran and Iraq. In 
April 1991, the Kurdish political leadership decided to start negotiating with Iraq (Gunter 
1992). As expected, negotiations did not succeed. Following that, the US and its allies 
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intervened to provide humanitarian aid, and by expelling the Baath army from the North, 
they established a safe haven for the Kurds (Meiselas & van Bruinessen, 2008). This 
achievement was accompanied by the declaration of a ‘no-fly’ zone in northern Iraq which 
was eventually legalised by the UN Security Council as Resolution No. 688 adopted on 5 
April, 1991. This put an end to displacement and the refugees started to return back to their 
homes. 
2.2.2 Kurdistan Parliament and the establishment of Kurdistan Regional Government 
The Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq, is a unicameral assembly of legislation. It was established 
in 1992 and has functioned since then with a relatively stable legislative capacity. In 2005, 
the Kurdistan Parliament and the other political institutions of the KRI were adopted into 
the Iraqi constitution and are functioning according to the Iraqi constitution. 
[ Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force, and 
decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including court 
decisions and contracts, shall be considered valid unless they are amended or 
annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in 
the region, provided that they do not contradict the Constitution.] 
(Iraqi Constitution 2005, Article 141) 
The establishment of a parliament in the North of Iraq was based upon a decision taken by 
the Kurdistan National Front. The National front was basically a committee which 
consisted of all the representatives from Kurdistan’s political parties, most of them the 
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leading decision- makers. The committee then, took a decision to establish a Kurdistan 
Parliament and implement parliamentarian rule in the region. This decision was a unilateral 
declaration of federalism in Iraq without seeking willingness from Baghdad. The reason 
behind the necessity of establishing a ruling system was that after the uprising in Kurdistan 
Region the Iraqi officials and state institutions withdrew from the Kurdish cities in the 
North. Therefore, the region found itself in an administration vacuum and decided to 
replace it with local rule. Nonetheless, before the establishment of parliament and the 
Kurdistan Regional government, a delegation visited Baghdad hoping for an agreement 
with the Baath regime regarding the fate of the Kurdistan Region’s administration. At that 
time, the main demand of the Kurdish delegation was for an autonomous federal region 
within Iraq, much similar to the 1970s agreement between both sides. As expected, the 
Kurdish delegation’s request in Baghdad was rejected and there was no agreement. It was 
only after that that the Kurdistan National Front formed a committee of 15 experts to 
decide on an administrative system in the region. The committee produced a document that 
later on was adopted as Law No. 1 , 1992 of the parliament. The document, as mentioned, 5
was also a unilateral declaration of federal autonomy in the Kurdistan Region. Instantly, 
the unilateral declaration of federalism was denounced by Baghdad and neighbouring 
countries but that did not halt the Kurdish politicians from establishng their own regional 
government. As a result, there was a vote in 1992 for a one-chamber parliament, elected by 
direct vote every 4 years, inspired by the consolidated democracies. Later in 2009, the 
name of the parliament changed from Kurdistan National Assembly to Kurdistan 
Parliament-Iraq, through an amendment to the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament’s by-law.  





Immediately after its formation, the parliament started to adopt foundation and landmark 
laws to establish a council of ministers and ministries, and then granted a vote of 
confidence to the cabinet of the first Kurdistan Region’s government. Formation of the 
Kurdistan parliament in basic liberal democratic style could be considered the continuation 
of a wave that started in the world in the 1990s. The world in the 1990s was going through 
a transformation and ‘by the late nineties, 60 percent of the world’s independent states had 
become electoral democracies’ (Diamond, 2015: 142). On the one hand, this shift also 
refers to the fact that the Kurdish political leadership was more aware of the world around 
them and had better knowledge of world developments, which meant that the Kurdish 
leadership had a better understanding of the world and greater opportunities to 
communicate with the rapid changes in the world political system. On the other hand, this 
move towards democracy was also a giant step towards social change in the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq. Suddenly, millions of individuals participated actively in decision-making, 
which was never the case before.  
2.2.3. Formation of Kurdistan Parliament and de facto Autonomy 
As a result, on 19 May 1992, approximately one million voters  participated in 6
parliamentary elections in the three governorates of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq. 
The two main parties formed alliances and their final results were very close to each other. 
The KDP won 50.22 and PUK won 49.78 per cent of the vote (Aziz, 2011). The election 
process and its results were approved by the London-based organization, Electoral Reform 
  Total number of participation was declared as 971953 voters. For more information, see http://6
perleman.org/Default.aspx?page=page&c=Parliament-History1992 Retrieved on 15-06-2017
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Society, which announced the elections as free and fair with no evidence of substantial 
fraud that would have significantly affected the result (Romano, 2006). Following the 
elections the Kurdish National Assembly was established and started to adopt landmark 
laws that became the foundation stone of Kurdistan Regional Government. The political 
developments in the North of Iraq and the establishment of autonomous government was 
an irritant mainly to the neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Iran and Syria who 
presumed the Kurds would declare an independent state of their own (Bengio, 2005). As a 
result, these three neighbouring countries announced their common commitment to 
maintaining the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq (McDowall, 2005). As a result, the 
region and its system after the 1992 elections and the formation of the parliament remained 
as de facto autonomy. This practice of autonomy was never permissive by the government 
in Baghdad until the fall of Baath regime.  
The close results of the two winning parties made them decide to form a power-sharing 
consensus. It took the name of ‘Fifty-Fifty government’. The seats in the National 
Assembly were also shared between the two parties, 50 for PUK and 50 for KDP, out of 
105 seats. The remaining 5 seats were allocated to the Christian community in the region as 
quota seats. In 1992 the establishment of this de facto state was legitimised by the 
foundation of Kurdistan National Assembly , which is the parliament of the Kurdistan 7
Region of Iraq. Law No. 1  of the region instituted the one-chamber parliament, elected by 8
direct vote every 4 years, on the inspiration of the consolidated democracies. Now, more 
  Due to an amendment to the Kurdistan parliament’s by-law in 2009, the name changed from 7
Kurdistan national assembly to Kurdistan parliament-Iraq.





than two decades has passed and the parliament has been evolving continuously in both 
structure and content: re-shaping to adjust itself and to try to accommodate factors such as 
manifested intentions of independence from the central government, democratic 
aspirations, security and economic problems, local cultures, continuous struggles and 
learning of political elites.  
The situation in Iraq and Kurdistan shifted into a new reality after the US-led coalition to 
remove Baath party from power in Iraq. The Kurds, as one of the main opposition parties 
took part in the war against the regime and side by side with the coalition forces fought for 
a better future in Iraq. Later, the Kurds took part in rebuilding Iraq and drafting a 
constitution for all Iraqis.  
After the toppling of the Baath party from power in Iraq, under the supervision of the 
coalition forces, an Iraqi interim government was appointed. This government consisted of 
the representatives from different Iraqi ethnic and religious groups . The interim 9
government was supposed to be a committee of all Iraqis to draft a constitution. This 
constitution was ratified in 2005 , Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq was granted the power of 10
law-making as a regional parliament, on the condition that the legislation did not contradict 
  The Iraqi interim government was created on 28 June 2004, to govern the country until the 9
drafting of a new constitution. It was replaced with the Iraqi transitional government on 3 May 2005.
  For further information regarding the arrangements of the Iraqi Constitution, see John McGarry 10
and Brendan O’Leary (2005) Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law; Nathan J. Brown Senior Associate Carnegie (2005) The Final 
Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and Commentary Endowment for International Peace; Dodge, 
Toby (2005) Iraq's future: the aftermath of regime change. Adelphi Papers. 
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the Iraqi Constitution . The legislation of the federal parliament can be adopted in KRI 11
only in the region. Otherwise, in the KRI priority is given to the legislation and laws 
adopted by the Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq. The Iraqi Constitution recognises, among others, 
that the region of Kurdistan has the right to exercise legislative powers. In the case of a 
contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a matter outside the 
exclusive authorities of the federal government, the regional power has the right to amend 
the application of the national legislation within the region. Furthermore, the 2005 
Constitution recognises the legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan after 1992, ‘…
Provided that they do not contradict the Constitution.’ (Article 141). 
2.2.4. The terms of Kurdistan Parliament - Iraq (1992-2017)  
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq and its institutions function according to the laws and 
  The provisions in the Iraqi Constitution regarding the Region of Kurdistan are as follows: 11
 Article 116: The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, 
regions, and governorates, as well as local administrations. 
 Article 117: First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of 
Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region. 
 Article 121: First: The regional powers shall have the right to exercise executive , legislative, and 
judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the 
exclusive authorities of the federal government. 
 Second: In the case of any contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a 
matter outside the exclusive authorities of the federal government, the regional power shall have the right 
to amend the application of the national legislation within that region. 
 Third: Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of the national revenues 
sufficient to discharge their responsibilities and duties, but having regard to their resources, needs, and the 
percentage of their population. 
 Fourth: Offices for the regions and governorates shall be established in embassies and diplomatic 
missions, in order to follow cultural, social, and developmental affairs. 
 Fifth: The regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the 
region, particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such 
as police, security forces, and guards of the region. 
 Article 141: Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force, and 
decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including court decisions and contracts, 
shall be considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of 
Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided that they do not contradict the Constitution. 
 *See: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=230001 
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legislations of parliament. Law No. 1 1992  is the very first law legislated by the 12
Kurdistan Parliament. This law has been considered the foundation stone for the political 
system in KRI since 1992. The law was enacted and the first parliamentary term was voted 
in 1992 on the basis of a closed-party-list electoral system, with a minimum threshold of 
7% . The seventh amendment of the law in 2013 changed the system into a semi-open-13
party-list of proportional representation . Consequently, the last elections in 2013 were 14
based on a semi- open-party-list proportional representation system. In the vote for the 
fourth term, electors voted for a party list and also prioritised one candidate from the same 
list. After the election results are announced, each party is allocated seats in proportion to 
the number of received votes, using the order of top winning candidates on its list. 
The history of the Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq can be described by its ‘ups and downs’. The 
plenary has experienced so much instability that at times it resulted in conditions of 
instability in the country and the region. There were times when the sessions were not held 
due to political disputes and disagreements. At the same time, there have been glorious 
times, like the period of the civil war in KRI, when the parliament refused to be a part of 
the conflict and continued legislating. The first term of the parliament and government in 
1992 was formed upon a consensus between Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These were the first elections after the region declared 
unilateral autonomy within a federal system. This autonomy was declared in association 
 The law was drafted by a committee consisting of representatives of Kurdistan Front and then 12
passed and approved by the Kurdistan Front leadership. On 19 May 1992, approximately one million 
voters participated in parliamentary elections in the three governorates of the areas under Kurdish control 
in the northern part of Iraq. 
 Election Law No. 1, 1992: http://perleman.org/files/articles/010315072126.pdf  13
 First Amendment of the election law: http://perleman.org/files/articles/150915101618.pdf 
 Seventh amendment of the election law: http://perleman.org/files/articles/080713065045.pdf
 Law No. 15, 201314
!  55
with Law No. 1, 1992. Neither Baghdad nor any regional or international states agreed 
with this declaration of autonomy. Nevertheless, the region continued as a de facto 
autonomy. The main participants of the first elections were KDP and PUK. Seven other 
political parties took part in the elections: Islamic Union of Kurdistan (IUK), Kurdistan 
Communist Party, National Democratic Union of Kurdistan, Turkmen, Assyrians and 
Chaldeans, Social Democrats of Kurdistan, and Toilers party. This alliance won 
approximately 90% of the votes and the cabinet they formed was named as Unitary 
Government.  
The internal political crisis mainly caused by the civil war led to a delay in holding the 
second term elections on time. The elections for the second term of the parliament took 
place in 2005, more than nine years after the date they were supposed to be held, in 1998. 
Due to the fact that the 7% threshold was lifted and quota seats were added for the 
minorities, the number of parties that entered parliament was higher: besides the bigger 
KDP and PUK, smaller parties like Kurdistan Islamic Union, Communist Party of 
Kurdistan, YNDK, Turkmen, Assyrian, Social Democrats, Labors party, Islamic Group and 
Toilers party were able to win seats.  
The situation was different for the third term and in the elections of 2009. The elections for 
this term were held on time but at the same time the political map of the region faced a 
change. The previous alliance of majority seats in the parliament and the power-sharing 
between KDP and PUK came to an end, with less hope to get close to those results again. 
This was due to the major fracture inside the PUK, the split of a group that later created the 
Movement for Change (Gorran). This newly-founded party took part in the elections and 
managed to win 24% of the votes, while KDP and PUK together won 57% of the total 
votes. After the election the newly-founded party, Gorran, declared itself the opposition. 
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This move by the Change Movement had no precedent in the parliament and KRI 
government. It was the first time that a political party with a salient number of seats in the 
parliament became an opposition party. The change movement secured nearly 1/4 of the 
total seats in the 2009 elections. Besides these three parties, other parties such as 
Communist party, Islamic Movement, Islamic Union, Islamic Group, Social Democrats, 
Future Party, Rafidayn, National council of Chaldean, Assyrian, Ashuri, Turkmen 
Democratic Movement, Turkmen Brotherhood and Turkmen Reform Movement also won 
seats in parliament.  
The fourth term of parliamentary elections were held on 21 September 2013. The 
parliamentary parties for the fourth legislature were: KDP, PUK, Change Movement, 
Islamic Movement, Islamic Union, Islamic Group, Social democrat, Labors Party, 
Rafidayn, National council Chaldean, Assyrian, Ashuri, Abna Nahrain, Erbil Turkmen List, 
Turkmen Change and Renovation, Iraqi Turkmen Front and Turkmen Development. In 
these elections, all political parties ran with no previous alliance and none of them were 
able to win more than 50% of the seats required to form the cabinet. Thus, they needed 
coalitions and as a result a consensus of all parties formed the cabinet. Nevertheless, the 
political agreement between the parties did not last long and as a result the sessions of 
parliament were locked during this term, in October 2015. This happened after Gorran 
insisted on the amendment of the presidency law, advanced as being the solution for 
political crises in the region. At the beginning, this amendment was supported by the 
simple majority of parliament and it passed on its first hearing. But for the second hearing 
the simple majority which is needed for a session to be held was not complete and the 
session did not happen. As a result, the amendment attempts failed. Immediately after this, 
a number of demonstrations occurred in Sulaymaniyah governorate and its suburbs, 
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targeting KDP branches and offices in that area. KDP reportedly accused Gorran of being 
responsible for the attacks against its branches and offices. The tension between the two 
parties rose to such an extent that KDP announced that they would no longer recognise the 
president of parliament from Gorran, accusing him of being biased. On 12 October 2015, 
the president of the parliament was not allowed to enter Erbil, the capital city of the region. 
A week later, KDP reshuffled the coalition and the prime minister sacked the Gorran 
ministers from his cabinet. This led to the stalemate and the parliamentary sessions stopped 
being held.  
The parliament was only reactivated nearly two years later on 15 September 2017. This 
was the time when the political parties in the KRI were involved in holding a referendum 
on independence. The majority of the parties supportive of the referendum agreed to 
reactivate the parliament for a more legalised and legitimised atmosphere of the 
referendum. So, the session of parliament, reactivated after almost two years, was also to 
pass the legislation which instructed the High Election and Referendum Commission to 
hold a referendum on 25 September 2017, in the KRI and the areas outside the 
administration of the KRI (Disputed Territories). 
The parliament is made up of a number of fractions representing political parties. Each 
fraction is formed after the parliament members take the oath. The formation of the 
fractions is an internal issue for the political parties and usually the parties have a say in 
deciding the posts inside their fraction. However, the fractions tend to elect their president 
in a democratic way where members of a fraction vote for the presidency board. There are 
also other responsibilities to be distributed among the members of each fraction such as 
presidency and presidency board of the committees. This is also a process that is supposed 
to be held democratically inside the fractions but again, the party’s decision is final. 
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Members of each fraction are expected to be cohesive especially in the legislative voting 
process. Regarding the presidency unit of each fraction, for instance, the presidency of the 
KDP fraction, which is currently the largest one with 38 seats, consists of the president of 
the fraction, deputy president, coordinator and a spokesperson. The fractions abide by the 
orders and discipline of their political party through and the presidency board of fractions 
that are supposed to be in continuous contact with their political parties. There are issues 
being discussed at the parliament such as budget, new drafts and legislation that need the 
final decision of the political party. Usually it is the responsibility of the president of the 
fraction to ask the members of the fraction to be aware of acting cohesively in order to 
achieve the party goals in certain pieces of legislation. 
2.2.5. The internal war between KDP and PUK 
A consensus and sharing of power was intended to bring stability and harmony between the 
two parties, but did not last long. Two years later, in May 1994, the dispute between the 
two parties reached the level of armed clashes. 
The war between PUK and KDP automatically turned the Kurdistan Region into two war 
fronts, one in the KDP-controlled areas and the other in the PUK-controlled areas. At the 
beginning of the war the PUK headquarters in Duhok was captured by KDP, and KDP 
Branch 4 in Silemani was captured by the PUK fighters. These two areas, as with the two 
parties, formed their own determination: each of the two political parties had their own 
militia fighters. The division went deeper and they established their own government and 
other separate institutions in Erbil and Silemani. Not only that, but the two parties also 
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allied with neighbouring powers in attempts to defeat each other (Rogg & Rimscha, 2007). 
For instance, PUK sided with Iran and with the support of the Iran Revolutionary Guard 
(Sepahê Pâsdaran) was able to control much of the KRI territories. In mid August 1996, 
PUK forces with the support of the Iranian soldiers, reached Safin Mountain and controlled 
the city of Shaqlawa. After that they took over Salahaddin where the headquarters of KDP 
is located, and where most of its leaders including the Barzani family resided. This led the 
KDP to send a message to the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, asking for support. On 
31 August 1996, the Iraqi army reached Erbil and in a very short time the PUK frontline 
was defeated and the KDP regained control over Erbil and the surrounding areas. It made 
the situation more complicated when the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) started to attack the 
KDP. This allowed Turkey to find a place in the conflict and to fight its main foe, the PKK, 
inside the KRI. In other words, all the three neighbouring countries, Iraq, Iran and Turkey 
were fighting inside KRI and heating up the conflict between the main Kurdistan political 
parties.  
‘The dead heat between the KDP and the PUK merely underlined the manifold and 
overlapping antagonisms between the two parties: personal between the two leaders, 
geographical between Bahdinan and Suran, linguistic between Kurmanji and Surani, 
and ideological between “traditionist” and “progressive” cultures. The 
geographical pattern had been confirmed in the vote, with the KDP’s overwhelming 
sway in Dohuk, and the PUK’s supremacy in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk provinces’.  
 McDowall (2005: 385) 
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The civil war lasted for more than four years and during this period both parties appealed 
to the governments of Iraq and Iran to defeat each other and take areas under their control. 
In September 1996 a KDP-led government was announced at the National Assembly 
(Parliament) in Erbil. Equally, in January 1997, the PUK announced a new government in 
Silemani. This split the regional autonomous government into two parts and as a result the 
era of two governments emerged. The fractions were so deep that even though more than 
two decades passed, the two different Peshmerga forces remained divided under control of 
the two parties. Meanwhile, during the civil war both parties’ media claimed complete 
control over the whole Kurdistan region. An estimated 5000 fighters and civilians lost their 
lives and tens of thousands of families were displaced as a result of internal war in KRI 
(McDermid, 2010).  
There were numerous interventions by the US, France, and Iran that resulted in temporary 
ceasefires. Finally, in 1998, the Washington peace agreement was signed through the 
intervention of the US and the two parties agreed upon a ceasefire. This agreement was 
focused mainly on security and peace and it emphasised that the agreement between the 
two parties ‘would make the return to armed conflict less likely’ (Aziz, 2011: 87). The 
agreement did not put an end to two administrations and the split remained between the 
two co-rivals. During all this period the MPs on both sides agreed on several extensions of 
the parliament’s term until elections were possible. In October 2002 the MPs of both 
parties entered into a transitional session until elections in 2005. Besides, the MPs decided 
to pass the Law Number 16, 2002: a ratification of the Washington ceasefire agreement 
between KDP and PUK, in the Kurdistan National Assembly. 
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During the internal war, parliamentarians refused to be a part of it and stood against it. The 
members of both parties remained at the chamber in Erbil without getting involved in the 
war. Hence, parliament, for more than a decade, legislated for both administrations in Erbil 
and Sulaimani. At the beginning of the civil war, Jawhar Namiq, the president of Kurdistan 
National Assembly, who was a member of KDP politburo, released a statement clearly 
opposing the civil war between the two parties. Together with other members of parliament 
from both parties he went on a protest against the war. They opposed civil war fiercely and 
they staged a 103-day sit-in protest at Panagiri Hall inside Parliament. Although their 
protest did not put an end to the civil war, it nevertheless marked the important stance 
taken by MPs to engage in continuous cooperation rather than constantly stop the process 
of legislation. 
The impact of the civil war on the way the region is currently structured remains evident. 
The two parties showed their determination to reunify the two administrations in practice 
immediately after the peace agreement. The successive regular parliamentary elections in 
2005, 2009 and 2013, and the formation of the consensus government in Erbil were 
important steps towards removing signs of two administrations in the region. However, the 
armed forces, known as Peshmergas, remained as before under partisan authority. 
According to Law No. 1, 2005 (amended), the president of the region is commander in 
chief of the Peshmerga and armed forces (Article 13, 1). This remained the law on paper, 
but in practice each party, PUK and KDP, had their own Peshmergas under their command. 
After the 2009 elections and formation of the cabinet, the Ministry for Peshmerga was 
formed: mainly aiming at the reunification of the two parties’ Peshmergas and armed 
forces. At first, the two forces were put into the form of two units, unit 70 for PUK and unit 
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80 for the KDP Peshmergas. Similarly, Kurdistan Security Council was founded to gather 
both sides’ security and intelligence units under one umbrella. Nevertheless, all these 
attempts were useless and the two parties’ various forces continued to remain under the 
control and command of their partisan line.  
2.3. Kurdistan Region after 2003 
2.3.1 Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Kurds 2003-2013 
After all the tyrannical acts of the Baath regime against the Kurds in Iraq, the removal of 
this regime was a dream for the Kurds. In 2003, the Kurds were also partners of the US-led 
military intervention that aimed at the removal of Saddam Hussein and Baath regime from 
the power in Iraq. The US and allies were given the military support of the Kurds and also 
their agreement to use Kurdistan as a military base during Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(Lawrence 2008). Although the Kurdish autonomous government was one of the most 
remarkable achievements of the Kurdish National Movement, it left the region unstable, 
due to the internal conflict. However, this situation changed dramatically during and after 
the US-led intervention in Iraq, which forced KDP and PUK and their Peshmergas to work 
together (van Wilgenburg, 2012: 49). For the first time in the political history of Iraq the 
Kurds were given equal rights with Arabs to participate in Iraqi government. In June 
2004’s Transitional Government the Kurds were active participants. Then in the drafting 
committee of the Iraqi constitution the Kurds played an important role and their main focus 
was to guarantee a highly decentralised region. Marr (2012: 293) noted: ‘The Kurds 
worked to weaken the authority of the central government on issues such as taxation, 
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health, and education. In essence, the Kurds wanted a virtually independent state in the 
North in a voluntary union with Iraq – a confederation – with a right to secede. Even 
though they did not get this, they did manage to get a weak central government and a 
highly decentralised polity’. 
Kurds of Iraq supported the constitution of 2005 believing that this constitution met most 
of their demands. According to the Iraqi constitution, the Republic of Iraq has a ‘federal 
system that is made up of a decentralised capital, regions, and governorates, as well as 
local administrations’ (Iraq. Const. Art. 116). Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is a 
recognized region in the Iraqi constitution and the region is made up of three governorates: 
Erbil, Sulaimani and Duhok. KRI enjoys a constitutional legitimacy to adopt its own 
regional constitution that ‘defines the structure of powers of the region, its authorities, and 
the mechanisms for exercising such authorities’ (Iraq. Const. Art. 120). During the 2004 
referendum on the Iraqi Constitution, the Kurds held another, unofficial, referendum that 
collected 1,700,000 signatures in favour of secession from Iraq (Galbraith, 2005). Although 
the referendum was not official, the results were presented to the UN headquarters and the 
US administration. The results of this referendum were neglected and the attitude taken 
was mainly towards a united Iraq (Chorev, 2007). In the 2005 elections for the Iraqi 
Council of Representatives, the Kurds won 75 seats out of 275. 
Meanwhile, in the same year, 2005, the elections for the second term of Kurdistan 
Parliament-Iraq were held, thirteen years after the first. These were the first elections after 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. KDP and PUK built an alliance together with seven other 
political parties: Islamic Union of Kurdistan (IUK), Kurdistan Communist Party, National 
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Democratic Union of Kurdistan, Turkmens, Assyrians and Chaldeans, Social Democrats of 
Kurdistan, and Toilers party. This alliance won over 90% of the votes and the cabinet they 
formed was named the United Cabinet. 
The Kurds have been able to guarantee more independence within the constitution of Iraq. 
According to the Iraqi Constitution , Kurdistan Parliament has the authority to legislate as 15
a regional parliament dealing with different areas in a condition that they do not contradict 
with the Constitution . The legislation of the federal parliament can be enacted in 16
Kurdistan but in areas related to Kurdistan Region of Iraq the priority is given to the 
legislation and laws of Kurdistan Parliament. The Iraqi Constitution recognises, among 
others, that the region of Kurdistan has the right to exercise legislative powers. In case of a 
contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a matter outside the 
  For more information regarding the arrangements of the Iraqi Constitution, see John McGarry 15
and Brendan O’Leary (2005) Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription, 
International Journal of Constitutional Law; Nathan J. Brown Senior Associate Carnegie (2005) The Final 
Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and Commentary Endowment for International Peace; Dodge, 
Toby (2005) Iraq's future: the aftermath of regime change. Adelphi Papers. 
  The provisions regarding the region of Kurdistan in the Iraqi Constitution are as follows: 16
 Article 116: The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, 
regions, and governorates, as well as local administrations. 
 Article 117: First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of 
Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region. 
 Article 121: First: The regional powers shall have the right to exercise executive, legislative, and 
judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the 
exclusive authorities of the federal government. 
 Second: In case of contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a matter 
outside the exclusive authorities of the federal government, the regional power shall have the right to 
amend the application of the national legislation within that region. 
 Third: Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of the national revenues 
sufficient to discharge their responsibilities and duties, but having regard to their resources, needs, and the 
percentage of their population. 
 Fourth: Offices for the regions and governorates shall be established in embassies and diplomatic 
missions, in order to follow cultural, social, and developmental affairs. 
 Fifth: The regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the 
region, particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such 
as police, security forces, and guards of the region. 
 Article 141: Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force, and 
decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including court decisions and contracts, 
shall be considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of 
Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided that they do not contradict the Constitution.
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exclusive authorities of the federal government, the regional power has the right to amend 
the application of the national legislation within the region. Furthermore, the 2005 
Constitution recognises the legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan after 1992 
‘provided that they do not contradict the Constitution’ (Article 141). 
Anyone aged 18 or over who is a citizen of the Kurdistan Region and is on the electoral 
register is eligible to vote in a direct, universal and secret ballot. Anyone aged 25 or over 
who is a citizen of the Kurdistan Region and is on the electoral register is also eligible to 
put his/herself forward as a candidate for the parliamentary elections. Elections for the 
Kurdistan Parliament are based on a semi open party-list proportional representation 
system. Electors vote for a party’s list and the voter can also prioritise one candidate inside 
the same list . After the election results are announced, each party is allocated seats in 17
proportion to the number of votes it received, using the order of top winning candidates on 
its list. Nowadays, at least, since 2005, elections are held every four calendar years. 
In the 2013 elections, parties took part with no previous alliance and not surprisingly none 
of them were able to guarantee the majority of the seats to form the cabinet. Thus, they 
made a consensus of five major parties and with participation of the Christian minority 
quota the Cabinet of Consensus was formed. 
The parliament’s fourth term was to be concluded by 1 November 2017. A week before the 
termination of the fourth term the parliament held a session on 24 October and extended its 
term for two legislative terms which is eight months. This means that the elections for the 
    The electoral system used to be a closed-party list proportional in 2005 and 2009 17
elections but the law was amended in 2013 and the new amendment proposed a semi open-party list of 
proportional representation. See more at http://perleman.org/files/articles/080713065045.pdf Retrieved on 
15-06-2017
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presidential and parliamentary elections are postponed for eight months. On 29 October, 
President of KRI Masoud Barzani sent a letter to the parliament refusing to stay in office 
during any extensions. As a result, Parliament passed legislation and distributed the powers 
and authorities of the president among the Parliament, the Cabinet and the Judiciary 
CSouncil.  
2.3.2 Economic system and economic development of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
Concerning the economy, the KRI has seen development in petroleum wealth and natural 
resources in the years after the new constitution. Article 112 of Iraqi constitution is in 
accordance with the region Oil and Gas Law approved by Kurdistan Parliament in 2007 . 18
These legal basis are the ones that region’s officials claim as their legitimate right to 
maintain, manage and produce their own natural resources. The president of the KRI stated 
“The Kurdistan Region hasn’t taken a single step in violation of the constitution, we are 
only practicing our rights.”  The central government, however, is against the KRI policy 19
of natural resources that leads to economic independence. Kurdistan Regional government 
and central government in Baghdad are in ongoing disputes over the legalities, terms and 
methods of the oil and gas contracts signed in Erbil (International Crisis Group, 2008). 
After all, this has not stopped the KRI to be an attractive cite for international major oil 
companies to sign numerous agreements of cooperation and extraction with ministry of 
natural resources of the regional government. As Gunter (2011:104) stated: "Given the 
  See Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq available at: http://www.krp.org/uploadedforms/18
_OilGasLaw_en.pdf Retrieved 15 June 2017 
 See also Kurdistan Region of Iraq Investors Map available at: http://www.oryxpetroleum.com/uploads/
PDF/Kurdistan_Region_of_Iraq_Investors_Map.pdf  
Retrieved 15 June 2017
  http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/26022014    Retrieved 15 June 201719
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KRG region’s progressive investment law, free market practices and excellent security 
situation relative to the rest of Iraq, foreign direct investment in the region exploded". 
According to the Iraqi constitution the region is granted an annual budget of 17% from the 
federal budget. KRI officials claim that they have never received 17%: what received was 
between 10% and 12%. In January 2014, the Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki signed 
an order to cut the wages, salaries and budget of the KRI. After this, several meetings 
between the two sides were held to tackle the problem but the federal government did not 
agree to resend the KRI share. Four months later the first crude oil shipment of KRI was 
sold on the international market. KRI officials refer to this as the only solution to maintain 
the economy of the region while the central government blocks the budget share. During 
the same year in June, Islamic State terrorist group took control of several parts of Iraq in 
the South and centre of Iraq. This led to the displacement of thousands of Iraqi families. 
The majority of the internally displaced Iraqis found refuge in the KRI. Two months later 
the Islamic State advanced towards the North and attacked the KRI. As a result the KRI by 
the beginning of 2015 had a population of more than 1.5 million refugees and IDPs, more 
than 1000 kilometers of frontline with ISIS and a budget cut from Baghdad. Meanwhile, 
the oil prices internationally went down, which, together with other mentioned factors led 
to inability of the region to pay even the salaries of public employees.  
The landlocked reality of the region has made it dependent on Turkey, as a neighboring 
country through which the KRI oil is mainly exported via pipelines and through Turkish 
harbours. As a non-state and non-sovereign entity, the KRI unlike other exporters of oil, is 
also limited in its international loans and sovereign wealth funds (Mills and Sen, 2016). 
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Despite all this, the KRI is recognised as a wealthy region with high potential in energy 
sectors and with the capacity to distribute or redistribute wealth, according to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit . 20
2.3.3 Erbil and Baghdad relations after 2003 
The 2005 constitution of Iraq enshrines a decentralised federal state in Iraq. In the 
preamble, the Iraqi constitution identifies the Iraqi government as being a ‘republican, 
federal, democratic, pluralistic system’. In Article 47, separation of power is taken as a 
principle of government in Iraq. This constitution grants the ‘Region’ status of Kurdistan 
Regional Government in Article 117. In Article 141, the constitution recognises all the 
‘legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force’ and also 
the decisions taken by the government in KRI ‘to be considered valid’. Basically, when 
looking at the text of this constitution there appears to be no problem at all but when it 
comes to its implementation, it is another story. The reality is that this constitution with the 
main principle of decentralisation is to be implemented by those who as a majority believe 
in full centralisation. This has led the Iraqi constitution to be relinquished while the 
preamble refers to ‘the adherence to this Constitution’ as a condition so that ‘preserves for 
Iraq its free union of people, of land, and of sovereignty.’ The first dispute between 
Baghdad and Erbil after 2005 was over the implementation and respect of the constitution. 
Article 140 carried the solution for disputed territories between Baghdad and Erbil to be 
solved by a referendum to be held in those areas ‘by a date not to exceed the 31st of 
December 2007’: the authorities in Baghdad refused to hold the referendum and as a result 
disputes started.  
  See more at http://www.italy.krg.org/21062014E.html Retrieved on 15 June 2017 20
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In the same year, the parliament of Kurdistan Region of Iraq adopted the Oil and Gas Law 
22/2007 . The law justifies the rights of KRI to progress energy industry by referring to 21
the principles of the Iraqi constitution. Articles 115 and 121 of the constitution grant the 
exclusive and legislative powers to decide on the new contracts and agreements concerning 
the natural resources of the region. Furthermore, the KRI Gas and Oil Law refers to 
Articles 111 and 112 of the constitution which grants the ownership of the newly-explored 
oil wells. This law could be considered as the start of institutionalising and localising the 
oil and gas field in KRI. At the same time it could be considered as the inception of the 
main dispute between Baghdad and Erbil. The disagreement on both sides came at the 
moment when Baghdad cut the budget share, wages and salaries of KRI. 
One of the main deficiencies of the system in KRI is the absence of a constitution for the 
region to regulate the political system. The draft Kurdistan constitution was finalised in 
2009, but due to some disagreements among the political parties, a new committee for 
redrafting was established in 2015. This committee consisted of 21 members intending to 
represent the diversity in the Kurdistan region: however the committee members and their 
representation were fully politicized. The committee had 90 days to finalize the draft, but 
due to disagreements between the main parties, the committee stopped its work shortly 
after its creation. Besides the intra-group misunderstandings, there is no large pressure for 
this constitution to come into being, because a constitution of Kurdistan would unveil and 
expose the intentions of independence of the region, which intentions are not accepted by 
the central federal government of Iraq. Hence, issuing a constitution would escalate the 
 The English version of the law is available at: http://cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/21
Kurdistan%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Law%20English__2007_09_06_h14m0s42.pdf  Retrieved 20 June 
2017
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conflict even more with the central government. These factors hamper the emergence of an 
Iraqi Kurdistan constitution, maintaining it in a stand-by non-legal draft.  
Otherwise, the region made the necessary preparations to hold an independence 
referendum. The president of KRI Masoud Barzani held a meeting with Kurdistan political 
parties on 7 June 2017. The decision of this meeting was to hold the referendum on 25 
September 2017 . Immediately after, on 8 June 2017, president Barzani issued a 22
presidential order  addressing the Independent Commission of Elections to make the 23
necessary preparations to hold a referendum for Kurdistan Independence on 25 September 
2017. This decision drew local and international reactions. Fuad Hussein, chief of staff of 
the Kurdistan President stated, ‘The Kurds have the right to self-determination as a right 
endorsed by the United Nations and as a people who have their land, language, culture, 
history and identity’. The decision to hold the referendum was not welcomed by the Iraqi 
officials in Baghdad. ‘Any decision that concerns the future of Iraq must take into 
consideration the constitutional texts, as it is an Iraqi decision,’ said Saad al-Hadithi, the 
spokesperson of the Prime Minister of Iraq. Prime minister of Iraq Hider al-Abadi also said 
that it was not the right time faor referendum. ‘The desire of our Kurdish brothers to create 
a country of their own is their right given the desire and the objective and nobody has the 
right to deter them. But holding a referendum at this time is not right as the ISIS war still 
rages, the region’s situation is not suitable and some neighbouring countries believe this 
move poses a threat to their own nations security’. 
Binali Yildirim, the prime minister of Turkey in a press conference on 9 June 2017 told 
  President Masoud Barzani in a tweet on 7 June 2017 posted ‘I am pleased to announce that the 22
date for the independence referendum has been set for Monday, 25 September 2017’. Link to the tweet: 
https://twitter.com/masoud_barzani/status/872496589868290049 
  KRI Presidential Order Number 106 of the year 2017, for more information, see http://23
www.kdp.info/a/d.aspx?l=13&a=101036 Retrieved on 12 June 2017.
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journalists that ‘We want a united Iraq. Iraq belongs to all Iraqis as one state. We already 
have many problems in the region. We do not want to have a new problem added’. Overall, 
the reactions at the regional and international level similarly focused on the unity of Iraq. 
2.4. Kurdistan Independence Referendum 
Kurdistan Independent High Election and Referendum Commission (KHEC), also referred 
to as Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission (IHERC), was established 
according to Law No. 4, 2014 adopted by Parliament of Kurdistan-Iraq. The drafting of the 
law started immediately after the address of President Barzani to Parliament on 3 July 
2017, when he requested Parliament to form a referendum committee and pass the law for 
the KRI electoral commission. Twenty days later, the law  was passed in a popular vote in 24
parliament, and according to the law the commission was to be established within ninety 
days. The establishment of this body and formation of a referendum committee was 
initially the result of the intention of the KRI political leadership to hold a referendum of 
Independence. However, this did not go ahead as planned, and it was only ten days later 
that ISIS took over the city of Sinjar and the direction of the fighting moved towards the 
North of Iraq and Kurdistan Region. This meant the region had to defend more than one 
thousand kilometres of frontline from ISIS (Wintour, 2016). As a result, the KRI entered 
the war and the only priority for the region for more than two years was the war against 
terror. KRI Peshmergas in those two years fought in cooperation with international allies 
and the Iraqi army, and liberated most of the areas which were under ISIS control. After 
that, the region and its political leaders restarted their plan that was initiated before the 
ISIS attack in 2014. 
 The PDF version of the law is available at: http://perleman.org/files/articles/020914010617.pdf24
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On 7 June 2017, after a meeting of political parties headed by Masoud Barzani, president 
of KRI, they decided that a referendum on independence would be held on Monday, 25 
September 2017. Later a referendum committee was formed, mainly from the attendees of 
this meeting and representatives of a number of other political parties and ethnic groups. 
Although one of the four points of the declaration of the first meeting was to ‘hold the 
efforts together in order to reactivate Kurdistan parliament’ , in fact the decision was 25
taken at a time when the Kurdistan Parliament was still ‘frozen’. The Parliament had not 
sat for almost two years due to the disputes between the political parties mainly KDP and 
Gorran. These disputes were not solved by the time this meeting was held and as a result 
the two main political parties, Change Movement (Gorran) and Islamic Groug (Komal), 
refused to take part in the meeting headed by Barzani. The two parties subsequently 
declared that the decision undertaken by this meeting was illegal and that the only place to 
decide on such a fateful matter as holding a referendum was in parliament. The two parties 
have repeatedly refused to take part in the joint meetings of KRI political parties 
(Referendum Committee) stating that the ‘high priority is to activate the parliament’ . The 26
committee in the following meeting that was held on 30 June, made a statement  with 27
three points. The second point of the statement was to reactivate the parliament in two 
weeks. This did not happen in two weeks as well and the parliament was only able to have 
its first session after one month and two weeks. On 15 September, the parliament session 
was held after more than two years of closed doors. This session was held as an 
 See the statement of the political parties’ meeting at: http://presidency.krd/kurdish/articledisplay.aspx?25
id=ovrdCltbCxg=
 The official statement of Gorran spokesperson is found at: http://www.gorran.net/en/Detail.aspx?26
id=12447&LinkID=128
 The statement is found at: http://presidency.krd/kurdish/articledisplay.aspx?id=BWd4AEWj3N8=27
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extraordinary session to support the referendum and was also considered as the reactivation 
session of the Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq. The session passed a resolution that delegated the 
Kurdistan Independent High Election and Referendum Commission to hold a referendum 
in the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistani territories outside the Region’s 
Administration  due to the acting related laws in KRI.  28
2.4. The Question and the implementation 
‘Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the areas of Kurdistan outside the region's 
administration to become an independent state?’ The question was in Kurdish, Arabic, 
Turkmen, and Assyrian languages. The term ‘the areas of Kurdistan outside the region's 
administration’ was introduced politically to replace the term ‘disputed areas’. The 
disputed areas referred to the unsolved dispute between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad 
over territories which both sides claim. According to Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution 
this dispute was supposed to be overcome through a referendum to be held in Kirkouk and 
other disputed territories by a date not to exceed 31 December 2007.  
[… this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalization and 
census that concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to 
determine the will of their citizens, by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 
2007]  
Article 140, Iraqi Constitution, 2005 
The issue of the disputed territories and the unwillingness of the central government to 
solve it is considered, among others, as the main dispute between Erbil and Baghdad. The 
regional government has accused the centre of violating the constitution and more 
 The parliament delegates the commission to hold the referendum at its first meeting after reactivation. 28
See the details at: http://perleman.org/Default.aspx?page=article&id=23494&l=3
!  74
specifically the articles related to the regional government. The violation of the constitution 
as claimed by the KRI has been committed by successive Iraqi prime ministers, ministers, 
council of representatives, the Shura Council, Judiciary and Military . The region accuses 29
the central government of violating or not fulfilling over 55 articles out of 144 articles of 
the constitution. 
Table 2: Violation of the Iraqi constitution claimed by the KRI 
Source: www.cabinet.gov.krd   
Section of the 
Constitution
Number of violated 
or unfulfilled articles
Number of Articles 
for which required 









14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 
32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 
43, 44, 46
21, 22, 28 23 articles out of 32
Federal Powers 48, 49 (1), 61 5C, 65, 
80, 87, 88
61 9C, 65, 84 (1), 85, 
86, 92 (2) 
10 out of 53 articles
Independent 
Commissions
102, 103, 104 105, 106, 107, 108 7 out of 7 articles
Powers of the federal 
government
109, 110 (9), 111, 112, 
115, 117, 118, 119, 
121, (1, 3, 5), 125 




130, 132, 135 (1), 136 
(1), 137, 140, 141 
132 (3), 142 8 out of 18 articles
Total 67 out of 144 articles 
which is 47% of the 
constitution
 The full report of violations of constitution committed by the Iraqi government is found at: http://29
cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/2017/Constitutional_violations_Sept_24_2017.pdf
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The political leadership in Kurdistan mainly argued that the results of the referendum will 
be negotiated with Baghdad in a peaceful way. Meanwhile, they focused on the rhetoric 
that the will and determination of the people of Kurdistan Region concerning a referendum 
vote shall be respected. Nevertheless, Baghdad repeatedly called for the non-holding of the 
referendum as irresponsible and not timely. The neighbouring countries reacted in an even 
harsher manner calling on KRI authorities not to hold an independence referendum as it 
was a ‘grave mistake’ . 30
Islamic Republic of Iran which is considered another strategic neighbour of the KRI stated 
its opposition to the referendum of independence. The country declared its adherence to the 
unity and integrity of Iraq as tweeted by the Iranian supreme leader Khameneyi ‘Iran 
opposes holding talks of a referendum to partition Iraq and considers those who fuel the 
idea as opponents of Iraq's independence.’  31
However, despite all the pressures from Baghdad and neighbouring countries, the 
referendum was held in the KRI and Kurdistan territories outside the KRI, as referred to as 
the ‘disputed territories’. The region’s authorities specified that the vote in the disputed 
territories was not to determine the fate of those areas and the issue was to be negotiated 
with Baghdad. At the same time Baghdad refused all negotiations with the KRI after 
holding the referendum. The majority of disputed territories had been under the control of 
the KRI since early 2016. ISIS took over those areas in 2014 after the Iraqi army withdrew 
from most of the areas without any confrontation. Therefore, the areas were no longer 
under the control of the Iraqi army after being liberated by the KRI Peshmergas.  
 See Binali Yildirim’s statement at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/news/turkish-pm-condemns-30
irresponsible-iraqi-kurdistan-referendum-vote-92163096
 Ali Khameneyin, the supreme leader of Islamic republic of Iran’s tweet on the referendum in Kurdistan 31
Region of Iraq: https://twitter.com/khamenei_ir/status/877229666830045184
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As explained before, the Kurdistan Independent High Election and Referendum 
Commission was the authorised body to carry out the referendum in KRI (KHEC). Due to 
the provisions of Section One of Article 56 Law No. 1, 1992 (amended) and under the 
legislation adopted by Kurdistan Parliament on its ordinary session No. 18 dated 23 July 
2014, the Kurdistan Parliament passed Law No. 4, 2014 establishing KHEC. The 
commission was ready to hold the referendum and all the required preparations were made 
including the participation of international and local monitors and observers . 32
Despite all the pressure the KRI went ahead with the decision and the referendum was held 
on 25 September 2017. The results of the referendum as expected were 92.7% votes in 
favour of an independent Kurdistan with registered voters turnout of 72.8% . Immediately 33
after the referendum, the central government reacted harshly. Baghdad refused any kind of 
negotiations with Erbil and instead applied sanctions on the region including the closure of 
borders, in cooperation with neighbouring countries, and an airport ban. The embargoes 
continued as the only condition by the centre for the start of negotiations with the region 
was to nullify the referendum. Meanwhile, the region rejected cancelling the referendum 
results as urged by Baghdad.  
2. 5 Political Parties in the KRI 
2. 5.1 Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was founded on 16 August1946. It is considered 
the very first party to struggle systematically for the rights of the Kurds in Iraq. The 
 A sample of registration for the international observers and monitors to take part in KRI referendum: 32
http://campaign.r20.constantcontact.com/render?m=1102913833397&ca=2954c5e3-2934-487c-b1bd-
c79d21ec97b9
 For full report of results, see http://www.khec.krd/pdf/173082892017_english%202.pdf33
!  77
establishment of KDP brought a change in the Kurdistan Region’s political life and had an 
impact on its development. KDP held its foundation congress in Baghdad on 16 August 
1946. KDP was founded by the Kurdish revolutionary leader Mustafa Barzani, from a 
tribal family leadership background in Barzan area. In 1979, Barzani died and the 
leadership passed to his son, Masoud Barzani who also, until the present moment, is the 
president of the KRI, and has been since the 2005 elections. According to Stansfield (2003) 
the circumstances that helped the establishment of the KDP were a combination of tribal 
militancy, the development of an urban Kurdish intelligence that promoted Kurdish 
nationalism, and the particular role that Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the Barzani tribe 
played. Currently, Masoud Barzani, the President of the Kurdistan Region is also President 
of KDP. According to the presidency law, 2005, the president was to be elected in the 
parliament in a confidential vote. The law was amended in 2009 and Barzani was re-
elected in a direct vote winning nearly 70% of the votes. In 2013 his two terms were 
concluded and, by law, he could not run again. His term was extended by a law passed in 
the Kurdistan Parliament in 2013 after a majority of the KRI political parties, mainly PUK, 
requested him to stay in office. In 2015, the extended two years also terminated but a new 
presidential election was not held. Then the term was extended again until the next election 
in 2017. In the 2013 elections the party won 38 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament. 
2.5.2 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was formed on 1 June 1975 in Damascus, Syria. 
Jalal Talabani, a former secretary general of KDP Students Union is considered the main 
founder of PUK. The party was founded after a breakup of Talabani with a number of other 
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prominent members from KDP in 1975. The party has been led by Jalal Talebani until 
today. Jalal Talabani was elected as President of Iraq in 2005 and was re-elected in 2010 
for a second term. He suffered a stroke in December 2012. After that, Fuad Masoum, 
another founding leader from PUK was nominated and elected as President of Iraq in 2014. 
The PUK and KDP since 2005 had an agreement of power-sharing where both parties 
agreed to rule the KRI and act as an influential bloc in Baghdad. As a result, they ran 
together as the Democratic Patriotic Alliance and won a majority of seats in Kurdistan 
Parliament and secured an influential fraction in Baghdad. This came to an end in 2009 
with the formation of the Change Movement (Gorran) as it fractured the PUK. In the 2013 
elections the party won 18 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament. 
2.5.3 The Change Movement (Gorran) 
The two parties, KDP and PUK, majority and duopoly continued until the parliamentary 
elections in 2009. Then, a new political power entered the competition. The Change 
Movement (Gorran) emerged as a separate group from the PUK. The movement was led by 
Nawshirwan Mustafa, former deputy secretary general of PUK. Mustafa was one of the 
main decision-makers and leaders of PUK who also had enough influence to form a new 
political reality in the region. The new party won 1/4 of the seats in the Kurdistan 
Parliament, with 25 seats in the 2009 elections. After that they decided to remain as an 
opposition party. This was the first time in the history of the KRI that a party declared itself 
the opposition. The situation changed after the 2013 elections, when almost no alliance 
took place prior to the elections and then no party won a sufficient majority to form the 
cabinet alone. The Change Movement won 24 seats in the 2013 elections and entered a 
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consensus of five main political parties together with KDP, PUK, Islamic Union and 
Islamic Group. Within this consensus, Gorran participated in power-sharing for the first 
time since its establishment. The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defence, and the 
Presidency of the Parliament were among the Gorran’s notable portfolios in the 2013 
consensus. This agreement, however, lasted less than two years at which point the party 
was accused, mainly by KDP, of not respecting the consensus. 
2.5.4 The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) 
In 1994 the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) was established by a group of Kurds with a 
religious background. The party’s most influential character was Salahaddin Bahaaddin 
who became its first Secretary-General. KIU is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood 
and their main ideology is to form a state of Islam that at the same time is underpinned by 
democratic values. The party is the most influential Islamic political party in the region. 
During the 2013 elections it won 10 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament .  34
Conclusion 
In this chapter a historical and political review of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is 
presented. It explains the current situation in the KRI and its status as a part of Iraq. To 
conclude, first, the Kurds have not been able to demonstrate unity within Iraq. Different 
parties with different agenda and interests have been in continuous dispute, the most 
obvious being the civil war in 1994 between PUK and KDP over revenues. The failure to 
  All the elections results are found at http://perleman.org/Default.aspx?page=page&c=xol4, 34
retrieved on 20 June 2017
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retain unity among the Kurds has prevented the KRI from reaching its greater goals such as 
full autonomy, independence.  
Second, the formation of the Kurdistan Parliament on a liberal democratic model can be 
considered as a continuation of the world transformation towards democracy. This shift not 
only introduced a new political system but also heralded a great step towards social change 
in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The new system was a hopeful step towards the end of 
tribalism, had it only lasted longer and the civil war not occurred two years later.  
Third, the regional powers have also used the Kurds in Iraq to further their own interests. 
For instance, the Shah of Iran used the Kurds against the Iraqi government before the 
Algiers Agreement. After the agreement between Iran and Iraq in 1974 the Kurdish 
Peshmergas were left with no support. This led to the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of Kurds in the North of Iraq. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran again 
made use of the Kurds against the Saddam Regime. However, this could be argued as being 
in favour of the Kurds, as the ancient proverb says that the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend.  
Fourth, the ongoing clashes between Iraq and the Kurds, with little intention of 
reconciliation on Baghdad’s part, strengthened the rebels in Kurdish areas day after day; 
while Iraq’s involvement in other regional conflicts, on the other hand, such as the eight-
year Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait, were factors that weakened Baghdad. 
Continuous conflicts and wars left Iraq in a more fragile condition than ever to confront the 
establishment of a Kurdish autonomous entity in 1991.  
!  81
Fifth, beside the fragility of Baghdad due to continuous wars, the Kurds made use of the 
creation of the no-fly zone and safe haven. This drew a separation line between Iraq and 
the KRI for more than a decade. This division helped the KRI to establish its own character 
in the region and take steps towards building institutions.  
Sixth, the level of trust between the Kurds and the Iraqi rulers is very low. From the 
monarchy until today Kurdish rights have been denied. In the same way that the former 
ruling Iraqi regimes suppressed the Kurds, the current government does the same through 
the cutting of budget share, wages and salaries. This mistrust between the elites has been 
transferred to the public as a belief that there is no hope for a better future for Kurds within 
Iraq. This was further confirmed in 2004, when 1.7 million Kurds in the KRI signed to 
secede from Iraq. Today the setting of 25 September 2017, as the date scheduled for the 
holding of a referendum on Independence in the KRI, is also another indicator that the 
Kurds of Iraq believe in secession rather than remaining part of the current nation state. 
Seventh, the KRI with its underlying natural resources such as oil and gas is seen as an 
important economic area. With such an abundance of resources in the region, and the 
extent to which autonomy and de-centralisation has been guaranteed in the Iraqi 
constitution, the Kurds are now in a stronger position than ever in Iraq. This enabled the 
Kurds to respond to the economic sanctions imposed by Baghdad, especially in early 2014. 
Since then, practical steps towards economic independence from Baghdad have been taken. 
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Eighth, political disputes and disagreements are still at a level that seriously damages the 
political system. The Kurdistan Parliament entered into freeze mode for nearly two years 
over the disputed views between the main parties regarding the political system. This also 
highlights the fragility of the political system in the KRI especially in the absence of a 
constitution.  
Ninth, the historical dream of the Kurds is still undimmed and they would use any 
opportunity to reach it. The referendum for an independent Kurdistan has been planned by 
the KRI politicians and they called for it at the moment they could afford to do so. Despite 
the brutal reactions that followed, the outcomes and results of this referendum have 
provided the Kurds with a legitimate card to demand their natural right of self-
determination - democratically. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE FORMATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESS IN THE KURDISTAN 
REGION OF IRAQ (1961 - 2014)  
Introduction 
The existence of the Kurdish press was dependent on the evolution of political movements 
and political circumstances. Hassanpour (1992) states that the Kurdish press is ‘the organ 
of Kurdish nationalism’ (p. 221). Or in the words of Ahmadzadeh (2003): ‘the emergence 
of journalism among the Kurds marks the beginning of their movement for national rights’. 
However, the Kurdish press has witnessed developments over time in line with 
developments of Kurdish national movements. Therefore, with the understanding that the 
development of the Kurdish press went hand in hand with development of Kurdish politics, 
this chapter is divided into three periods: the first being rebellion press (1961-1991). This 
period started when the press was a means of communicating revolution. It started with the 
rise of Kurdish revolution in 1961 and lasted until the uprising in 1991. The second period 
was partisan press (1991-2003). The uprising brought the revolutionaries and their press 
down from the mountains into cities in northern parts of Iraq. During this period the press 
worked as a partisan mouthpiece for the main two political parties. These two parties 
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entered a civil war during this period and their press was used as a means for attack and 
war. The third period was press of autonomy: following laws and legislation (2003-2014). 
In this period, Kurdistan Region of Iraq was granted regional autonomous status according 
to the Iraqi constitution. During this time a number of important press-related laws were 
adopted. This period lasted until the rise of the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL).  
Rebellion press refers to the period during the, and especially in the aftermath of, World 
War II and the end of the Iraqi monarchy. This period is explained through the times of the 
mountain revolution especially from 1961 to 1991. Here is presented the rebellion press in 
the years between 1961 to 1970 that is also known as the September Revolution  and the 35
period which is known as the May Revolution  from 1971-1991. The second period, 36
partisan press, is related to more than a decade of a de-facto autonomous region in Iraq 
starting from 1991 until the fall of Baath regime in Iraq in 2003. The third period as press 
of autonomy will be explained after the adoption of press-related laws and regulations. This 
started mainly in the years following the establishment of the Kurdistan Parliament in 1992 
and continued after the fall of the Baath regime in 2003. 
  September Revolution (Shorishi Eylul): The first organised rebellion against the Iraqi 35
government led by Molla Mustafa Barzani. It lasted from 1961-1970. 
  May Revolution (Gulan Revolution) after the collapse of the September Revolution especially by 36
the end of the Cold War and the new Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran, the Kurds of Iraq entered 
a new era of revolution. This period is known as the May Revolution. It took place as a mountain 
rebellion from 1971-1991.
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3.1 First period: Rebellion press: the press during the days of mountain rebellions 
(1961-1991) 
The first period is explained by giving a historical background to the rise of the press in the 
mountains during the revolution. Developments of such a press are discussed in terms of 
moving towards a means of spreading nationalism among those rebelling in the mountains 
and also among the people within cities, despite all the restrictions. This period covers the 
times of rebellion for the Kurdish movement when a secret press and mountain press 
emerged. During the time of revolution special attention was paid to the press and 
communications: the leadership of the movement understood its importance. Therefore, 
newspapers, magazines, and manifestos were continuously issued and distributed. 
Distribution was not limited to the mountain rebels but also it was secretly sent and 
distributed among the people within cities. The mountain rebels in this period also 
managed to launch a mobile radio station. This was another method of spreading the 
message and the ideology of the movement in a more practical manner. The radio was very 
basic, using an AM radio transmitter. The station was mobile, changing its position 
according to the Peshmergas’ position. The frequency of the radio station was also 
moveable. The state continuously attempted to silence the mountain station through various 
means such as broadcasting parasite censors. The position of the radio was attacked 
numerous times and the radio changed position from one cave and mountain to another. 
The station opened a place in the heart of Kurdish people inside the cities and also those in 
exile in the border cities of Iran and Turkey. The audience waited on a daily basis for the 
radio transmission to start so they could hear the latest developments in the revolution and 
about Peshmerga victories.  
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The revolution and the Kurdish resistance against the Iraqi government was continuous but 
there were times when both sides reached a ceasefire and short-term agreements. The 
agreements did not last long because the Iraqi government called for negotiations and 
ceasefires only at the times when they were weak. The agreements were easy for Baghdad 
to violate after finding themselves again in a position of strength. After the 1958 revolution 
in Iraq known as the Republican Coup against the Hashemite monarchy, Abdulkareem 
Qasim, the new prime minister and his government showed openness towards Kurdish 
people and their rights (Dawisha, 2009: 171-183). Therefore, upon their invitation on 6 
October 1958, Mustafa Barzani returned from exile (Barzani, 1998: 158). Barzani and his 
followers had spent more than a decade within the Soviet Union (Sluglett, 1987: 79-82). 
Immediately afterwards, on 4 April 1959, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was 
allowed by the government to launch its daily newspaper, Khabat, as the mouthpiece of the 
party. The newspaper received a working license from the government on 9 February 1960 
(Alzubaidi, 1998: 34). Qasim’s policy of openness did not last long: in the second half of 
1959 he started a policy of suppression against the Kurdish people. Then, on 23 September 
1961, at a press conference in Baghdad, Qasim declared war against the Kurds (Talabani, 
1970: 105). Consequently, the KDP was banned from activities as a political party in Iraq. 
The September Revolution (Sluglett, 1987: 79-82), Shorashi Aylul, is known as the first 
Kurdish-Iraqi War (11 September 1961 – 1970). This revolution was led by Mustafa 
Barzani, the leader of the KDP, who managed to defeat pro-Iraqi forces in the Kurdish 
areas and create an integrated Peshmerga  force, demanding regional autonomy.  37
  Peshmerga is a national Kurdish fighter. They were the main resistance fighters during the 37
Kurdish National Movement seeking their rights including the right of self-determination. The word 
Peshmerga literally means: those who face death or those who are ready to sacrifice. This sacrifice mainly 
refers to the devotion of these fighters to their cause.
!  87
Although Baghdad repeatedly responded to the insurrection, the Iraqi army was not able to 
silence the uprising in the Kurdish areas. In 1963 there was a Baath military coup as a 
result of internal instability and distrust inside the government of Abdulkareem Qasim of 
that time. During the Baathists’ rule, the war continued, mostly targeting the destruction of 
villages and carrying out mass bombings of civilians. One year after, another coup led by 
Abdulsalam Arif ousted the Baathists. Arif’s continuous offensives against the Kurds 
failed, and he therefore declared a ceasefire. In 1966 Arif died and was replaced by his 
brother Abdulrahman Arif who re-started attacks on Kurds. His attempts also caused many 
casualties in the Iraqi army who was faced instability after being defeated repeatedly by the 
Peshmergas. The chaos in the army led to another coup in 1968 with the Baathists returned 
back to power. It could therefore be argued that the Kurds’ hard struggle was among the 
main factors for the Iraqi army’s inconsistency (Sluglett, 1987: 103-105). The highland 
nature of the Kurdish areas in Iraq granted the insurrection a tough geographical location 
from which to continue rebellion. During all that time the Kurdish Peshmergas’ main 
locations were the mountains. 
The September Revolution (1961-1975) is considered an important period of Kurdish 
contemporary history in Iraq. During the same time, the leadership of the revolution gave 
important attention to the press and the means of communication leading to the 
development of a mountain press alongside the armed rebellion. A core question here is 
whether the revolution contributed to the development of the press in Kurdistan or not? To 
answer this question the natural evolution of the Kurdish press should be taken into 
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account. The Kurdish press was a product of the Kurdish national movement and both 
developed together in parallel.  
3.1.1 Mountain rebellion 
In the late nineteenth century, the Kurdish national movement evolved to a point where 
it demanded rights for the Kurdish people for the first time, including the right to have 
a state of their own. Ever since then, Kurdish journalism has always been a part of 
political and national movements. This means the Kurdish press as had to work under 
pressure and in disturbing circumstances. The Kurdish press has been repeatedly 
banned, exiled, and stopped by successive governments in power. As a result, the secret 
press developed as an important component of Kurdish national and political 
movements. 
The tough political situation for the Kurdish political parties was the main factor in the rise 
of Kurdish secret press. This type of press has played an important role during the Kurdish 
political movement in Iraq. It was also known as the mountain press or Peshmerga press: it 
emerged in the early 1960s. The main political party leading the national movement was 
the KDP but the press was not merely a KDP-oriented press: other parties such as the 
Kurdistan Communist Party also had their mouthpiece newspapers published secretly in 
Kurdish. However, it is difficult to follow the developments in the rise of the Kurdish 
underground press because it was distributed among members and followers of the party 
who were asked to destroy it immediately after reading its instructions. This makes it hard 
to find an archived copy.  
Given the hard situation of Peshmergas in the mountains with limited access to any means 
of publishing or printing, those responsible for the press had difficulties producing it. 
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Therefore, a year after the 1958 ceasefire between the Kurdish resistance and Baghdad, in 
1959, the KDP officially received its license to publish Khabat as its mouthpiece 
newspaper. This was the time when they also managed to buy a printing machine in 
Baghdad. The life of this licensed newspaper was short: it was banned by the authorities in 
Baghdad at the same time as the KDP was banned from all political activities on 23 March 
1961 (Raman, 1998: 223). The printing machine and printing facilities also were taken 
over by the government. Shortly after, the revolution began. At that time the KDP managed 
to secretly bring a small and primary printing machine with limited capacities from 
Baghdad and install it at a house where one of the hidden party cells was located in 
Sulaimani (Shawis, 1998: 55). Later, this machine was transported part by part in secret 
into the mountains, and installed, together with the radio station inside a cave called 
Girdarash. The circumstances of the revolution made it difficult to establish a media centre 
in one place. The printing machine and radio station were mobile and their locations 
changed from time to time. (Appendix 3, Interview #7). Under such circumstances, Khabat 
was could not be published regularly and it was only possible to publish it in emergency as 
a means of communication among Peshmergas, Kurdish secret cells and rebels to spread 
news of the struggle against Iraqi offensives and calling for unity among the Kurds to stand 
together to achieve victory (Ahmed, 2000: 70).  
The other KDP revolution publication was Dangi Peshmerga; Voice of Peshmarga. Its first 
issue appeared in December 1963. This publication included news of victories of the 
revolution and enemy defeats, provided Peshmergas with instructions and educated them 
about the necessity of defending their nation. It also spread national awareness among the 
fighters and the people (Dangi Peshmerga, 1969: 5). 
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Kurdish writers and intellectuals such as Ibrahim Ahmed  and Hajar Mokriyani , as well 38 39
as a number of educated KDP members like Sami Abdulrahman  and Jalal Talabani were 40
among the principal ‘movers’ for the emergence of a revolutionary press. These 
publications mainly depended on the educated members of the party to fill its pages and 
mostly the whole content of the papers and also the radio station were prepared by a 
committee named committee of publication and guidance of Kurdistan revolution (Ahmed, 
2001: 3). Then, the publications were circulated among the literate members and 
Peshmergas. The publications were not necessarily periodical but at the time of being 
prepared they were also sent to the party branches to be distributed among their members 
in the mountains. The main danger was distributing them inside cities where the 
government strictly banned any such publications, and anyone seen with such a document 
could the face death penalty. (Appendix 3, Interview #7).  
The Communist Party of Iraq also had a hard time dealing with Baghdad governments. 
This reached the point where the lives of their members were seriously in danger especially 
after the 1963 coup that brought the Baath party to power in Iraq. Therefore, many of their 
members escaped and joined the Kurdish revolution in the mountains of Kurdistan (Jundi, 
1994: 229). Their Kurdish mouthpiece newspaper was named Rêgay Kurdistan and was 
   Ibrahim Ahmed is a Kurdish novelist and writer who was the first KDP Secretary-38
General. Later, with his son-in-law Jalal Talebani, he led the opposition split from the KDP and formed 
the PUK.
   Abdulrahman Sharafkandi (Hajar Mokriyani) is a known Kurdish poet, writer and 39
revolutionary intellectual.
   Mahmoud Abdulrahman (Sami Abdulrahman) was a Kurdish politician who also worked 40
at Iraq Oil company. He joined the Kurdish revolution in the mountains in 1963 and worked as a 
consultant to Barzani. He was a main architect of the attacks on the Kirkouk refineries in 1966 during the 
revolution.
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issued from 1962-1972 (Ahmed, 2001: 30). The main message of this newspaper called for 
peace and harmony alongside their communist and Marxist ideologies. Through this 
newspaper they referred to the Kurdish revolution as a continuation of revolutions in Iraq 
aimed at freedom and coexistence (Rêgay Kurdistan, 1964: 3).  
The revolution continued with successful victories over the Baath regime. Those victories 
made the Baghdad government consider a resolution to the long-lasting conflict. As a 
result, a series of negotiations between Baghdad and the Kurdish leaders started and talks 
ended up with an agreement known as ‘11 March 1970 Peace Agreement’ (Mcdowall, 
2004: 327-328). The peace agreement, for the first time, granted the Kurds of Iraq 
autonomous status with rights such as adopting the Kurdish language together with Arabic 
as the two official languages of the country. According to this agreement the Kurds of Iraq 
were promised the granting of autonomy. This promise was never kept and the agreement 
was not implemented. As a result, the agreement collapsed as the Baath party and its 
government showed no interest in its immediate implementation. Therefore, a new wave of 
conflict between the Kurdish revolutionary Peshmergas and the Baathists started in 1974. 
Less than a year after, Baghdad made an agreement with Tehran. This was the main reason 
that the Kurdish rebellion was defeated. The 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and 
Iran was signed by the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein. The agreement was initially to 
solve the border issues between the two countries but it mainly focused on weakening the 
Kurdish rebellion movement. This was the original aim of the Baath regime, to achieve the 
defeat of the Kurdish movement through this agreement. According to this agreement Iran 
would stop any kind support for the Kurdish rebellion and would withdraw its soldiers 
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from Iraqi territories . After this, Iraq started harsh offensives against in the North aimed 41
at attacking the Kurds and after a series of heavy battles, the Kurdish rebels withdrew and 
were defeated. The Baath campaign against the Kurds was not merely aimed at attacking 
the fighters but also the public and villagers. The attacks after the Algiers Agreement were 
also aimed at destroying the Kurdish villages and ended up causing the flight of more than 
one hundred thousand Kurdish refugees to Iran and Turkey. The Algiers Agreement is 
known as the defeat of the revolution among the Kurds. Nevertheless, this did not silence 
the rebellion forever and the Kurdish forces returned in strengthened, and only a year after, 
they started a new rebellion Shorashi Gulan, the April Revolution. Shortly after, the newly 
raised revolution received support from Iran. This came as the Shah-Saddam Algiers 
Agreement came to an end automatically with the rise of 1979 revolution and the collapse 
of Shah's regime in Iran. After that Iran provided support to Peshmergas especially during 
the 1980s Iran-Iraq war. During the eight years of war between Iran and Iraq, Peshmergas 
received military support from Iran and fought against their common enemy. This also 
played a significant role in the creation of an autonomous Kurdish status in the North of 
Iraq. 
At times of revolution, despite all the restrictions, some papers such as Jin, Shafaq, Afrat, 
Kishtokal and Iraqi new which emerged the years before the revolution continued to be 
published. Besides, there were also four other Kurdish daily, weekly and seasonal 
newspapers who were licensed during the years of revolution (Jabari, 1975: 62). Those 
newspapers were:  
   See the full text of the treaty at: http://untreaty.un.org/English/treaty.asp41
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•Erbil (weekly) issued in Kurdish and Arabic by Erbil Municipality in February 1962 and 
continuing up to 1964. 
•Raparin (weekly) issued in Kurdish and Arabic by Abdelaziz Talib in 1963 and until 
1968, 307 of its issues were published.  
•Tutin (Seasonal Scientific) its first issue was published in 1962 in Kurdish, Arabic and 
English. It continued until 1972.  
•Dangubas (weekly) issued in Kurdish and Arabic in Baghdad in January 1966. 
During the period known as the September Revolution the importance of the press was 
explicit to the leadership of the revolution and political parties. The revolution was eager to 
keep the press as one of the main communication means of the revolution. Despite its 
secrecy it played an important role in conveying the revolution’s message in the mountains 
and also inside the cities. The production of the revolution’s press was the responsibility of 
educated senior cadres and members of the parties. For this reason the committee of 
publication and guidance of Kurdistan revolution was established in order to prepare the 
press and radio content. On the other side, the Iraqi government in its methods of 
suppressing the revolution was a threat to the cities’ hidden cells (the distributors of the 
publications), as well as in the mountains by bombing the caves where the radio and press 
had their activities. Overall, the September Revolution’s press can be referred to as a 
revolutionary press. 
3.1.2 Mountain radio (1963-1991) 
The leadership of the revolution realised the importance of having a radio station to get 
their voices heard. The decision was taken, but putting together a radio station under such 
circumstances in the mountains was a challenge. Finally, in March 1963, in Shikawtarash, 
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a cave located on Mawat Mountain in Sulaimani province, the first waves of radio 
Kurdistan were sent on shortwave 43 meters (Bayiz, 2002: 141-146). In general, the press 
activities mainly operated from the bases of the Kurdish revolution, which were at that 
time in the mountainous areas. This radio, Dengê Kurdistan, Voice of Kurdistan, rapidly 
became popular among the people although it broadcast for only two to three hours a day 
(Appendix 3, Interview #7). The radio programmes focused mainly on revolutionary 
messages and news related to Peshmerga victories over the Iraqi army.  
During the May Revolution the radio programmes broadcast for one and a half hours from 
8:00 pm to 9:30pm Baghdad time. Hajar Mokriyani, the poet and one of the establishers of 
the mountain press in his book Cheshti Mijewir refers to the importance of radio during the 
revolution as being ‘more powerful than an army of ten thousand soldiers’ (Mukriyani, 
1997: 476). The Iraqi government for its part did not stay silent with regard to this radio 
station with its impact of influencing public opinion against the government. Therefore, 
along with the bombing of the mountains and caves, the government sent parasites to block 
the waves from reaching the people. This led to the station taking other decisions such as 
transporting the station from one cave to another, especially when they suspected the 
station’s whereabouts had become known. The frequency was also changed from time to 
time in order to escape the parasites and censors (Appendix 3, Interview #7). Thus the 
audience got used to searching for Kurdistan Radio on different frequencies from one day 
to another. Baghdad has always denied the existence of a station like that on Iraqi territory. 
The Baath regime which was uncomfortable with the existence of a radio station found 
there was nothing they could do to stop it, so would repeatedly claim that it was 
broadcasting and receiving support from Iran. The facts were that the radio was located in 
the Kurdish mountainous areas with repeated Iraqi airstrikes bombing its suspected 
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location. (Fathullah, 1999: 80). 
The radio programmes were effective during the revolution. The main focus was to cover 
subjects related to the rights of Kurdish people and the oppression that had been imposed 
on them. In fact, it was easier for the radio to reach out to the public in order to easily 
convey the message of the revolution to the people. The overall aim was to create patriotic 
awareness among people. The radio was banned inside the towns and the cities, but 
nevertheless kept being heard. There were cases when there was only one radio in the 
whole village and people would gather secretly at one place to listen to the radio programs. 
People felt attached to the radio programmes, especially in the evenings when they were 
eager to hear the news of Peshmerga victories from the radio. Together with its 
revolutionary mission to communicate its messages from the mountains to the cities, the 
radio also played an important role in improving the culture and Kurdish language at the 
time (Bayiz, 2002: 141-146). Regarding the type of programmes broadcast on radio, Tehsin 
Dolemeri, who worked for the mountain press and was also a radio announcer at that time 
in the mountains, says:  
[… the programmes were starting with patriotic songs like (Çemê Rêzan) and 
(Ey Reqîb) . Then, firstly there was the news. We used to have local and 42
international news. For the local news we used to focus on the revolutions and 
Peshmargas. We covered victories of Peshmargas and also the oppression that 
was imposed on the Kurdish people by the Iraqi government such as the killing 
of innocent children and women, executing, bombing and destroying villages 
  These two songs are known among the most popular patriotic songs especially in the Kurdish 42
part of Iraq. However, one of them (Ey reqîb) is considered the national anthem of the Kurds.
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and towns… etc. For the international news we had cadres who were gathering 
news through international stations and translating it. ]  
(Appendix 3, Interview #7). 
The main focus of the mountain radio was to spread nationalistic messages and strengthen 
the feeling of patriotism among the public. There was a clear division between what to be 
addressed regarding the internal politics and what is relevant to the case internationally. 
The news was addressing atrocities and crimes committed by the Baath government 
against the people of Kurdistan in Iraq. This was intended to raise the awareness of the 
public about the inimical acts of the Baath regime against the Kurdish people. The 
messages were mainly included with the victories of Peshmaras in war against the Baath 
regime and the advances of the revolution and resistance against the regime to gain the 
rights of the Kurdish people. The leadership of revolution believed in the impact and 
effectiveness of the radio waves inside the cities. Although the station was put together 
with very primitive means and everything was very basic, it was still able to carry the 
message of the revolutionary Peshmergas from the mountains to their people behind those 
mountains. Meanwhile, the people were also expecting and waiting for the times of the 
radio programmes. The mountain radio was a very important source of information for the 
Kurdish people to understand the advances of the Peshmergas and to follow the 
development of their cause.  
All news and content was prepared and agreed upon by the committee of 
publication and guidance of KDP politburo before being announced. We had 
messages of guidance and instructions intended to be sent to our audience. For 
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every broadcasting day we used to have an overview of the political situation. 
To prepare the news, in all the party branches we used to have two-way radio 
receivers to communicate the daily news of their areas. We also collected news 
from other party committees by riding motorcycles or bicycles bringing the 
bulletins from different committees. All the news and the content were prepared 
at the committee of publication and guidance of the KDP politburo. ]  
(Appendix 3, Interview #7) 
The mountain station and the news generated for the station were also under the direct 
control of the political party. A special committee was formed to evaluate the news and 
content of broadcasting and publications. All the gathered news was first evaluated by the 
committee and then the committee was in the position of deciding whether to put it out on 
air or not. This committee was a part of the politburo of the KDP, and its job was to 
monitor, evaluate and approve the publication and broadcasting. 
The mountain station continued to operate as a mouthpiece of revolution from inside the 
caves and the mountains. Despite its limited resources, it aired messages to its audiences 
on a regular basis. A number of literate and educated members of party and Peshmergas 
were assigned to do the work of operating the station. They were doing almost everything, 
from news gathering to announcing the news and even technicians’ jobs. The station was 
under the direct supervision of the publication and guidance committee of KDP politburo. 
This committee regularly prepared content and announcements specifically targeted at 
people inside the cities. The committee also was also responsible for the selection of 
qualified members (mainly from among Peshmergas) to join publications committee. The 
mountain station’s other function was to be used as a source of information for Peshmergas 
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on different frontlines. The station used secret codes to communicate among each 
Peshmerga group. To avoid discovery, these codes were changed regularly. The radio 
station served as a partisan machine, mainly aimed at mobilising the public towards certain 
objectives of the revolution.  
[… We were Peshmergas, technicians, journalists, writers, announcers and so 
on all at the same time. We had few people who had any idea how to work with 
media. In my personal case, I was writing poetry and presenting it occasionally 
among Peshmargas. That is how I was asked to join the press team. We did not 
have press professionals but we were learning through doing it. In the 
beginning we had two electronic engineers from whom we learned everything 
technical needed for that station.] (Appendix 3, Interview #7) 
The limitation of professional capacities was an inevitable fact. There were few educated 
members among the party and Peshmergas who joined the revolution. However, among 
those who joined the revolution, there were tens of students who had not been able to 
finalise their studies due to political reasons. For example, during resistance times, Kurdish 
students were rarely accepted for study at university level. A heavy security check was 
required in addition to the support and recommendation of influential individuals. This left 
the young Kurdish high school graduates, who were not admitted to the universities for 
political reasons, two choices: join the army for mandatory military service or join the 
revolution in the mountains and become a Peshmerga. Many of those, especially during the 
1980s chose to join the revolution. In addition, even accepted and admitted to university 
were dismissed after a year or two, accused of being part of secret Kurdish political cells. 
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This accusation was as serious as facing the execution penalty. As a result, many young 
Kurds left university in the 1980s and joined the Kurdish resistance in the mountains. It 
was young Peshmergas who were mainly the educated ones in the mountains. 
Nevertheless, being able only to read and write could be the main qualification for 
recruitment to the publication committee. The mountain press personnel were not assigned 
solely to publication and press work. The whole operation of both publications and radio 
station were managed by people who learned it by doing it. The members of the 
publication committee and press were at the same time Peshmergas and revolutionary 
fighters. They also learned to operate the radio station and deal with its technical issues.  
[… our goal was to be able to broadcast to each household in Kurdish areas. 
Although they were listening secretly, from the very beginning the radio 
received a very warm reception by the people. This, for sure, faced harsh 
reaction by Baghdad and at the same time raised our motivation. The Iraqi side 
used continuous parasites to censor and block our waves but we were obliged 
to change our sender location to escape the parasites. Meanwhile, our 
audience were also used to searching for our new locations on AM when 
parasites were censoring it. It was a challenge, but we persisted. Our station 
was a moveable one. In order to hide it from the airstrikes we used to remove 
the antennas and put them together again after each air bombardment. Tall 
poplar trees were used to place our antennas again. Sometimes it was not easy 
to hide and a couple of times our place was bombed and our comrades were 
martyred. But all the risks aside, we were continuing to broadcast because we 
believed if we stopped then the enemy would have achieved its goals. ]  
(Appendix 3, Interview #7) 
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The challenge that the mountain press faced was enormous. War, bombs, airstrikes, 
censorship and blocking of waves did not stop them from continuing. Both the leadership 
of the revolution and the Iraqi government of that time were aware of the importance of the 
press. Peshmergas did everything they could to maintain the press especially the radio 
station. At the same time, the Iraqi government was using every means to suppress and 
silence the revolution’s voices. The mountain press messages were heard by the public 
inside the Kurdish cities and towns. This was a very powerful mobilisation means used by 
the revolutionaries and it was difficult for the government to combat. The government in 
return was sending parasite waves to block the waves being sent from the mountains and to 
silence the radio. When this was happening, the radio personnel in the mountains shifted 
the waves into another frequency signal. Those people listening were used to this device 
and anytime a parasite was imposed, people were aware and would change the receiver’s 
frequency.  
Overall, the underground press played an important role in the Kurdish national movement 
in Iraq. The role was carried out mainly through the establishment of the revolutionary 
press that included publications and basic radio broadcasts. The publications were not as 
influential as the radio, simply because secret distribution within the cities was difficult. 
Therefore, the role of radio was more obvious during the Kurdish revolution that places the 
radio among the best means of communication especially during the May Revolution - 
Shoreshi Gulan. Despite all the parasites and restrictions imposed by the Iraqi regime, the 
radio continued to broadcast. Even technical and logistics shortcomings did not stop the 
radio from being broadcast all those years. The radio, on the one hand, was spreading 
messages with a national and patriotic content to create awareness among the public of the 
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tyrannical actions of the Iraqi army. On the other hand, it was one of the unique players in 
strengthening the Kurdish language and culture as a means of communication.  
3.2 Second period, Partisan press: press coming down from the mountains into cities 
(1991-2003) 
The second period is the partisan press. This period mainly covers the time during the 
historical transformation of the region and the establishment of the Kurdish de facto federal 
autonomous government. This period presents the transformation of the press from the 
mountain to the cities. For the first time the Kurdish press operates inside the cities and 
under a Kurdish authority with more freedom. During this period the facilities for the 
publications led to the evolution of a party press in a rapidly increasing and developing 
press. This was when each political party launched its own media and press institutions 
immediately after descending from the mountains. The first legal document related to the 
press was also passed by the Parliament of Kurdistan in 1993, known as Law Nr. 10 of 
1993. Only two years later, when the civil war between the two main parties started, the 
press from both sides played a part as a means of war and incitement. 
3.3.1 The Uprising and de-facto government 
If the year 1975 is considered as a defeat for the Kurdish revolution, then one can refer to 
1991 as the year of victory which was the turning point in the history of the Kurdish 
struggle for self-government. In 1991 the situation allowed Kurds to create a new reality in 
Iraq. Wounded Iraq was too fragile to think of a fresh war with Kuwait, especially after the 
damage of eight years of aimless war with Iran. The Kuwait invasion can be considered an 
end for Baath and Iraq hegemony in the region. Shortly after entering Kuwait, coalition 
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forces intervened and it was at that point they started to put limits and boundaries for 
Saddam's tyrannical acts in the region. The following spring was a blossoming for the 
Kurds of Iraq. For the first time an uprising allowed them to control their populated 
territories such as Erbil, Sulaimani, Duhok and also Kirkouk provinces. These cities 
together form what is nowadays known as Kurdistan. Shortly after, the Baath regime in 
Baghdad returned in revenge. This caused the flight of nearly two million citizens to the 
northern borders of Turkey and Iran. The conclusion to this came when British, US and 
their allies came to rescue the Kurds and provide them with humanitarian support under 
different names such as Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Haven. To protect them 
from Iraqi air attacks, on 5 April 1992, in accordance with UN Resolution 688, the no-fly 
zone area was applied in Kurdish areas and as a result Kurds returned back from the border 
camps. 
As soon as they were back in Kurdistan, political parties and groups started to consider a 
form of unity among themselves. As a result, they formed the Kurdistani Front, consisting 
of representatives from seven Kurdish political parties and groups of that time. But they 
had problems concerning the governing of the area. Therefore, the Kurdistani Front 
decided to start a series of negotiations with Baghdad regarding administration issues. 
These negotiations never ended up with fruitful agreements, and neither side was ready to 
compromise with the other. As a result, on 26 October 1991, the Iraqi government started 
to withdraw its government offices and institutions completely from Kurdish parts in the 
North. This left areas with a huge legal and administrative vacuum. Thus, the Kurdistani 
Front formed a committee of 15 experts from all parties to come up with a system of 
governance in the region. Their intention was to build an administration that would meet 
!  103
the needs of citizens in the region. This committee then, proposed a draft election law  to 43
the political representatives of Kurdistan and it was approved in April 1992 to hold a 
parliamentary election. On 19 May, voters participated in multi-party free and open 
parliamentary elections in Kurdistan. The threshold was 7% and each one of KDP and 
PUK won the election and formed a shared government. The power sharing seemed not to 
work for the nature and reality of the political groups of that time, and it lasted only two 
peaceful years  and during those two years some important laws and resolutions were 44
passed by the Kurdistan National Assembly . One of those significant laws was the Press 45
and Publication Law which was passed on 25 April 1993, as proposed by the Kurdistan 
Region’s Ministry of Culture, Law No. 10 of 1993.  
3.2.2 The press after 1991 
The Kurdish political parties who were aware of the important role of the press from their 
mountain experience, now were able to launch their own press with a wider freedom and 
providing better access for the audience. On 1 December 1991, the first Kurdish daily 
newspaper published after the uprising was Kurdistani Nwe launched by the PUK in Erbil. 
This was followed by Birayeti daily newspaper published by the KDP. In addition, tens of 
other media publications and also radio and tv channels came into being, taking advantage 
of the atmosphere of freedom for the media. Nevertheless, all the media were controlled or 
backed by one political agenda or another. Meanwhile, on 26 November 1992, a daily 
   Law No. 1, 1992: the law of ‘the Kurdistan National Assembly’ which has so far been 43
amended five times. 
   On May 1994 the disagreements between the two parties reached such a level that they 44
entered into armed clashes. This turned the Kurdistan Region into two war fronts: one in KDP-controlled 
areas and the other in PUK-controlled areas. On one side, the prime minister who was from PUK party 
during the civil war became the military commander. The deputy prime minister from the KDP on the 
other side took the commandership of the KDP frontline.
    According to Law No. 2, 2009, the name Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq is used instead of 45
National Assembly of Kurdistan-Iraq.
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newspaper, Harem (The Region), was established by the government in Kurdistan, as their 
official publication.  
During this time political parties who had come into being during the revolution and now 
had descended from the mountains, for the first time started to build civilian offices. 
Journalism inside cities was a new experience for them. Previously, journalism was used 
by them only to broadcast revolutionary messages to their members and the public, but 
now journalism entered another phase, based mainly on providing information to citizens. 
The two main parties, KDP and PUK, installed the same press machines from the 
mountains with the same personnel as decision-makers for their press. After 1992, the press 
was a part of the politburo and branches of political parties. Over time the two parties 
employed a number of new members in their media departments. This was primarily done 
by the main political parties while each worked at strengthening their mouthpiece 
publications and channels.  
When the PUK and KDP entered the war, in the same way as the region was divided into 
two frontlines, the press was also divided between two main parties. Even the smaller 
parties who stayed the ally of one party or another, had to decide which press ‘line’ to 
choose. Therefore, the press during the civil war in Kurdistan Region served as the two 
parties’ war machine to spread hate speech against each other. In general, the press in 
Kurdistan was a means of struggle as mentioned by the president of Kurdistan Journalists 
Syndicate in an interview conducted with him: 
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[… Generally, the press in Kurdistan is a product of our political struggle. Therefore, 
it has been used as a means of defence, of attack, as well as for the spreading of a 
political agenda. ]  
(Appendix 3, Interview #2) 
3.3 Third period: The laws and legislation related to the press adopted by the KRI 
Parliament (2003-2014) 
For presenting the third period in this chapter, the importance of the press-related pieces of 
legislation passed by the Kurdistan Parliament is explained and an analysis of the 
regulation of the press within the law is presented. We also give some historical 
background together with an analysis of Journalism Law No. 35/2007. The importance of 
this period lies in the rise of a large number of press and media outlets. However, the 
diversity of the press stems from the political affiliation of each one, usually with with 
political parties. Journalism Law No. 35/2007 and the Law of the Right to Access 
Information No. 11/2013, are among the main press-related pieces of legalisation in this 
period.  
3.3.1 Iraqi criminal law and publication law 
In Iraq, the press and publications have traditionally been under the control of the state 
(Ricchiardi, 2011). Besides legislation, resolutions and laws to regulate the press, the state 
directly owned and controlled the press. Laws were often outdated and still they were not 
implemented. For instance the Iraqi press for many years followed the regulations 
introduced in 1931, the Law of Publications No. 82. Prior to the adoption of this law, the 
only press-related legislation was the one from 1863 of the Ottoman Empire, which 
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regulated the press in all the areas under the authority of the Ottomans including Iraq. 
As a part of federal Iraq, the Kurdistan Region followed the regulations in force in the 
country. This, with the exception of the partisan and mountain press and publications 
especially during the revolution times in Kurdistan Region. After the fall of the monarchy 
in Iraq the situation did not change towards the better. During this period pieces of 
legislation to regulate the press and both the Publication Law of 1968 and the Criminal 
Law known as Law No. 111/1969  were adopted. Both of these criminalised journalists 46
for insulting the government . Having press and publication legislation adopted as a 47
chapter within Criminal Law is revealing. In other words, journalists are treated as 
criminals according to the law in Iraq especially if their reports are not endorsed by the 
state. This was considered as direct pressure and censorship against journalism in Iraq. 
Therefore, all the publications and broadcasting media in Iraq were under the direct control 
of the state. However, this was not exactly the case in Kurdistan Region. The region 
adopted its own laws regulating the press and journalism and those pieces of legislation in 
the region provided journalism with a broader freedom to practise. The following are two 
paragraphs from the Criminal Law related to the press: 
SECTION THREE 
Liability in offences of publication 
  Paragraph 81 - Without prejudice to the criminal liability of an author or 
illustrator of a book or other means of expression, the editor in chief of a 
newspaper is punishable in his capacity as principal to an offence committed 
  the law with its amendments is available in English at: https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/46
irq/1969/penal_code_html/Iraq_The_Penal_Code_1969ENG.pdf
 See more at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/iraq47
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by means of that newspaper. If there is no editor in chief, then the editor in 
charge of the department responsible for the publication is liable. However, 
either of them may be absolved from the penalty if he can establish during the 
investigation, that the publication had occurred without his knowledge and if 
he provides all the information and documentation available to him that will 
assist in the identification of the person responsible. 
 Paragraph 83 - No person is absolved from criminal liability of publication 
offences even though the writing, drawing or other form of expression is a 
quotation from or translation of publications that are issued in Iraq or abroad 
or if they are merely rumours or stories propagated by others. This provision is 
not applicable if the publication quotes official government publications . 48
Concerning the practice of journalism and publishing in Iraq, Criminal Law mainly focuses 
on the convicting of journalists and editors rather than on their protection or their rights. 
This automatically puts the editors under pressure to do everything to be very careful about 
what is being published and what is not. Criminal Law was the only law to deal with cases 
regarding the press and journalists in Iraq. This means that there was no space in the legal 
framework for the protection of the professionals in this field. Freedom of speech had little 
meaning in the Baath system: the press was free to praise the Baath regime and its 
dictatorship in Iraq. Having criminal law as the main legal framework of dealing with 
journalists, was another method of state control, at its peak of brutality during the Baath 
regime. There was no other way: the only expectation from editors and journalists was to 
abide by the Baath rules. No one had the right to criticise or even express a simple opinion 
 the law with its amendments is available in English at: https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/48
irq/1969/penal_code_html/Iraq_The_Penal_Code_1969ENG.pdf
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that went slightly against party principles. All types of publication, including writing, 
drawing, voice and video records, quotations and translations of text, whether issued inside 
or outside the country, were under heavy control.  
Publications went through a filtration process before receiving a publishing license. 
Therefore, the majority of decision-makers in the Iraqi media were senior Baath party 
members. Even Saddam Hussein’s eldest son, Uday Saddam, was appointed as a chief 
editor of the Babel newspaper . In general, editors were expected to abide by Baath party 49
principles. 
3.3.2 Press-related laws in the KRI 
After the US-led coalition and removal of the Baath party from power in Iraq, the Kurds, 
as one of the main opposition groups took part in rebuilding a new Iraq to gather with other 
entities of Iraq. After that, an interim government was appointed in Iraq made up of 
representatives from different Iraqi ethnic and religious groups . Then, a committee was 50
established to draft a constitution for a democratic Iraq . In 2005 this constitution was 51
ratified in a referendum and thereupon it became the basis of legislation and the political 
system in the new Iraq. According to the 2005 constitution, Kurdistan entered a federation 
with Iraq and this granted the Kurdish administrated areas the status of a federal 
autonomous regional government within Iraq. In addition, this constitution considers all 
  An article on Uday and his press-related activities is available at: http://www.pbs.org/49
frontlineworld/stories/iraq/uday.html
  Iraqi interim government was created on June 28, 2004, to govern the country until the drafting 50
of new constitution. It was replaced with the Iraqi transitional government on May 3, 2005.
  The US-led coalition invasion of Iraq was legitimised by the willingness of the US and its allies 51
to democratise the country. However, critics argued that this democratisation did not happen and despite 
all efforts, shortly after the invasion further factions were to be found inside Iraq that continue until today. 
See more at: Barker, Michael J. ‘Democracy or polyarchy? US-funded media developments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq post 9/11.’ Media, culture, and society 30.1 (2008): 109.
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laws and resolutions passed by the Kurdistan parliament as valid legislation . The 52
Kurdistan parliament is fully authorised, according to the constitution, to accept, refuse or 
amend any legislation passed by the Iraqi council of representatives, and to decide whether 
it be adopted in the KRI or not. 
Concerning the press-related laws and regulations, the KRI started to legislate in the 1990s. 
The Law No. 10, 1993, is one of the very first pieces of legislation adopted by the 
Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq. This law is considered the foundation law for regulation of the 
press and publications in KRI. In addition, the same law guarantees the independence of 
the press and freedom of speech (Article 2). This is mainly because the necessity of having 
journalism and the press in a legal framework in the KRI was sensed since the beginning of 
autonomous rule in the KRI. Therefore, in 1993, one year after the creation of parliament, a 
draft of the Press Law was proposed and the law was adopted as the first legal framework 
for the practice of journalism in the KRI. Later, in 1998, parliament passed the law of 
Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate (KJS) as the official body representing journalists. Then in 
2001 a law was passed regulating the retirement of journalists. The establishment of KJS 
was of importance especially during a time when the two main parties, KDP and PUK, 
alongside with their press were just coming out armed conflict. The foundation of 
Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate was one of the first steps to reconciliation especially 
among the media and press on both sides. Obviously, the both sides during media was 
playing negative role especially in escalating the conflict and further deepening the 
disputes. Therefore, the KJS was a step forward towards peace and reconciliation starting 
  Constitution of Iraq 2005, Article 141: Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 52
shall remain in force, and decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including court 
decisions and contracts, shall be considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the 
laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided that they do not contradict 
the Constitution.
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from the press of both sides.  
Along with Press Law No.10 of 1993, the law of Political Parties No. 17 of 1993, also 
plays an important role in heading the press in the KRI in a certain direction which the 
press in the KRI was heading to. This law grants political parties the right to have their 
own media. This did not mean that all the media in the region would be owned or 
controlled by one political party or another, but at that point that was the case. This could 
not be seen as the one reason for the rise of a political party’s press in general, but parties 
were aware of the role of the media in circulating their ideas. Besides, they benefitted from 
decades-long experience of their mountain and rebellion media. Thus, in the 1990s the 
press was completely owned and controlled by the political parties and groups in the 
region, especially the two main parties, who started to operate their own press as one of the 
main pillars of their party institution. In addition, there were two other laws passed related 
to the press and its destination in the KRI. One of these laws was Law No. 4, 1998, 
Journalists Syndicate of Kurdistan-Iraq and the other was Law No. 13, 2001, Journalists 
Retirement Law. The journalists retirement law plays an important role in the protection of 
journalists and their professional career. The journalists retirement law, for the first time, 
was a way of appreciating the profession and accepting its practitioners inside the system.  
In order to understand the role of the state in regulating the press, an attempt to analyse 
licensing and permissions processes is undertaken. Some regulations regarding the 
qualifications of the chief editor and the owner of the press, shut-down conditions, and 
censorship methods are also referred to in the Law of the Press, 1993.  
The law consists of 19 articles, basically aimed at regulating press and publications in 
Kurdistan Region at the beginning of autonomous Kurdistan’s government. To understand 
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the importance of this legislation, we highlight the space provided by this law for the rights 
and regulations to publish, restrictions and censorship, licensing and freedom of 
publication. ‘The law seems to be very basic but compared to the press limitations in Iraq 
and the Middle East area, this is considered to be unique for that time’ as Azad 
Hamadamin, Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate’s president noted (Appendix 3, Interview #2).  
According to Article 2 of this law, each citizen is free to publish with no inspection or 
censorship of the press. Nevertheless, there are some qualification set for anyone who 
desires to start a press publication. The concessionaire and the chief editor are both 
required to have a number of qualifications. These conditions are considered as restricting 
those individuals who were previously convicted from starting their own publications. This 
law specifies Article 5 for the licensing process. This process takes place by requesting an 
appeal to the ministry of culture where only the minister has the authority to approve or 
disqualify a press from being licensed within 30 days. According to the law, the appeal 
must include the name of the concessionaire and chief editor as well as the name and 
language of the periodical and its type. In case of non- approval, the appellant can refer to 
the appellate court and there the court decision is final. Here, the law makes the press face 
clear restrictions by going through the process of licensing. Through this complicated 
process, any publication can be banned or not approved by the ministry, as, for instance, if 
they are not in favour of their politics. Meanwhile, another positive side of this legislation 
is that, after licensing, the publication gains legal status and neither the administration nor 
the court can withdraw the right of publishing from it, shut it down or ban it (Article 6, 1). 
Overall, the law, to some extent applies the principles of freedom of the press in 
democracies but at the same time it is subject to restrictions especially concerning the 
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obstacles of licensing. Nevertheless, it should be taken into the consideration that this law 
was passed in 1993, only one year after the granting of a status of autonomy to the KRI. In 
addition, this law was passed inside a country such as Iraq with its Baath regime where 
there was no such culture of legislation according to the principle of a free and independent 
press. 
After the fall of the Baath regime in 2003 the elections for the second term of parliament 
took place in 2005. Since then, elections were held regularly every four years. During the 
last three elected terms of the Kurdistan parliament only one press-related law was drafted 
and passed by parliament: Law of Journalism No. 35, 2007. A number of other press and 
media-related drafts have been proposed to parliament but none of them has made it into 
law so far. The following is a table that shows all the press-related laws which regulate the 
press and media in the KRI. 
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Law No. 10/1993  
Press Law
1993 •Foundation law for regulation of press and publications 
•Guarantees the independence and freedom of press 
journalists (Articles 2 and 14) 
• Regulating licensing of press and publishing (Article 5).
Law No. 17/1993  
Law of political 
parties
1993 -Grants all the region’s political parties the right to own their 
media (Article 13)
Law No. 4/1998,  
Law of Journalists 
Syndicate of 
Kurdistan-Iraq
1998 •Establishment of Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate, a union of 
journalists in the KRI. 
•The syndicate guarantees support for its members and 
journalists in the KRI and protects them (Articles 4 and 19). 
-Support towards more professional  journalism (Article 4). 
-The syndicate guarantees support for its members and 
journalists in the KRI and protects them (Articles 4 and 19).
Law No. 13/2001,  
Journalists retirement 
law
2001 - Regulating retirement for journalists
Iraqi Constitution. 
Ratified in a national 
referendum in 2005. 
2005 Guarantee of free press in Iraq (Articles 36, 37 and 38)
Law No. 35/2007  
Journalism Law
2007 1. Guarantee of: 
• freedom press and expression,  
• protection of journalists, 
• independence of journalists, 
• professionalism. (Article 7) 
2. Regulating press and periodical publications in the KRI 
(Article 2) 
3. Regulating the legal rights and obligations of journalists 
(Articles 8 and 9).  
4. The law is mainly focused on the written press.  
5. Removing the licensing requirement for press and 
publication (Article 1). 
Law No. 11/2013  
The law of access to 
information
2013 1.Guarantees citizens’ access to the information from public 
and private sectors. 
2.Support for more transparency as a principle of democracy. 
(Article 2) 
3.Creating a freer atmosphere for publication and expression. 
(Article 2)
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In 2007, the Kurdistan Journalist Syndicate proposed a draft law to the parliament of 
Kurdistan. After a series of discussions inside and outside parliament, mainly between the 
lawmakers and journalists, the law was voted and adopted in December 2007. This law is 
called Journalism Law No. 35, 2007. The law is made up of fourteen articles within five 
chapters. This law is also focused mainly on the print media for which a number of local 
practitioners voiced disagreement. There is still no law related to broadcasting or other media. 
Journalism Law No. 35, 2007 refers to freedom of press and freedom of expression as 
fundamental rights of journalists. Article 2 of this law and 5 sub articles are entirely devoted 
to this issue. The right to publish and right to ownership of a publication are also thoroughly 
regulated in this law. The law grants journalists immunity having the ability to practise their 
profession without being arrested and the right to not have their office or house searched 
without a prior court order. This immunity however, is questioned by local journalists as there 
are still cases when journalists are arrested, attacked, jailed and even tortured with no regard 
for this law. This law removes the licensing bureaucracy for press and periodical publications. 
An announcement to be published in two newspapers in the KRI is sufficient for a newspaper 
or publication to start up officially and legally. The announcement shall include information 
about the newspaper or the periodical which is to be established (Article 1, Law No. 
35/2007) .  53
On 5 June 2013, another important law was drafted and passed by the parliament of 
Kurdistan, The right to access information law, No. 11, 2013 . This law essentially refers 54
to the importance of citizens being allowed to access information and their right to be 
  See the law in Kurdish: http://perleman.org/files/articles/221008121630.pdf Retrieved on 53
06/04/2017
  See the law in Kurdish: http://www.perleman.org/files/articles/120713023536.pdf Retrieved on 54
06/04/2017
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informed. The law was adopted as a guarantee of transparency in the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq. According to the law, all public and private institutions in the Kurdistan Region are 
obliged to have one or more named employees assigned to provide the public with 
information upon request (Article 7, 1). 
By the establishment of the Kurdistan parliament, for the first time, the Kurdish press was 
regulated by the Kurdish authorities. Nevertheless, such regulations and legislation are 
mostly to better control the press activities by the state. Sometimes, this leads press in a 
direction where it remains as an institution controlled by the state. The justification of the 
state in necessitating the laws and regulations for the press is to protect the rights of 
journalists and freedoms of press. As can be seen, all the press- related regulations and 
laws in Kurdistan refer to the importance of freedom of expression and press. However, 
those regulations also do not seem to fully guarantee the rights and freedoms of the press 
and practitioners of the field tend to face continuous problems with the law. 
Conclusion  
It is evident that the emergence of the Kurdish press has been in parallel with the evolution 
of political and national movements. The Kurdish press has always been an inseparable 
part of the Kurdish rebellion for their national and political rights particularly in Iraq. 
Therefore, the development of the press has been dependent on political developments in 
Kurdistan. The Kurdish press has been a part of the Kurdish rebellion and the mountain 
struggle. Then, it was a part of the autonomous de-facto state after 1992 and after that 
started to adapt itself into an era of institution-building when the Kurdistan parliament 
passed press-related legislation.  
!  116
In fact, the Iraqi governments have shown the same level of hostility to Kurdish political 
parties and their press. Meanwhile, the Kurdish rebellion press and secret press continued 
uninterrupted because of their awareness of the necessity of communication between 
Kurdish Peshmergas, themselves and also their people inside cities. In the case of 
communicating with those inside cities, radio played an important role, but at the same 
time secret publications were also influential. 
When political parties spread to the cities in 1992, they were already aware of the 
important role of the press from their mountain experience. As a result they launched their 
own press with ever-wider freedom, and continued to assure better access to press for their 
audience. This led to the press going through a period of regulations within the local 
legislature, the Kurdistan Parliament. For the first time, the Kurdish press functioned under 
laws and regulations legislated by their own state. Although the existing laws are not 
always considered by the practitioners in the field as protecting their full freedoms, they 
nevertheless helped the press to progress and develop. As it has been noted, it can be 
concluded that the press in the KRI has developed over a period of time, despite the fact 
that this development is parallel with the political development. Therefore, in essence the 
fact that this chapter is divided into three periods is also an indicator of the development of 
the Kurdish press from one period to another. To sum up, the press in the KRI has 
developed over time depending on political development. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FOUR DIMENSIONS OF MEDIA SYSTEM IN THE 
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ  
Introduction 
A notable finding of this research is the fact that almost all the media in the KRI are 
owned, run, controlled or linked to political parties. At the same time media outlets are 
supposed to be the source for information being provided to the public in the region. In 
fact, what people receive from these channels are mostly political messages which focus 
restrictedly on political agenda-setting of political parties. As Hallin and Mancini put it, 
‘Media systems are shaped by the wider context of political history, structure, and the 
culture’ (2004: 46). The political background of the region, culture and social structure is 
highly reflected in the local media and press. In other words, in order to understand the 
way media outlets operate in Kurdistan, a thorough understanding of political and cultural 
history of the region in the last century is needed. This chapter gives an overview of the 
political history, culture and structure of Iraq and Kurdistan. The chapter will first describe 
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and attempts at democratisation especially in what is related to 
press and politics. Then, it will give an overview of the four dimensions of the press 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004) with a specific focus on the KRI.  
4. 1. Background 
The Iraq of post-Saddam Hussein has repeatedly been motivated and supported by the 
international community to function as a democratic state. Above all, the United States of 
America claimed it was working towards democratising the country. after the 2003 military 
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intervention changed the system in Iraq. The Kurds of Iraq were among the main local 
opposition forces who fought side by side with the US led coalition in favour of a regime-
change in Iraq. The Kurdish Peshmergas took part in the war against the Baath Regime in 
Iraq together with the coalition forces, and the region was used as a military base by the 
coalition forces. The aftermath of the war for Iraqis was an era of hope that peace and 
prosperity would return to Iraq. However, to make that hopecome true, Iraq faced 
challenges, and shortly afterwards the country became home to sectarian conflict. 
Minorities found it difficult to live in Iraq peacefully. When the new constitution for Iraq 
was being drafted under the supervision of the US and their allies, the Kurds again were 
one of three main participants in the drafting committee. Meanwhile, the Kurdish 
nationalist agenda and dream of independence was sensed by everyone, but this time Kurds 
decided to be part of a federal Iraq. A regional government was proposed for the Kurds, 
and this was guaranteed in the draft constitution. Later the region was recognised 
according to this constitution, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region 
(Article 117, Iraqi Const. 2005). The powers of the regions are guaranteed in Section Five, 
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2005 Iraqi constitution . However, the ratification of the constitution did not put an end to 55
the chaos in Iraq, and in some ways it even aggravated it. For instance, Article No. 140 of 
the Constitution proposes the issue of the disputed territories be solved in a free 
referendum by the inhabitants of those areas in order to set the boundaries of those areas, 
whether they are a part of the Kurdistan Region or not. This referendum was scheduled for 
not later than the end of 2007 but due central and federal government disagreements it did 
  [ Article 116: 55
 The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, 
and governorates, as well as local administrations. 
 Article 117: 
 First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of Kurdistan, along 
with its existing authorities, as a federal region. 
 Second: This Constitution shall affirm new regions established in accordance with its provisions. 
 Article 118: 
 The Council of Representatives shall enact, in a period not to exceed six months from the date of 
its first session, a law that defines the executive procedures to form regions, by a simple majority of the 
members present. 
 Article 119: 
 One or more governorates shall have the right to organize into a region based on a request to be 
voted on in a referendum submitted in one of the following two methods: 
 First: A request by one-third of the council members of each governorate intending to form a 
region. 
 Second: A request by one-tenth of the voters in each of the governorates intending to form a 
region. 
 Article 120: 
 Each region shall adopt a constitution of its own that defines the structure of powers of the region, 
its authorities, and the mechanisms for exercising such authorities, provided that it does not contradict this 
Constitution. 
 Article 121: 
 First: The regional powers shall have the right to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial 
powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive 
authorities of the federal government. 
 Second: In case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a matter 
outside the exclusive authorities of the federal government, the regional power shall have the right to 
amend the application of the national legislation within that region. 
 Third: Regions and governorates shall be allocated an equitable share of the national revenues 
sufficient to discharge their responsibilities and duties, but having regard to their resources, needs, and the 
percentage of their population. 
 Fourth: Offices for the regions and governorates shall be established in embassies and diplomatic 
missions, in order to follow cultural, social, and developmental affairs. 
 Fifth: The regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the 
region, particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such 
as police, security forces, and guards of the region.]
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not take place . Baghdad was pushing for imposing more centralised power while the KRI 56
was seeking more autonomy. Therefore, the disputes between Baghdad and Erbil deepened 
day by day and reached a stage where Baghdad cut all the wages and budget share of the 
regional government due to disputes over new oil contracts in the KRI. The budget cut 
happened in January 2014 and so Kurds continued their unilateral management of the 
Kurdistan Region’s oil contracts. The issue came to a head when in September 2017 the 
region held an independence referendum. Immediately after, the central government 
applied more brutal sanctions over the region including an airport ban and closing the 
borders. The authorities in Baghdad accused the Kurds of violating the constitution in 
holding such a referendum for secession. For their part, the region’s authorities accused the 
federal government of themselves violating the constitution. The Kurdistan Regional 
Government even released a full report referring to the constitutional violations of 
Baghdad .  57
4.2 The four dimensions of press 
4.2.1 Dimension#1: Media market 
It is clear that the market for the media is an important factor for its sustainability and 
development. However, marketing methods and policies may differ from one place and 
  Article 140: 56
 First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation 
of the requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. 
 Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional 
Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and continue to 
the executive authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes 
completely (normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed 
territories to determine the will of their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.
 The full report in English is available here: http://cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/2017/57
Constitutional_violations_Sept_24_2017.pdf
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time to another. For the printed media, circulation numbers are of paramount consideration 
for editors in order to continually increase their readership. This runs the press towards a 
direction where numbers, tirage and sold outs matter. Therefore, mass circulation of 
different media, like any other product in any given market, automatically creates 
competition, even though now other methods of media marketing and circulation are 
pursued, such as the online market. However, the traditional newspaper still exists with its 
traditional markets. In the model which Hallin and Mancini (2004) present there is a focus 
on the wide differences in newspaper readership as one of the main indicators for 
differentiating among media systems in different countries. Therefore, the need to prioritise 
media circulation through marketing could be considered as one of the most important 
methods of sustainability for newspapers in western world. However, this might not apply 
in the same way in the KRI where democracy and institutional infrastructures including a 
free press are still at a fledgling stage.  
In general in the KRI, the press does not automatically feel obliged to seek economic 
independence through finding a market and sources of revenue. This is mainly because the 
majority of the press are affiliated to, or owned by, politicians or political parties, and there 
is a press budget allocated. However, the majority of these media claim that they attempt to 
be financially independent from political parties. Rudaw, for instance, is one of the media 
establishments in the region that considers itself a company concerned with marketing: 
[ …We are a company and of course we care about marketing. In fact we have 
been able to reach out to a large number of viewers, listeners and readers, by 
using different methods from printed newspapers to Android and iOS 
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applications: we therefore receive many advertising offers from outstanding 
companies and businesses both internationally and in Kurdistan. For the first 
time in the Kurdish media, we have been able to bring in sponsors for our 
programmes and publications. There is a good income to be had, but due to 
current financial crises in the KRI we also face difficulties. I can easily say that 
our income is more than the income of all the other KRI media establishments 
together. But still, the market has never been able to meet all our expenses or 
even a half of our expenses, and we still need a source of support. ]  
(Appendix, Interview #3) 
Rudaw is a major media channel with one of the largest audiences in the KRI. The 
channel’s main income source is its owner, Nechirvan Barzani, who is Deputy President of 
the leading political party and at the same time Prime Minister of the region. Rudaw is also 
one of the most active channels on social media. In general, media channels and 
newspapers in the KRI refuse to reveal their sources of income but it is almost obvious for 
the public to know what belongs to whom, where and how. These channels tend to reveal 
their identity by siding with a particular political agenda, either during an election 
campaign or even in a particular political case that may arise in the region. Usually 
audiences of media channels and readers of newspapers are aware to some extent of the 
ideological allegiance of what they read, watch or hear. The Director General of Rudaw 
disclosed the identity of the owner and income sources of the channel during our interview: 
Well, I will be frank because I am giving this interview to be used in an 
academic work. I have not even disclosed this on Rudaw itself when I was 
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interviewed on the first anniversary of Rudaw. As H. E. Necirvan Barzani 
himself does not declare it as his own project, why should I say that? But, that 
is true, Mr. Necirvan Barzani is the main support for this institution and it 
belongs to him, I am a manager here, I am not the owner.  
Although Rudaw is considered one of the professional channels in the region and they 
work at being as impartial as possible, they still belong to a political party which may 
impose its influence, especially critical moments. Meanwhile, this could be considered as a 
new way of politicising the media by introducing it as an independent, impartial and 
credible source and at the same time using the advantage of its popularity at times of party 
need. These types of media project are first established through huge investments by 
politicians who believe in the power of media. Later, they simply get accustomed to 
promoting a political agenda. This could be named as indirect political ownership and 
advantage from the media. The directors of this type of media, and journalists, tend to deny 
having political ties or obligations towards a political party. Ako Mohammed, Director 
General of Rudaw told us they have no relations with the KDP and are not part of their 
media apparatus: 
About our involvement with KDP and its media machine we have no 
connection to that. We do not receive anything from them and even at times 
they are harsher with us than other media channels. So, it is not fair to label us 
as affiliated to a party because even the political party does not consider us as 
one of them. Our main aim is to publish news professionally and we don't 
believe in the attacking form of media which is now the case in Kurdistan, we 
do not have any personal issues with anyone or any group.  
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This type of media is different from party media. In the case of party media, the main aim is 
to directly serve the party and its agenda. Therefore, there is a clear distinction between 
current party media and that during the period of revolution and in the mountains. Obviously, 
the main role played by the media of the mountain and rebel times was spreading national and 
revolutionary ideologies. The role of today’s media is to legitimise party performance and 
influence the vote in favour of the party. However, the way each political party defines media 
is totally different, and particularly as concerns marketing and revenue: 
[…we have an intellectual project, not one for benefit. We are not focusing on 
selling our newspapers or any other media product, that is not the main goal, 
but we still sell. Our aim, as I mentioned is not business it is rather journalism 
and culture. Our main income is not the market, we do not depend on the 
market. In our party budget for the media, we do not consider the revenue as 
income. We do not run our media with its revenue. ]  
(Appendix, Interview #5)
Seeking a market has not been the main burden for the media in the Kurdistan Region. 
Most media channels do not even have a marketing plan. Finding income resources is the 
last thing in the minds of editors and media decision-makers in the KRI. This is mainly 
because all the surviving media and press in the KRI are the ones owned and funded by 
political parties. The newspapers for instance, care little about circulation planning, and the 
revenue they receive from the selling of the newspaper is not really considered as their 
income. In addition, the market is also too weak to cover the expenses of media channels 
and the press in order to survive. In fact, there are also no serious companies or 
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establishments specialising in circulation. There is no postal service covering Iraq, neither 
is there one in the KRI. Local and city-to-city transport means do not function. These are 
considered among the main obstacles of circulation for the publications in KRI. One of the 
very first attempts to open a company for circulating newspapers was initiated by a 
political party. In June 2007, Tatar Company  was established following a decision by 58
KDP’s media and culture department. This company’s only purpose was the circulation of 
newspapers and publications all over the Kurdistan Region and sometimes even in 
Baghdad, Mosul and other parts of Iraq. At first, this company was available for use by 
press outlets regardless of affiliation, but later an order from the KDP limited it to KDP 
publications only.  
4.2.2 General market for the printed media in KRG 
This section details the general market for the printed media in KRG. The data comes from 
the general register of the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate and includes all the officially 
registered printed media in the KRI. The data was collected by the author during research 
for this dissertation.  
A dataset was created with 765 entries, with data on the following variables:  
Name of publication; owner of publication; language and province of publication ( but not 
of distribution); type of publication according to the number of times issued per week; year 
of first publication; printing house. These data were available from the official records for 
printed publications in KRG. Finally, the party affiliation for each publication was 
 Tatar Company was first established as a private company to distribute newspapers and 58
magazines in the KRI. Later it became part of the KDP media department.
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established in a qualitative way, through asking a number of experts with knowledge in the 
field to which party that publication belongs. 
The following data are described in this chapter (please see the Appendix for the entire 
dataset of the Newspapers registered with the Kurdistan Syndicate of Journalists).  
Article 4 of the Iraqi Constitution declares Arabic and Kurdish as Iraq’s two official languages 
together with the right of other minorities such as Turkmen, Syrian and Armenian to be 
educated in their mother tongue. However, in the KRI the main and the official language 
remains Kurdish and this is the main language of the press. In addition, other languages such 
as Assyrian, Turkmen, Arabic and recently English are used in the press. This right is also 
granted in the Kurdistan Region’s draft constitution.  
 Article Seven of the KRI (2009 draft constitution) is as follows: 
1) Kurdish is the official language of the Kurdistan Region. 
2) Official correspondence with the regional and federal authorities shall be in both Arabic 
and Kurdish. 
3) Teaching Arabic in the Kurdistan Region shall be mandatory. 
4) The Turkmen language is to be considered the language of education and culture for the 
Turkmen in addition to the Kurdish language. Syrian shall be the language of education 
and culture for those who speak it, in addition to the Kurdish language. 
Nonetheless, the Parliament of Kurdistan-Iraq, in 2015 passed a new law, Law No. 4, 2015, 
to form a new committee for drafting the constitution. A draft was previously prepared in 
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2009 but due to the internal disputes between the political parties about that draft, a re-
drafting was proposed. According to the law, the new committee is to consist of 21 
members representing the political diversity of the region, and is to finalise a new draft in a 
period not exceeding 90 days. Later, this committee and all its activities were halted as a 
result of political disputes over issues such as the amendment of the Kurdistan Presidency 
Law. 
At present the languages used in the Kurdistan Region’s press are Kurdish, Arabic, 
Turkmen and Assyrian. Kurdish is the first language for the majority of the press. The 
second is the use of both Kurdish and Arabic together. Turkmen and Assyrian languages 
are also used in their population areas in the press, which also publishes bilingually. For 
instance, Assyrian is more popular in Duhok and they Kurdish and Arabic also to publish 
and Turkmen in Erbil and Kirkouk where they also publish a trilingual press in Turkmen, 
Kurdish and Arabic. This is an indication that these minorities besides having a message 
for their own readers, also have things to say to the Kurdish and Arabic speakers in a 
society where they coexist.  
There are also two dialects of Kurdish spoken in the KRI, Sorani and Kurmancî (also 
called Badînî). Badînî is mainly spoken in Duhok governorate and also some districts and 
sub- districts of Erbil governorate. Thus, the major spoken dialect, which is also the official 
dialect of the government, is Soranî. Therefore, there the readership of newspapers 
published in Badînî is limited in other governorates of the KRI. For instance, Evro daily 
newspaper which is in Badînî Kurdish dialect is not able to find a market in other cities 
than Duhok. The same is not however true for the Soranî Kurdish newspaper which has a 
!  128
good circulation in Duhok and in Badînî-speaking areas: Government and political 
correspondence is mostly in Soranî and it remains the main medium of instruction in the 
region.  
Figure 1: Ownership of newspapers by province and city. 
Political parties own the majority of the press in the KRI although ownership is not 
necessarily direct: it may be through different channels. As well as the newspapers declared 
by political parties as their mouthpieces or owned by them, there are a number of 
newspapers declared as independent but which are nevertheless still connected in one way 
or another to political parties. Private individuals, non-profit organizations, business and 
profit groups can also be used in an indirect way that furthers the interests of one party or 
another.  
Moreover, even State institutions and public universities can be controlled by political 
parties according to their influence in the area. For instance, in Sulaimani where the PUK 
is in power, a newspaper published by a municipality or university will not stay neutral 
when it comes to PUK politics. The same is true for Duhok and the KDP because of the 
influence of this party in that governorate. This table shows the date when the newspaper 
was first published in each province.  According to this finding, the number of publications 
started to increase significantly after 2003. This had to do with the change of regime in Iraq 
after the US-led intervention and the end of Baath control over the media in the country. 
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Figure 2: Type of Newspaper by Province. 
 
4.2.3 
Dimension#2: Political parallelism 
When a century ago in 1898, the first Kurdish newspaper was published in Cairo, it had a 
clear political and national line and was therefore published secretly. This newspaper was 
named Kurdistan and was considered the Kurds’ first attempt at practising journalism. 
However, it was not easy to print and publish a Kurdish newspaper during that time due to 
the political restrictions. The Ottoman Empire set numerous obstacles and limitations for 
publications, and the state was in control of the press. Meanwhile, the founder of the 
newspaper, Miqdad Midhat Pasha, the founder of the newspaper, was determined to 
continue publishing Kurdistan. Nevertheless, the newspaper faced many difficulties 
including becoming a newspaper published in exile. Kurdistan was published for a dozen 
issues, then had to stop. Facing these types of restriction mainly imposed by the authorities 
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was the case of almost all Kurdish newspapers established after Kurdistan in those times. It 
was normal practice for Kurds to be banned from having publications in their mother 
tongue. Normally, newspapers were not permitted by the state. So newspapers had their 
beginnings by being published in secret, and irregularly. Threats and obstacles faced by the 
publication’s editors, mainly from the state, then shut them down. The motive for 
restricting publications was fear by successive governments of a spreading of a sense of 
national identity among the Kurds. 
  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is an explicit link between the rise of the 
Kurdish press and the Kurdish nationalism movement (Hassanpour, 1992; Ahmedzadeh, 
2003). Therefore, it can be argued that development of the Kurdish press has been in 
parallel with the Kurdish national movement especially in the Kurdish part of Iraq. At the 
same time, the evolution and rise of the press alongside the Kurdish national movement 
and revolution, have been inevitable during the twentieth century in the other Kurdish 
populated areas, in Turkey, Syria and Iran. In Iraq the persistent resistance of the Kurds 
was mainly focused on their national rights and seeking of identity. The movement opened 
up an enormous space for emerging, revolutionary media. This type of media was mainly 
established in the form of mountain mobile radio stations, non-periodical newspapers and a 
number of secret publications distributed inside secret cells mostly in the cities and towns. 
This type of media continued until the turning point of the revolution after the 1991 
political incidents in the area, especially in Iraq. The uprisings in the South and also 
northern parts of Iraq after the Gulf War gave the Kurdish national movement a new 
impetus. This was followed by the application of the ‘no-fly zone’ both in the South and in 
northern parts of Iraq, leading to the establishment of the autonomous administration for 
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the revolutionary Kurds. The period after this brought the Kurdish media out of exile: 
mountain radio stations and secret publications became established in the cities. That was 
when for the first time the newly founded parliament passed laws concerning the press and 
journalists.  
[…the media after uprising started to be framed in its form and it is developing until 
today. When we started after the mountain period there were only a handful of people 
who had an idea about journalism throughout the region. It was a big challenge to 
work with zero knowledge, but we persevered. We have always tried to keep our 
media up to date with modern developments and to adjust to global systems. We 
continuously encourage our staff to learn, and this is done through different 
capacity-building programmes inside and outside Kurdistan. ] 
(Appendix 3, Interview #2) 
A new reality came into being for the press and media, even if with a limited capacity, 
when the de facto autonomous Kurdistan Region came into existence. The absence of 
professionals, infrastructure, culture and technicians were among the main challenges of 
this period. Nevertheless, the region’s press witnessed an overwhelming eagerness to 
develop and improve. By the late 1990s, the number of newspapers, radio and TV stations 
were continuously increasing: the KRI upheld open policies towards the press and upheld 
its legal commitment to the principle of free speech. This was a unique case throughout 
Iraq and the standard of press in the KRI was by no means incomparable to that in 
Baghdad. What was known as the press in Baghdad was a handful of newspapers and 
media channels directly and strictly under the control of the Baath Regime. Therefore, the 
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2003 change of regime for the other parts of Iraq was a new period and a new era for the 
press. For the first time in the history of Iraq, the practice of a free press took hold, after 
the end of the Baath regime. This was a practice that had already been going on for 
approximately one decade in the Kurdistan region as a result of the region’s autonomy, and 
non interference of Baghdad after 1992. Thus, compared to other parts of Iraq, the 
Kurdistan region was in freer and better shape for its press to develop.  
In an interview, the secretary general of the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate quoted a 
number: 500, for magazines and newspapers published in the region, and he said the 
number changed rapidly on a daily basis (Interview, 11 November 2014). This number had 
exceeded 700 by late 2015 (Appendix 5, Newspapers in KRG). However, the press in 
Kurdistan faced a number of shortcomings and difficulties especially in regard to the 
political influence at that time. In an interview with Aza Qaradaghi, a journalist with more 
than 20 years’ experience who at the same time is a member of KDP’s culture and media 
department, the media’s situation was explained as below: 
[ …the media was started in this region by the political parties, and from those 
parties have emerged the structures of the media for the first time. This goes 
back to the political and social circumstances that the Kurdistan Region has 
experienced. During the years when Kurdistan was in rebellion and the 
Kurdish movement for liberation was going on, we did not merely use weapons 
to record victories: the press and means of media were also very important for 
the success of the revolution. They were used both to have the voice of their 
oppressed people heard in the world and also as a means of spreading 
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information and messages among themselves and their people. Media was an 
important part of standing against the invasion of Kurdistan, because invading 
Kurdistan was not only taking land but was also invading the culture and 
brains of people.  
Media has been one of the main pillars of political development in the Kurdistan region of 
Iraq. The parties turned a new page of agenda-setting using press and media channels in the 
era after 1992. The same revolutionary media that was used during the parties’ persistent 
struggle against the Baath regime became a calmer and rather freer media. Nevertheless, 
the same strategy was followed in the party media especially concerning the party 
members who worked for the party media. As for the parties, the press and communication 
means were of vast importance in reaching the public from the mountains and in 
legitimising the resistance as a just war for rights. During the time of mountain struggle, 
media played a vital role in gaining support from the citizens and in the recruitment of new 
fighters to the revolution and in receiving material support from the people. At the same 
time, as well as the political messages, the revolutionay press played an important role in 
preserving the culture and language of the Kurdish people. This was an important function 
of the mountain radio station when the Kurdish language was in danger of disappearing 
due to the hostile policies of the Baath regime, which banned the right of access to 
education or media in the mother tongue, and the use of which at all was limited, and 
prohibited in some cases. This was the situation of the press at the time of the resistance. 
Later, after the uprising and descent of the Peshmergas and political parties from the 
mountains to the cities, the media atmosphere also changed. However, party media 
continued to play an important role in preserving the language and culture side by side with 
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practising the partisan rule. In the period after the uprising the main focus and priority 
shifted from nationalistic, partisan messages alone to new developments: messages that 
included political marketing, and provision of information. 
[… the period after the revolution when we came into cities, we decided to 
continue our media: we still believed that there was a need for media to spread 
national awareness. ] 
(Appendix 3, Interview #5) 
One of the main challenges of the media after 1992 was the lack of professionals in the 
field. The media continued with the same staff from the mountains and in time new people 
were trained just by doing the job. There was no school or even training provided to 
journalists in the 1990s in the KRI and most of the practitioners in the field were writers or 
those who had had who sufficient education to read and write in Kurdish. In the late 1990s 
there were attempts by different groups of writers and Kurdish intellectuals to transform 
the Kurdistan Region’s press from a party press into an independent press. A number of 
attempts were translated into reality and newspapers such as Hawlati were carrying the flag 
of independent journalism. Despite the eagerness and serious endeavours made to move 
towards an independent press, it was not easy to start. A number of difficulties faced those 
attempting independent reporting and journalism in the KRI, which are still present today. 
Here are some of them:  
• Not having economic independence 
• The lack of a media market to generate income 
• The presence of powerful political parties which control the media 
!  135
• The absence of legal backing for the rise of an independent press 
• The weak role of the state in supporting a free and independent press in the KRI. 
At the same time, there are a number of press and media channels in the KRI that claim to 
be independent. Most of these self-styled independent channels are owned and operated by 
political parties side by side with the officially-known party media. Regarding the rise of 
an independent press in Kurdistan, Aza Qaradaghi calls them the ‘Recycle bin of parties’. 
He uses the ‘recycle’ phrase to refer to attacks by one party against another through 
particular media. According to Qaradaghi, having diverse viewpoints is not sufficient for 
the press to define itself as impartial or independent. 
‘This type of press is used by all political powers to attack one another and in return 
the media receives funds. This press allows everyone to publish and one can see 
articles supporting one particular party, with articles attacking that party in the 
same issue. ‘Awene’ and ‘Hawlati’ are good examples of such a press. This diversity 
in the Kurdish press is manipulated by parties as an indirect way of sending each 
other messages that they are unable to send directly.’ 
(Appendix 3, Interview #2). 
Today, one of the most popular media establishments in the region is Rudaw Media Network. 
Despite their claim of being independent and self-governing, it was evidently founded by 
Nechirvan Barzani, Deputy President of the KDP and Prime Minister of the KRI. The Rudaw 
company consists of a 24/7 HD satellite news TV and radio channel in addition to a weekly 
paper. They have attempted to report from around the world and from time to time Rudaw 
correspondents appear live in European countries, in the US and UK and in countries in the 
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Middle East. Rudaw is based in Erbil and was founded in 2012. 
Bas newspaper is another newspaper that is funded by the KDP and has been published in Erbil 
since 2012. They have a weekly newspaper and their online news web platform  is also popular 59
and operates in six languages. Since the beginning preparations were being made by Bas News 
Agency to establish a modern, professional TV news channel in Kurdistan. The Change 
Movement first started with an expanded media machine in 2009. They used to have the 
newspaper Rojname which they closed to focus more on their TV channel KNN, in addition to a 
number of online sources. They are mainly based in Sulaimani. Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), 
Kumal, also closed their printing media in order to concentrate on Payam TV and their online 
publications. Xendan is another publication house that emerged in Sulaimani. They have 
published Aso newspaper since 2004 and they consider Aso the first daily paper published in the 
KRI. Aso has been published weekly, monthly, three times a week and daily. Now it has stopped 
being published, but Xendan online news continues and is among the most active outlets in the 
KRI. Xendan is said to be tied to, owned and controlled by PUK members. 
  
Kurdistani Nwe, as the official mouthpiece newspaper of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
has been published continuously since its foundation in 1992. In addition to this daily newspaper 
there are a number of other newspapers and magazines published by, and closely tied to, 
Kurdistani Nwe. On the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) side, the official mouthpiece 
newspaper, Khabat (Xebat) has been published continuously since 1959. This newspaper is 
considered the first formal newspaper of a political party in the KRI. These two newspapers are 
directly run by the media departments of these parties. Besides the two officially declared 
  The website is: http://www.basnews.com59
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newspapers, as described, these two parties have numerous other undeclared newspapers which 
they fund. It is not only the KDP and PUK, but other political parties too, which follow the same 
method of owning newspapers.  
Hewler is another daily published in capital city Erbil. Without saying so, it obviously belongs to 
the KDP and together with Xebat is located inside the main building of the KDP department for 
culture and media. A weekly magazine, a new online channel, and an English-language weekly 
The Kurdish Globe are also published by this department and located in the building. In addition, 
there are tens of other newspapers, magazines, radio and TV channels being published or 
broadcast throughout the KRI under the auspices of the KDP culture and media department. The 
department pays attention to online and social media as well, keeping the party active online 
through a number of web pages, Facebook pages, Twitter feeds and through YouTube and other 
outlets. Other political parties pursue the same intensive media programme. For instance, the 
Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) has published Yekgirtu weekly newspaper since their foundation 
in 1994. This Islamic party is also very active in broadcasting, and a satellite TV channel named 
Spede together with Yekgirtu Radio are the official party outlets. The KIU has its well-known 
local radio stations in Duhok, Erbil and Sulaimani, and more specifically for its religious 
ceremonies’ coverage because of the focus of this party in reaching out to the public through 
religion. Hence, the much bigger focus is on the religious programmes on radio and TV. 
From the above, it can be argued that the press in the KRI is heavily under the control of political 
parties. This leads to less of a sense of responsibility to their readers, and, rather, a sense of 
responsibility to their political parties. We have said that political parties own almost all the press 
Kurdistan. Whether direct or indirect ownership, it impacts on whether the press develops from 
!  138
being partisan to being independent and impartial; whether the motive becomes more to inform 
readers than to satisfy politicians. This might also be related to the fact that the region is still a 
state-in-the-making. The findings of Tamar Liebes (2000) in her study on Israel are relevant to 
this: ‘media stays under control of political and cultural elites during the process of nation-
building and the formation of the new nation-state (p. 24). 
4.2.4 Dimension#3: Professionalization of journalism 
In their model, Hallin and Mancini (2004) present the practice of a profession as ‘based on 
systematic knowledge or doctrine acquired only through long prescribed training’ (Wilensky 
1964: 138). Further, they focus on three dimensions of professionalization which they refer to as 
being ‘fairly related’. These three dimensions of professionalization are: Autonomy, Distinct 
professional norms and Public service orientation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 36). Autonomy is 
an important factor of professionalization of the press and in this model the focus is ‘not 
necessarily the autonomy of individual journalists, but of the corps of journalists taken as a 
whole’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 34-37). However, autonomy is not perceived to have existed 
by the majority of the journalists contacted during our survey for this thesis. When asked about 
ownership, 93% of the journalists contacted state that the newspapers they work for are owned 
by either political parties or politicians. 49% of the journalists contacted for this survey say that 
the newspaper they work for is owned by the political parties, while more than 45% say that their 
newspaper is owned by politicians.  
For the second dimension which is introduced as Distinct professional norms (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004: 36), they specifically refer to the practice of journalism organised as a style of life 
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for journalists. This includes ethical principles and professionalism. In case of the KRI, the 
ethical principles are not officially declared but rather defined and organised among the 
journalists themselves. The practice of this profession is regulated mainly by laws passed by 
Parliament in the KRI, as described in previous chapters. Concerning professionalization, as also 
noted by Hallin and Mancini (2004), this has to do with the autonomy of the press. 
Professionalization is affordable when ‘journalism is thus likely to be manifested in criteria of 
newsworthiness on which journalists will agree regardless of their political orientations, as well 
as a tendency for journalists to define their standing in the field in terms of the opinions of fellow 
journalists, rather than those of outsiders – political party leaders, for example, or 
stockholders’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 37).  
In our survey, when asked about the political affiliation of the journalists, approximately 25% of 
respondents avoided answering the question, while another 62% of the journalists answered that 
they have a party affiliation. The political affiliation of the journalists varies from one province 
to another among the three provinces where this questionnaire was distributed. The largest group 
were Duhok journalists, and 76% of them declared a political affiliation, 66% in Erbil and 35% 
in Sulaimani. This means that the autonomy of the journalists is not guaranteed, while the 
majority of them clearly state a political affiliation to at least one political party. Not only that, 
but journalists also feel pressured at work by political parties, by the state or by the media 
decision-makers. With regard to pressure from a political party or from some authority 
preventing them from writing about a particular issue, 24% of journalists feel this pressure. 73% 
gave the opposite answer and declare no pressure from a political party to write or not write 
about a certain subject. The pressure is slightly different when it comes to direct contact with the 
decision-makers of the newspaper. 20% declare feeling pressure from the editor of a newspaper, 
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while 79% feel no pressure from the editor of the newspaper. As well as all this, 19% of 
participants in this survey state that they have been subject to physical attack, imprisonment or 
threat during their work. This explains why it is difficult for an autonomous journalism to get 
established and to function professionally.  
In addition, many journalists in Kurdistan have other jobs and they are not simply practising 
journalism. 50% of the journalists contacted state that they have other jobs in addition to working 
as journalists. This is related to the economic conditions in the region in general and in the field 
of the press in particular. However, for the purpose of this research a question was asked about 
the professional background of journalists, given the fact that journalism both as a practice and a 
profession is new to the region. Only 12% of journalists contacted said they hold a degree in 
journalism.  
Public service orientation is also introduced by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as the third important 
dimensions of professionalism. This is largely related to the school of social responsibility of the 
media (see as well in Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’s social responsibility theory of the 
press,that belongs to this era in the scholarship on professionalism). 
Journalism as a profession is practised by different groups of people. To practise professionally, 
some receive education in this field and some learn through the practice of doing the job, and 
some do both. However, the KRI journalism is traditionally practised by party members who also 
learn by practise. Schools and departments of media and journalism only started a few years ago 
in the KRI. The graduates of these departments are starting to enter the field. However, receiving 
education in the field of journalism alone is not sufficient to have attained the skills of 
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journalism. Overall, scholars argue that with the opportunity to practise and be educated in 
parallel level, there will be better outcomes (Gaunt et al, 1992). 
The indicators for professionalism adopted in this thesis are as follows: autonomy and 
independence, education, experience and years of work, training and courses, self-perceptions of 
independence, self-censorship and a journalist's sense of duty to national security. These 
indicators are presented in the next chapter with the results of the questionnaire distributed 
among journalists in all three provinces of the KRI. 
4.2.5 Dimension #4: The role of the state 
Numerous laws have been adopted by the Parliament of Kurdistan since its establishment in 
1992. It is the Law of journalism, No. 35, 2007, that concerns our study. This law is considered 
one of the most important legal interventions in the field of the media in the KRI. However, the 
role of the state concerning the press is two-fold and is not merely related to this law or its 
implementation in the region. Nevertheless, understanding this law and its role in shaping media 
activities in the region is one way of understanding the state’s role in dealing with the media. 
Meanwhile, there must be a closer look at the legal and executive powers political parties hold to 
understand the role that they play in shaping reality.  
The party interference in the press in the KRI is almost inevitable. It is not even considered as 
interference any more, it is owning and controlling the press and media. As an illustration, the 
KRI has been, and still is, functioning as a cake of two halves, one for the KDP and other for the 
PUK. This two-administration reality is a leftover of the civil war of the 1990s between the two 
parties. Silemani and its surrounding areas are mainly controlled by the PUK and in the other 
part is the KDP with its control over Duhok and Erbil. This division was largely shaped during 
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the civil war from 1994. Although the war ended in 1998, the two-administration reality 
remained. Although following the 2005 elections and the two further elections in 2009 and 2013 
the government was unified, and there was only one governing body in the capital city in Erbil, 
the two-administration mentality continues to rule until today. The characteristics of dichotic 
administrations; one in Erbil and another in Silemani, can still be seen on the ground in the ruling 
system of the region. Unification was merely a power sharing of 50% for each party. 
The two parties signed an agreement on 27 July 2007, known as the Strategic Agreement. It 
focuses on the meeting of the political relations between them in what is related to power-sharing 
at both levels, the KRI and Iraq. As a result the two parties have always continued to divide 
power among themselves whether in one administration or in separate ones. 
To clarify, a reference is made to the process of forming a council of ministers of KRG in 2014. 
According to Decree 56, Law No. 1, 1992 Parliament nominates both prime minister and a 
deputy to form the cabinet in a period of time not exceeding 30 days (Law 56, 1992). The fact is 
that this law is designed according to the reality of the two-party control of the region. When one 
of the two parties fills the position of prime minister, the other party automatically fills the post 
of deputy prime minister. This process of ‘couple-nominating’ was one of the heated subjects of 
the formation of the eighth cabinet of the KRI. This led to an amendment of the law later on 21 
May, so that the nomination process no longer goes through choosing a couple (Law No. 56, 
Amendment 1, 2014).  
To return to the argument, in the KRI there is no single media outlet, news channel or even 
newspaper that is officially owned by the state. However, there are funds and subsidies provided 
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by the state to support media activities. Meanwhile, almost all the press and media in the KRI are 
owned by parties, mainly by the KDP and the PUK. 
Another way of controlling the press is through civil society organizations such as the Kurdistan 
Journalists Syndicate which was formally designed to be a local union of journalists. The ruling 
system of the region has been able to politicize civil society organizations. Besides the internal 
organizations of the two main political parties, the KDP and PUK, that include women, students, 
lawyers, engineers, doctors, teachers, journalists, there are many other civil society organizations 
that are fully controlled by the parties. These groups are probably considered the backbone of the 
political organization of both parties inside society.  
The press law of Kurdistan recognizes that a syndicate is the legal framework for journalists and 
they are encouraged to become members. This law makes membership of this organization a 
compulsory duty for journalists who practise in the KRI: the law provides protection only to 
members of the syndicate. In addition, as a way of holding journalists under control, the 
government grants pieces of land and real estate to journalists through the syndicate, which is 
almost a continuous process: those who have not received any land are put on the waiting list for 
the next government grant. This ties journalists to the syndicate and government will, in order to 
be subsidised by the state. Therefore, the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate (KJS) is accused of 
being a partisan organisation under the direct control of political parties. The survey shows that 
many journalists believe that the syndicate is form of political control of the media in the region. 
Although the syndicate does hold periodical elections, they are also controlled by political 
parties. The two main parties have copied their model of shared government to organisations, so 
that the syndicate administration is also a shared one. In the last election in 2010 the secretary 
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and deputy had already been assigned by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and PUK. 
According to a political agreement between the two parties the position of the secretary of the 
KJS belongs to the KDP and the deputy to the PUK. 
Conclusion  
From what is explained above, it emerges that the press in the Kurdistan region is heavily under 
the control of political parties. This makes them feel a lesser responsibility towards their readers 
than towards their political parties. As described, political parties in Kurdistan own almost all the 
press. This ownership whether direct or indirect, has an influence on the development of the 
press from a partisan to an independent, impartial press that cares more for readers being 
informed than for politicians being satisfied. Many current political leaders have worked as press 
editors and this continues today. Editors and press decision-makers in the KRI are mainly the 
senior members of the political party that owns the press. To conclude, first, the media market in 
the KRI is weak. This is mainly due to the funds and subsidies that the press receive from the 
political party owner on a regular basis. There is no eagerness or serious attempts to expand the 
market and revenue, as the budget from the party covers all expenses. This causes the market for 
the press to be weak. Second, the political party control of press in some cases has made the 
press publish what concerns their parties rather than their readers. This makes the political 
parallelism to be at a high level and strong in the KRI. Third, professionalism is also a process-
in-the-making. Most journalists have no background in the field. This is also related to the 
newness of journalism in the KRI. The majority of journalists learn by doing the job. The recent 
establishment of journalism and media departments at the KRI universities are contributing to 
development in the field and to capacity-building of the practitioners. Finally, the role of the state 
is to be argued mainly in what is related to the laws of press and journalism in the KRI. Despite 
their limitations, the laws are good documents that if  implemented properly would lead to 
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positive developments in the KRI press. Having the texts of written laws is one thing: their 
proper implementation is another. The weak implementation of the press-related laws has been 
one of the main obstacles to press development in the KRI.  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CHAPTER FIVE: THE VIEW OF JOURNALISTS ON 
THE PRESS AND MEDIA IN THE KURDISTAN REGION 
OF IRAQ: CONTROL, RESTRICTION AND SELF-
CENSORSHIP  
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the relationships between journalism and politics in the KRI, based 
on the answers to questionnaires distributed among the journalists of daily and weekly 
newspapers in the region.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: first, work experience, education and gender of 
respondents are described, followed by accounts for ownership and political affiliation of 
newspapers, and political affiliation of journalists. Finally, pressures and mechanisms to 
restrict the media and freedom of speech from the side of politics are described.  
The total number of journalists that work for the press is unknown. There is no official 
register. The exact number of press and media outlets registered with the Syndicate of 
Journalists is available (see Appendix 6): there were 765 outlets of different types (e.g. 
dailies, weekly and monthly publications). One hundred and fifty forms were distributed in 
the period June-July 2014 among the journalists of the three provinces of the KRI, 50 for 
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each province. There were 131 returns: 49 from Duhok, 44 from Erbil, and 38 from 
Silemani. Out of the total respondents, 75% work for daily newspapers and the remaining 
25% work for weekly newspapers. 
5.1 The respondents: age, gender and work experience 
The data from our questionnaire shows that males dominate among KRI journalists. 
Approximately 88% of respondents are male. Although there has been no previous study 
concerning the gender representation in the KRI press, the female percentage has been 
increasing. According to Aza Hasib, ‘only a dozen female journalists worked in the field in 
1992 and the number is higher nowadays: this shows development both in the field and the 
society’ (Interview #4, Aza Hesib). This is also related to the religious and tribal reality of a 
patriarchal society in the KRI that has led to gender imbalances, not only in journalism, but 
also in other professions. The responses show 80% of the female respondents are younger 
than 35 years old. The number of women working at TV channels is notably higher 
especially in TV shows and as news presenters. Women’s representation in the KRI, 
especially in politics, is treated a positive discrimination. For instance, a quota law 
guarantees a 30% female representation in Parliament. The quota law for women obliges 
political parties to have at least 30% women candidates, and 30% of winning seats in each 
party have to be taken by women. However, this quota does not necessarily translate into 
other positions such as in the cabinet, or other political institutions.  
5.2 Education and professional experience 
The questionnaire was distributed among journalists of the three governorates of the KRI. 
Out of 131 respondents 38% are from Duhok governorate, 34% from Erbil, and 29% from 
!  148
Silemani. Only 12% of journalists contacted hold a degree in journalism. This is partly 
related to the novelty of the field as an academic branch at universities and education 
institutions in the KRI. Regarding training courses for journalists in Iraq, after 2003 
USAID introduced a programme called Iraqi Civil Society and Independent Media 
Program (ICSP). This programme budget from 2004-2007 amounted to $57,104,492 
dollars (Al-Rawi, 2012: 58). A document from the US embassy in Iraq to the US secretary 
of state-Iraq entitled Media Gold Rush in ‘Virtual Marketplace’ refers to the professional 
capacity-building of the Iraqis (WikiLeaks, 2016): 
The Iraqi media has acquired important professional capacity. Since April, 
2005 over one thousand Iraqi journalists and managers have received 
technical training from USAID on investigative journalism and strategic 
management. Over two hundred journalists have received informal training by 
working with the MNF-I (Multi-National Force – Iraq) and Embassy press 
officers, and up to one hundred have participated in PAS (international study) 
exchange programs in the US and the region. The US has also invested heavily 
in infrastructure and training for both Iraq's independent media and 
telecommunications regulation and the Independent Media Network, both 
established by the CPA. 
  
After 2003, the Iraqi media was supported from different sources in order to be empowered 
and developed. These funds were mainly from state funds, international media channels 
such as the BBC and also international organizations including the UN, IREX [The 
International Research and Exchanges Board], IWPR [Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting] (Al-Rawi, 2012: 59). The funds were mainly focused on the training of 
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journalists and the development of Iraqi local media. Numerous training courses were held 
all over Iraq and a number of local media outlets were funded to develop. The aim was to 
democratise the country and activate an independent impartial media that compliments the 
democratisation process. The impact of these courses might have had a positive outcome 
for the individuals involved, but in general what was built from post-2003 was an ethnic, 
sectarian, religious media. Almost all the sectarian, religious and ethnic groups have their 
own media. At the first glance this might seem like a diverse media and that every 
community and group has their own freedom of expression, but in fact this diversity fosters 
further division and conflict among these groups. In other words, when each ethnic or 
religious group own their own media, there is a risk that such outlets foster conflict, 
especially each group has its own agenda and ideology.  
In the KRI, training courses for media and press development were also held. When asked, 
82% of journalists reported that they had received training and 18% declared that they had 
not received any training at all. The experience of journalists in the region derives mainly 
through practice and there has been little opportunity for them to receive education and 
follow appropriate training at school. Even today journalism does not necessarily focus on 
the study of journalism as the main requirement for practising in the field. In fact, one 
suggests ‘a mixture of both training at school and meanwhile practising the job’ 
demonstrates better results (Gaunt et al, 1992: 459). 77% of respondents had more than 
seven years’ work experience, and the other 23% less. This shows that the majority of KRI 
journalists have gained their knowledge about the field through experience. For majority of 
them this experience has been complimented by having the opportunity to attend training 
courses, while there are some who have not received any training and continue to practise. 
For some who work in the KRI media with no journalism background or any other serious 
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involvement in the media, this is merely a job provided for them by their political parties. 
Occasionally a party needs to transfer a cadre from one place to another, so a position in 
their media channels or newspapers is an option to be considered. Some manage to 
integrate and learn the job, and sometimes they stay as party ‘watchers’ inside the 
institution.  
5.3 Second job for journalists  
Fifty per cent of journalists contacted for this survey declared that they also have another 
job. This, at first glance gives an impression that journalists seek other sources of income 
and to some extent that is true. Low salaries oblige journalists do another job alongside 
their journalism. However, the Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate, 
Azad Hamadamin has a different opinion: 
It depends on the journalists themselves and the quality of the job whether they 
enjoy working for their newspapers or media. I know many journalists who 
only do journalism and they don't really find time for a second job. Second, 
there are many teachers, writers, intellectuals who have other jobs but they do 
journalism as well. It really depends on the relation between them and their 
job. There were times when the media was not paying enough for a journalist 
to survive but nowadays the market is in competition and if you are a good 
journalist, you have good opportunities. (Appendix 3, Interview #2). 
The fact that those who are working as journalists have other jobs could also be related 
to the novelty of the field in the KRI. The market has little capacity to provide for 
media training and this gives space to those teachers, graduates with an interest in the 
field to enter journalism and become a part of it. They mainly keep their first job and 
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continue doing both. Overall, the reason to keep two jobs at the same time is obviously 
economic. The KRI is going through economic shortages especially due to revenue 
disputes between the federal and regional governments. The central government has 
stopped providing the region with their budget share as well as public service wages 
since January 2014, resulting in the KRI’s incapacity to pay wages and salaries 
regularly. 
5.4 Newspaper ownership, political affiliation of journalists and political 
affiliation of newspapers 
Ninety-three per cent of journalists contacted declared that the newspapers they work for 
are owned either by political parties or businesses or companies. Despite the official party 
media directly owned by political parties, there are some local newspapers with slightly 
more freedom to report on other issues than pure partisan subjects. Many such newspapers 
claim to be independent but as one of our interviewees said, it is not that difficult to tell to 
which side they belong: 
The role that political parties played in establishing media in Kurdistan should 
not be ignored. Political parties in the KRI are considered the establishers of 
the media in the Kurdistan Region. These political parties came to the cities 
with a background of mountain media (rebellion media) with no actual practice 
of modern journalism. The origins of the media in the region can be traced 
back to the political parties’ return to the cities. Nowadays, the media in the 
KRI is fully controlled by political parties and it is not difficult to tell to which 
party a newspaper belongs by only looking at the first page titles and 
headlines. 
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(Appendix 3, Interview #4). 
In the KRI there are examples of newspapers directly owned and controlled by political 
parties and a part of the party media apparatus, which claim to be independent. For 
instance Evro daily, published in Duhok declares on its front page that it is independent, 
while, in fact, it is part of the KDP media machine, all salaries and funds being provided by 
the party. Hawler is another example of a party newspaper which claims to be independent. 
However, it is located inside the KDP media department’s building and all the staff are 
party members. This newspaper is published and distributed for free. It could be considered 
as an example of a new method of party media influence in the KRI. This is referred to by 
Mahmoud Mohammed, the KDP politburo member in charge of the media department, as 
an intellectual project and as spreading education.  
Our aim is spreading culture and education, contributing to strengthening the 
language, and overall we have an intellectual project, not one for benefit. We are not 
focusing on selling our newspapers or any other media product, that is not the main 
goal, but we still sell. Our aim as I mentioned is not business, it is rather journalism 
and culture. Our main income is not the market, we do not depend on the market. In 
our political party budget for media we do not consider the revenue as income. We 
do not run our media with its revenue. 
(Appendix 3, Interview #5). 
Political parties seek all possible ways of reaching out to the public. Politicians have 
understood the importance of the press in making an impact and creating public opinion. 
Thus today there is major press and media competition between the political parties. One 
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way of feeling empowered for the political parties is to see their media in a powerful 
position. This helps them believe that they are in a secure position, that the press will make 
a positive difference in the way people support and vote for their party. Therefore, 
politicians come up with innovative ideas to control the media, and the KRI political 
parties are a case in point. One established a media channel with their money, employed 
staff and created full support systems and introduced it as an independent channel. Another 
established a full-colour newspaper, with the largest country-wide circulation in Iraq 
distributed and given away free of charge. Hawler is an example of such media and KDP 
politicians point to it with cultural pride: 
[…KDP press has many things that we are proud of. One of them is the Hawler 
newspaper which is a new experiment in KRI journalism. As KDP, we wanted to 
introduce a new type of press to Kurdish journalism. This is a daily newspaper which 
is published with a large tirage and widely distributed free of charge. The publication 
contributes to national awareness and information in the Kurdistan Region. This is 
also a good start by the KDP in creating a strong tie between people and the press. ] 
(Appendix 3, Interview #6) 
There are cases where media claim to be independent and private, while actually they are not, 
e.g. the newly-launched media company Rudaw. Rudaw has a large audience and indirectly 
belongs to the KDP. .Its owner Necirvan Barzani is Deputy President of the KDP and current 
Prime Minister of Kurdistan. Rudaw has managed to recruit those journalists who were 
working with the opposition party media channels by attracting them with well-paid contracts. 
For the KDP, perhaps, one of the main achievements of this channel is the previous 
experience of those journalists of the opposition media who now work under the umbrella of 
this semi-political channel, which claims that it has balanced news-making, is independent 
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and away from any party influence. However, it is not common to see reports or news that go 
against the KDP political. line. Here is when ownership matters. The other self-styled 
independent channel is Nalia Radio and Television (NRT), owned by Shaswar Abdulwahid, a 
businessman who led the No Campaign for the KRI referendum. NRT was automatically 
under the influence of the No Campaign and the channel owner of was provided with 
extensive coverage to practise his politics. The Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Journalists 
Syndicate considers that whatever media channels and newspapers claim about being 
independent, the majority of them are owned by political parties: 
The Press in Kurdistan is either fully political or semi political. We might have 
independent journalists but there no independent press in Kurdistan. There are 
some newspapers launched here which believe that they are independent as 
long as they attack the government and criticize any act of state, while they 
belong to a political party that might be in opposition. Political parties own 
99% of the media in the KRI.  
(Appendix 3, Interview #2) 
Partisanship of the media has a history in the region. For instance, the radio stations have been 
used as a means of sending nationalistic messages during the mountain revolutions. The station 
equipment and machine were usually in a backpack carried by Peshmargas from one cave to 
another in mountainous rebel times. Radio continued to be an influential means of 
communication until the civil war between the PUK and KDP started. 
However, the role that political parties played in establishing the media in Kurdistan is not to be 
ignored. Overall, the political parties are considered as the founders of the media in Kurdistan 
Region. Obviously, they came to the cities with a background of mountain and rebellion media, 
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with no actual practice of modern journalism. Thus, a party-established media is not necessarily 
a typical media or press, but over time it has developed and that development continues. 
5.5 Political or ideological affiliation of newspapers and journalists 
When asked about political affiliation of the newspapers, journalists were evenly split. Forty-
seven per cent of them believe that the newspaper they work with has a political affiliation while 
45% believe their newspaper has no political affiliation. This is also related to the transition from 
partisan and mouthpiece media to semi-partisan and relatively independent media in the KRI. 
Media outlets declare themselves independent while their funds, salaries and all expenses 
directly or indirectly come from political parties. In return, the newspapers are expected to show 
support towards the politics of these parties ‘in between their lines’.  
Although party control of the press has always been the case in the KRI, methods continue to 
change over time. As a matter of fact, the press and media was mainly established by the political 
parties and their main aim was and still is to use it in favour of their politics. However, 
journalists are not fully chained by party politics. When asked if they agree that the newspaper 
they work for receives orders and directions from the owners, 76% of journalists ‘strongly 
agree’, ‘agree’ and ‘partially agree’ that that is the case.. The chief editor of Hawler told us that 
they do not face any kind of pressure in their work and they are free to report anything unless it 
is against the party’s politics: 
[…We do not have anyone controlling us and we are not under any kind of 
pressure to do this and not do that but we are rather free in practising 
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journalism under one condition only, which is not doing anything that opposes 
the main line of our political party. We are members of the KDP and we know 
what is good and what is bad for our party. Meanwhile, we shall be aware that 
what we do is different from politics and we must practise our profession as 
journalists ].  
(Appendix 3, Interview #6). 
Another usage of this type of press, indirectly linked to the political parties, is to express 
and touch upon subject matters which other, officially owned party press, would not report. 
For example, there are times when two or more parties publicly agree on certain policies, 
while within the parties there are concerns about the agreement. This is the time when they 
use this type of newspaper to express what they really mean. However, the mass media 
attacks by one party against one or more other parties happen when they receive 
instructions from politburo: 
[…There are times when a party’s gets instructions to avoid touching certain 
subjects. Also there are times when we ask for a massive concentration on a 
group or a political party. We give instructions, for instance, to start attacking 
the politics of a certain party.]  
(Appendix 3, Interview #4). 
When asked about journalists’ political affiliation, nearly 25% of the respondents avoided 
giving an answer. Out of those who responded, 62% admitted that they have a party 
affiliation. When respondents are divided by governorates, the results are as follows: 76% 
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in Duhok, 66% in Erbil and 35% in Suliemani. Society in general is politicised and 
affiliation to one party or another has become part of an individual’s identity. Given the 
politicised atmosphere of the media in the Kurdistan Region and the way the media is 
controlled by political parties, it is normal to see followers and members of the same party 
working as journalists. As stated before, the majority of the party-owned media are run by 
their own senior members and they practise their political duty through journalism.  
Forty-five per cent of the total number of respondents answered that they are members of 
the same political party that owns the newspaper they work for. The respondents from 
Duhok governorate are mostly working for their own party’s newspaper. The reason is that 
the main two dailies published in Duhok belong to the KDP and the KDP receives more 
than 90% of its votes in Duhok governorate. This is when the journalists do not necessarily 
need instructions from their political party because they and their chief editors all know 
what to write: 
We do not need instructions! Most of us are KDP cadres, we know our party 
politics and we can differentiate between what is good and what is bad.  
(Appendix 3, Interview #6) 
When asked to agree or disagree that: the press is a political project of political parties and 
all their disputes, agreements and disagreements are reflected in their media, 44% partially 
agree that the media is politicized and is a place where political groups tend to settle accounts 
among themselves. Only 5% of the participants strongly disagree with this particular 
statement. 
5.6 Pressure and physical attack on journalists 
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Concerning political pressure to join a certain party, 84% have felt no pressure while 8% 
prefer not to respond and 8% declare that yes, they have faced it. Concerning pressure from 
a political party or group preventing them from writing about a particular issue, 24% of 
journalists felt this pressure. However, 73% declare the opposite and stated they 
experienced no pressure from a political party whether or not to write about a certain topic.  
There are various ways of imposing pressure on journalists in the KRI. For instance during 
the time of war, which started in 2014, journalists received strict advice to act responsibly. 
There were concerns about issues considered by the state as sensitive issues related to 
national security and that journalists must pay attention and deal with them carefully. The 
Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate released remarks on the journalists’ responsibilities, 
especially during the coverage of conflict, and published the following statement on 24 
October 2016: 
[The Council of the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate announces the following 
statement in order to create awareness among the journalists and media channels 
working in crisis and conflict zones. The following remarks are to be taken into 
account by the journalists during the events: 
• The freedom of the press is a preserved principle of the Kurdistan Journalists 
Syndicate and adheres to Law No. 35. Hence the Syndicate calls all the parties 
involved to provide the journalists and press with freedom to practise their 
profession without discrimination.  
• The journalists and the press, especially during this time, must create harmony 
between their professional and their national duty.  
• The principle of protecting National Security is also a professional principle. For 
that reason, the concerned institutions such as the Ministry of Peshmerga and 
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Ministry of Interior shall propose a roadmap for journalists regarding the issues 
related to national security. For this reason, the related institutions shall cooperate 
with the Journalists Syndicate to make sure all the journalists and press abide by the 
roadmap. 
•  Media developments have made it easy for journalists to broadcast live pictures 
and voices from anywhere. This shall be regulated inside the cities and more 
specifically on the frontlines of the war.  
• The Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate proposes to come up with an agreement 
between the syndicate and the press and media channels on improving the 
performance of journalism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 
• The source of information shall be the official sources, as in 2014 when we 
proposed having the spokesperson of the Peshmerga Ministry as the official source 
for the information about the war. However, at that time this request was not taken 
into account. 
• Due to an agreement between the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate and the 
International Federation of Journalists, an office for the protection of journalists 
protection was opened in the KRI. The office delivered tens of training courses for 
journalists and the subject has been a curriculum topic in some of the journalism 
schools. Therefore the Syndicate proposes the following: 
• Media channels shall send those journalists who have expertise in covering the war. 
• Protective equipment must be provided for the journalists. 
• The Syndicate is ready to provide training in this regard to any media channel 
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which requires it.]60
Above is an example of pressure on journalists in the form of protecting National Security. 
As clearly mentioned in the third point, the principle of national security is as important as 
the professional principle. This means that not taking national security into account puts 
your professional practice in question. Meanwhile, no one has ever introduced or defined 
national security and it can be anything a journalist does which is not liked by the 
authorities. Thus, journalists or the press can be accused of not practising professionally 
basically because national security equals professionalism. Prior to that (point two), the 
statement requests journalists to harmonise their professional duty and national duty. This 
is another headache for the journalists and another way to pressure them. The question: 
what is that harmony? Where and how should that harmony be kept? After that, in point 
six, when the Syndicate insists on their previo s plea to have the official spokesperson of 
the Ministry as the only source of information – this seems to be very unrealistic, 
especially when this statement starts with the belief of the Syndicate in the freedom of 
press, to ask journalists to take all their information about the war from the spokesperson 
of the Ministry. Otherwise, the statement of the Syndicate is fair. And, for instance, it is 
very important for the media channels to consider carefully who to send to the war zones 
and how well equipped a war journalist shall be.  
We asked journalists if they feel any restriction imposed on them under the name of 
National Security during their practice and whether they believe that the press is 







responsible for spreading a spirit of national solidarity. Eighty-two per cent of respondents 
declare that Kurdistan’s national considerations must be taken into account while 12% 
disagree. Meanwhile, when asked the question whether restrictions on the media can be 
justified in the interests of national security, 62% state that it is against freedom of speech. 
Related to this, the number of who ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’ and ‘partially agree’ that media 
must spread a spirit of national solidarity is very high (93%) - only 5% disagree.  
The pressure is slightly different when it is related to direct contact with the editor of the 
paper. Twenty per cent admit pressure from the editor of a newspaper, while 79% declare 
no pressure from the editor. Regarding physical attacks, 19% of journalists who 
participated in the questionnaire declare that they have been subject to physical attack, 
imprisonment or threat. 
I have personally been attacked after receiving threats and not listening to 
them. Yes, on a daily basis, but we believe in what we do. There is a necessity 
to change the style of media in the KRI. This is a transition period from a fully-
controlled party media to a real independent one and on this path we shall 
endure and I believe it will pass towards a better atmosphere.  
(Appendix 3, Interview #1) 
5.7 The Journalists Syndicate of Kurdistan  
In response to the questionnaire, most journalists agree that the Kurdistan Journalists 
Syndicate is a political machine to keep the media under control. 65% of journalists believe 
that the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate has been controlled in the last decades by the two 
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major political parties the KDP and the PUK. Every four years they go through a local 
congress where new administrative members are elected. More commonly than not, these 
administrative members are party members or supported by the two parties. 
  
The Syndicate is another way of politicising the media atmosphere and the 
division among members of this Syndicate in terms of their political affiliation 
clearly shows on the membership lists. Even the elected administrative 
members of the Syndicate clearly state that they represent their political party.  
(Appendix 3, Interview #1)  
A remarkable number of journalists believe that the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate is 
actually another way of exercising political control of the press in KRI. The institution is 
supposed to be an independent body to protect the journalists and become a platform for 
further developments in the field. However, the Syndicate is fully politicised and the 
members are classified by their political party affiliation. Even the management council of 
the syndicate is elected according to political agreements.  
Twenty-four per cent of respondents state the opposite, denying that the Journalists 
Syndicate is a tool for political control of the media. Another 11% state they ‘don't know’, 
or they do not respond to this question.  
Regarding the support journalists feel from the Journalists Syndicate, approximately 2% 
‘agree strongly’, 22% ‘agree’, and 45% ‘partially agree’ that they are supported by the 
Journalists Syndicate. Another 12% disagree. A common example of the Syndicate 
supporting their members is through offering material benefits. For instance, Azad 
Hamadamin, the Secretary-General of the Journalists Syndicate, told us  
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‘during the period from 2003 to 2010, more than two hundred pieces of land have been 
distributed by the Syndicate to its journalist members’ (Appendix 3, Interview #2). These 
pieces of land were provided by the government to support only those journalists who were 
members of the Syndicate. However, not every journalist is a member. There are journalists 
who believe the Syndicate is an indirect instrument of political control. Asus Hardi, chief 
editor of Awene newspaper, is an example of a journalist who is not a member: 
I am not a member of that Syndicate and I believe it is a product of a 
totalitarian mentality. This is inherited from the time of Saddam and the Baath. 
During the Baath time in Iraq, there was only one union or syndicate for each 
sector of civil society. These syndicates were directly tied into the party 
organisation system. The idea was initially to have the whole society under 
their political control. The Journalists Syndicate exercises the same control. 
(Appendix 3, Interview #1)  
Journalists in the KRI are in a developing situation, and new voices have appeared, among 
them those who oppose the old version of political control. There are many who believe 
they can change the way journalism is being practised by introducing independent 
viewpoints and avoiding partisanship in their work. The Syndicate has been perceived by 
some journalists as a machine of political control. This has not been denied by the officials 
of the syndicate and the political parties. The management council of the Syndicate 
consists of representatives of political parties, not journalists who would be the real 
representatives. The distribution of management council posts is according to the political 
power of the parties, and a member of the leading party becomes Secretary-General, the 
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second largest party takes the Deputy Secretary- General post, and so on. This could be 
interpreted differently as the Secretary-General of the Syndicate explains: 
[…when the Syndicate was launched in 1998, there were two main parties, the 
KDP and the PUK, and some other smaller parties’ journalists in the region. 
Our management body mainly consists of the representatives of journalist 
institutions in the KRI, and most of them are owned by political parties. Up to 
the present, there has been no serious independent journalism launched in 
Kurdistan to be represented on the Syndicate’s managing body. And in order to 
avoid clashes between different parties, the posts of the syndicates, not only 
this one but all syndicates in the KRI, are taken according to an agreement 
between political parties. If you ask me whether it is good or bad to have this 
agreement, honestly speaking I believe this has paralysed our job and the job 
of all other syndicates in the KRI. ] 
(Appendix 3, Interview #2) 
This is clear evidence that even civil society and professional organisations are politicised 
and controlled by the political parties. Political parties play an important role in the way 
these organisations function and they have been used as political machines to control 
different professional communities in the KRI. In addition, this has been institutionalised 
in the internal regulations of political parties in the KRI. All the active parties in the KRI 
have a specific department for professional organisations within their party organisation 
system. This department is mandated to control and watch the activities of the organisation 
and mobilise them at the times they are needed.  
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5.8 Perception of journalists about the free press in KRI  
Approximately 88% of journalists contacted for this questionnaire declare that they 
‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’ and ‘partly agree’ that freedom of speech is enjoyed in the KRI. 
When asked if Journalism Law No. 35, 2007 had a positive impact on the media in the KRI 
or the opposite, 66% of the journalists ‘strongly agree’, and ‘agree’ over the positive 
impact of the Law. However, when asked whether they believe that this law does not 
guarantee freedom of speech and needs to be amended, almost the same amount of 
respondents, 67%, agreed. 
The KRI continues to go through challenges and wars where patriotic and nationalist 
beliefs are still developing. Therefore, when asked whether they feel first a journalist, or 
first a patriot, or feel both, 35% state that they are first of all journalists, while 20% state 
that they are first of all patriots. Forty per cent respond that they are both journalists and 
patriots; 5% do not know or do not answer. 
The free press and freely practising journalism in Kurdistan is in its infancy. Many 
journalists have gone through difficulties and hardships to practise this profession in the 
region: 
[…We started a path that was not possible before. For example, it was not easy 
to criticise Barzani or Talabani in a newspaper when we started, but we did it. 
To be honest, one can make good use of the clashes and differences between 
parties in the region in order to create a space to criticise them. Thus, if the 
KDP is angry with you, you will see the PUK defending you without even 
asking them to, and the other way around - it works with all the parties. If we 
make both the KDP and the PUK angry, then the Change Party will be our 
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supporter. So, we are not scared of publishing matters that make parties angry: 
there is always the opposing party that is supporting you in attacking the other 
party. Of course, it is important to understand that after 2003 many things 
changed and the KRI became more open than before, in terms of freedom of 
expression.] 
(Appendix 3, Interview #1)  
Journalists are fearful of not having the support of one of the parties. In criticising the act 
of a specific policy it is not possible for the press and media to be successful without 
having the backup and support of one of the major political parties. Meanwhile, there are a 
number of political parties in the region where much of their politics is carried on through 
the media and without a powerful media they might not be able to survive and remain in 
the same position of power. The Change Movement is one such example. The party before 
breaking up from the PUK, it established a giant media network and chose to take an 
opposition path. Later, when they declared themselves an independent political party, they 
already had a foundation established by their media. 
Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter are derived from the data collected by the questionnaire 
conducted among journalists of the three governorates of the KRI. In addition to the 
questionnaire, some journalists and press decision-makers were interviewed and they are 
also presented in this chapter. Data from our questionnaire shows a male domination 
among those working as journalists in the KRI press. However, the number of females is 
also increasing. Most journalists do not have an educational background in this field, the 
majority being journalists by experience. However, most of them have received training 
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related to their field. The fact that many journalists have another job is not only related to 
low salaries but to the type of work that a journalist does. It also depends on whether the 
journalist is passionate about the journalism job. 
There is political domination over the press in the KRI. The majority of the newspapers are 
owned by political parties and there are others that claim to be independent but are 
indirectly owned by political parties. Thus, the partisanship of the media has a history in 
the region, the press still stays under the control of the political parties and the actual 
establishers of the media are political parties. Thus, the press still stays under the control of 
the political parties and the majority of journalists agree that the newspaper they work for 
receives direct instructions from their owners and political parties. In addition, the press is 
used by the parties to attack and oppose each other’s politics, and for this the indirectly 
owned newspapers are generally used. The politicisation of the press is not merely related 
to the press outlets and institutions, but at the same time the majority of journalists are also 
politically affiliated and are active members of the parties. Most of them work for the 
newspaper that is owned by their party. 
Political parties in the KRI have put much of their political activities on the shoulders of 
their media. It is almost impossible for some parties to survive without having their own 
powerful media. The dependency of the political parties on the media in KRI is evident and 
they invest more and more in improving their media skills. In similar vein, the media is 
dependent on the political parties. This interdependency means both happily contribute to 
each other’s continuation as inescapable political partners. This means that both parties and 
the media mutually agree political projects. 
Civil society and professional organisations are also politicised and controlled by the 
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political parties in the KRI. Parties have developed internal organisation regulations to 
keep track of their activities. In addition, the professional organisations and syndicates, 
such as the Journalists Syndicate, are actually run and controlled by the parties in a way 
that each one of the parties in power have their representation in those organisations. This 
shows that the parties are aware of the importance and the power of the press and media. 
There are cases of political parties in the KRI that might not be able to function without 
their powerful media, and they are fully dependent on their media. 
The pressure on journalists while practising is on different levels. Most of the journalists 
declare that they do not face any political pressure to write or not to write about a certain 
issue. However, there is some self-censorship that journalists automatically fall into, 
especially at a time when there is conflict and war. The majority of the respondents declare 
that Kurdistan’s nationalist considerations must be taken into account in the KRI press. 
This shows that journalists have a mixture of feelings dominant in their practice. Therefore, 
they mainly declare that they are both patriots and journalists at the same time. 
Regarding physical attacks on journalists, 20% of the respondents declare that they have 
experienced it, and this is a number to be considered seriously concerning the safety of this 
environment in the KRI. The majority of the journalists contacted believe that there is 
freedom of speech in practice in the KRI and that Law No. 35, 2007 supports this principle.  
Table 4: Age and gender of journalist survey respondents 
Age Male Female Total within age 
18-25 (7) 6% (6) 40% (13) 10%
26-35 (49) 44% (6) 40% (55) 44%
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Table 5: Type of newspaper (daily, weekly) 
 Table 6: Numbers and percentages of answers by type of newspaper and geographical 
coverage  
Table 7: Ownership and political affiliation of the journals 
36-45 (43) 39% (2) 13% (45) 36%
46-55 (10) 9% (1) 7% (11) 9%
56-up (2) 1% 0 (2) 1%
Total within gender (111) 88% (15) 12% (126) 100%
The newspaper you are working with is published:
Male Female Total
Daily (86) 92% (8) 9% 94
Weekly (24) 77% (7) 23% 31
Total (110) 88% (15) 12% 125
Numbers and percentages of answers by type of newspaper and geographical coverage 
Daily Weekly Total 
Duhok 48 1 (49) 38%
Erbil 25 19 (44) 34%
Sulaimani 25 12 (37) 29%
(98) 75% (32) 25% (130) 100%
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Table 8: Training and Experience of Journalists 
Table 9: Political affiliation of newspapers and journalists 
Q: Does the newspaper have any political 
affiliation? 
Q:Who are 
the owners of 
t h e 
newspaper? 
Yes No Don´t Know
P o l i t i c a l 
parties
52 6 3 (61) 48%
B u s i n e s s 
bodies
6 48 4 (58) 46%
Don´t Know 2 5 1 (8) 6%
Total (60) 47% (59) 47% (8) 6% (127) 100%
Do you have any training in 
journalism?
Yes No
How many years 
have you worked 
as a journalist?
M o r e t h a n 7 
years
86 14 (100) 77 %
Less than 7 years 21 9 (30) 23 %
(107) 82 % (23) 18 % (130) 100%
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Do you have any political 
affiliation? 
Yes 
The newspaper that you work 
for belongs to the same party 
that you are affiliated?  
Yes
Duhok (38 /49) 76% (26) 60%*
Erbil (29 /44) 66% (21) 72%*
Sulaimani (13 /37) 35% (11) 85%*
Total for the 3 regions (80/130) 62% (58) 45%* 
73% **
* % out of the total number of respondents from that province  
** % of the respondents that admitted being party affiliated 
!  172
CHAPTER SIX: THE VIEW OF POLITICIANS ON THE PRESS AND MEDIA IN THE 
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ: CONTROL, RESTRICTION AND SELF-
CENSORSHIP  
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the relationship between politicians and the press in the KRI, based on the 
answers to questionnaires distributed to Members of Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq. This is the 
second questionnaire of this thesis (Appendix 2), designed to ascertain the opinions and attitudes 
of politicians towards the press and politics in the KRI. The important factor is to analyse the 
inevitable relationship between politicians and the press. The relationship is rather one of 
interdependence that in some cases leads to close personal relations between politicians and 
journalists. The media’s relationship with politics has a history that traces back to the propaganda 
and the role that it played in shaping public opinion (Street: 2005: 19). According to Hallin and 
Mancini (2012: 302): ‘The relation between media and politics is situational, and any 
comparative analysis that ignores this fact, that assumes that journalists or media owners, for 
example, will act the same way toward political parties, the state, or social movements in every 
instance, is going to be a poor analysis.’ 
The above begins to explore the interplay between media and politics and their influence on each 
other. As mentioned before, the press and media in the KRI have developed as a political 
institution more than an information machine for the public sphere. Furthermore, the KRI type of 
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media has not been market-oriented and it has functioned, and functions, with almost no 
dependency on the market, i.e. it has stayed dependent on political parties and independent from 
the market. A significant number of the KRI politicians come from a background of working for 
their party media. This is also the case among the Members of Parliament. In addition, the daily 
interactions between the media and Members of Parliament sometimes turns parliament into a 
TV studio and sometimes turns the TV studios into the parliament plenary. Hence, the 
significance of the questionnaire to the Members of Parliament. 
6.1. The relations between politicians and the press  
The relationship between Members of Parliament and the press in the KRI is equivocal. Both 
sides keep this relationship on different levels. On the interpersonal level both MPs and 
journalists in the KRI usually communicate directly. Very often journalists call MPs on their 
private phone to ask a specific question, or to schedule an interview. MPs also call individual 
journalists or media channels if they have information they want to be made public. However, 
not all media channels or newspapers are ready to publish or broadcast news about a specific 
Member of Parliament or a party fraction in the parliament. Given that the media channels are 
party-owned, each Member of Parliament usually finds it easier to call the media channels or 
newspapers that are affiliated to their political party. On the other side, the media channels also 
pay priority attention to the news and information by the members of their party fraction before 
any other news from Parliament. This is an internal policy normally practised by all the party 
channels and newspapers in the KRI. Sometimes the leadership of a fraction calls a press 
conference to declare their fraction’s position on particular issues.  
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Occasionally, parties advise their members not to take part or collaborate with certain media 
channels. The boycott of NRT by KDP members in 2015 is an example. In 2015 the KDP 
ordered its senior members, including Members of Parliament not to take part in NRT TV or its 
online newspaper. The KDP justified this by claiming that NRT is not impartial and is a threat to 
national security .  61
Parliamentary sessions are open to the public and journalists are allowed to participate and 
follow the session from a special area that overlooks the chamber. This area is open to any 
individual or journalist wishing to follow the session. There is only one security checkpoint and 
it takes about five minutes to access the public area. In order to bring in their cameras and 
equipment, journalists need to prove they are bona fide journalists or represent a press or media 
outlet. 
According to the by-law of Parliament , one quarter of Members of Parliament can request that 62
a session be closed to the public. These requests are usually justified by the sensitivity of the 
session agenda. This request however, must be approved by a majority vote of the session. 
Otherwise all the sessions are freely accessible for all the media channels to air live or for 
individuals to follow the sessions on live stream. The Parliament has a webpage which focuses 
on news related to the Members and the Parliament’s activities. The site includes short 
biographies of all the Members of Parliament of all four terms. The agendas of sessions, live 
stream and majority of the laws passed and amended are available on this website.  
  NRT is accused of receiving subsidies from local and central government. See documents 61
available at: http://www.basnet.cf/2016/11/nrt_9.html , Retrieved 20 June 2017.
  See the by-law of Kurdistan Parliament at: http://perleman.org/files/articles/130614120741.pdf , 62
Retrieved 20 June 2017.
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6.2 The questionnaire 
The questionnaire was distributed among members of Kurdistan Parliament - Iraq. Out of 111 
Members of Parliament the questionnaire reached 87 members and we received 57 valid 
responses. Several of the same questions were put to both journalists and MPs for the sake of 
comparing their opinions regarding the press. The opinions of politicians on press and media 
sheds much light on the interplay between the press and politics.  
As well as their experience within the press before being elected, MPs were asked questions 
related to their level of education, experience, political party, constituency, and, if they had 
worked as a journalist, the type of press and in which city they had worked. 
MPs were also asked about their perceptions concerning the ownership and control of the media 
by political parties, party and ideological hegemony and censorship that they experienced if they 
had worked with the press before being elected, as well as their role as legislators and their 
opinions about the current press law. 
Finally, two questions were asked regarding their attitudes towards politics and democracy, one 
concerning their nationalist feelings and the other regarding democracy in the KRI. The 
significance of these two questions is that the first asks about their nationalist feelings in general 
and also towards the media. The second asks their opinion about democracy in the KRI. The 
question regarding nationalist feelings and values comes from the expectation that the media in 
the KRI may face pressure in the name of national values. The political rhetoric in the region is 
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dominated by nationalist messages, and that is almost the only point on which all political parties 
agree. Therefore, the media is also under the pressure of what are called ‘national values’. The 
second question tests the opinions of the politicians concerning their belief in democracy in the 
KRI – Iraq, after 2003, was a US and Allied ‘project of democratization’ . In the KRI there was 63
(pre-war) an already existing self-ruling government claiming to be more democratized than 
other parts of Iraq. This question was asked to test the reaction of the KRI politicians on 
democracy in this autonomous region of Iraq. 
6.3. Gender of MP respondents 
Out of a total 57 respondents, 13 are female MPs (23%). This is close to the representation of 
women in the KRI parliament. There is a quota  law that guarantees 30% female Members in 64
the Parliament. The female quota is organised so that each political party has at least 30% of 
women candidates, and 30% of winning seats for each party have to be allocated to women. This 
quota is a higher percentage than in the rest of Iraq which is 25%. The KRI female quota 
guaranteed the representation of women in decision-making in both the Parliament and 
Governorate councils. 
6.4 Politicians with a journalist background 
Forty-three per cent of politicians responded that they have worked as journalists before being 
elected as an MP. This is a significant result and is related to the politicization of the media in the 
KRI. Overall, as members declare in their biographies , 33 out of 111 Members of Parliament 65
  On 6 November 2003, President George Bush stated the broader vision of the USA and its allies 63
in a ‘mission to spread democracy throughout the Middle East’. See more at: http://
www.baltimoresun.com/news/bal-te.bush07nov07-story.html , retrieved on 12-06-2017
 Fourth amendment to the Kurdistan Region’s Elections Law: See the law in Kurdish at http://64
perleman.org/files/articles/260309020909.pdf retrieved on 12 June 2017
  http://perleman.org/Default.aspx?page=members&c=Presidency-Member201365
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have a background of working as a journalist. As mentioned before, a majority of press and 
media entities belong to political parties. This might bring in members of the party to work with 
their media. It is like a coin with two similar faces. For instance, a senior party member works 
for his/her own party’s press and actually this is when he/she declares him/herself as being a 
journalist. Then the same journalist, as a qualified party member is a candidate standing in 
elections and gets into Parliament and this is when he/she is considered as a politician. They 
mostly remain as politicians and mainly work as party members following party instructions, 
whether as a parliamentarian or as a journalist. 
There are also other factors such as popularity among the public that might be considered by 
political parties regarding candidacy. This is particularly the case among the TV and 
broadcasting personalities. In the 2013 KRI parliamentary elections, a TV presenter who was a 
candidate for the Change Movement had an extraordinary record, receiving over 140,000 votes . 66
Given that the value of a seat in those elections was 19,500 votes, this candidate collected more 
than enough votes for 7 seats, which is more than 29% of the total seats his party gained. 
6.5. Political parties in the Parliament 
Thirty-three per cent of respondents are from the KDP, 28% from the Change Movement, 12% 
from the PUK, 8% from the Islamic Union and 3% from the Islamic Group. There are eight other 
fractions that were contacted and asked their opinion for this questionnaire. The representation of 
the respondents is also close to the percentage of party seats in the Parliament. There are 
seventeen fractions of political representation in the fourth term of Kurdistan’s Parliament. The 
  http://perleman.org/Default.aspx?page=page&c=xol466
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following table shows the number of seats for each fraction of political parties in the Parliament 
for the 2013 elections: 
Table 10: Number of seats for each fraction of political parties in the parliament for the 
2013 elections 
Fraction Number of Votes Number of Seats Percentage
KDP 743984 38 38%
Change Movement 476736 24 24%
PUK 350500 18 18%
Islamic Union 186741 10 10%
Islamic Group 118574 6 6%
Islamic Movement 21834 1 1%
Socialist List 12501 1 1%
A z a d i L i s t 
(Communist Party)
12392 1 1%
Third Direction List 8681 1 1%
R a f i d a y n L i s t 





A s s y r i a n a n d 
Chaldean Counci l 
( A s s y r i a n a n d 
Chaldean Quota)
5730 2 Quota
T u r k m e n 
D e v e l o p m e n t 
(Turkmen Quota)
5259 2 Quota
Erbil Turkmen List 
(Turkmen Quota)
1951 1 Quota
Turkmen Change and 
R e h a b i l i t a t i o n 
(Turkmen Quota)
1926 1 Quota
Iraqi Turkmen Front 
(Turkmen Quota)
1753 1 Quota
A b n a A l - N a h r a i n 
( A s s y r i a n a n d 
Chaldean Quota)
1093 1 Quota




6.6 Ownership of media in the KRI 
Thirty-five per cent of the respondents declared that the media they worked with was owned by a 
political party. At the same time, 56% preferred not to answer this question. In another question, 
they were also asked about the media in the KRI - are they controlled, owned or sponsored by 
political parties? Fourteen per cent of respondents ‘strongly agree’ and 61% ‘agree’ that the 
media is sponsored, owned, or controlled by political parties. Twenty-one per cent ‘disagree’ and 
1% ‘strongly disagree’.  
In most countries ‘the largest media firms are owned by the government or by private families’ . 67
The media is considered as the information provider for the public. This information most of the 
time includes political agendas and candidates’ profiles in order for the citizens to vote in a more 
informed way. This is when questions arise concerning the information provided by the political 
party owned media and whether it would lean towards pushing the party’s agenda. In the KRI, 
each political party has its own programme and providing information would probably be from 
the perspective of the party programme and agenda. Another model of the media which has 
emerged in the KRI are known to be privately owned, and are, in fact, not free from political 
interference. Nevertheless, political parties tend to deny the ownership of such channels. This is 
probably one reason why 56% of the politicians who responded to this questionnaire preferred 
not to answer the ownership question.  
For instance, the largest media network in the KRI is Rudaw that declares itself as an 
independent private company. This company is owned, founded and fully funded by Nechirvan 




Television (NRT) is also the largest media network in the region and claims to be independent. 
Its owner, Shaswar Abdulwahid, is a member of the Change Movement and almost all the 
decision-makers of this channel are members of, or close to, the Change Movement. These 
political ties have given the two channels, Rudaw and NRT, a reputation as rivals. Emanating 
from two different parties, their messages conflict.  
Below, is an example of these two channels covering the same issue from two different 
perspectives. The head of the Rudaw office in Washington D.C. reports that the US Department 
of Foreign Affairs does not oppose the KRI referendum for Independence and that ‘they 
understand the will and rights of the people of Kurdistan’. However, the head of the NRT office 
in the USA reports the opposite, stating that the US Department of Foreign Affairs is against the 
KRI referendum for Independence.  
The political influence of the media is further exposed when the owner of NRT declares a No 
Campaign for the Independence referendum in Kurdistan. This is followed by the establishment 
of a satellite channel to support this campaign. The campaign called itself ‘No for Now’. This 
channel, as declared by the KRI officials and Ministry of Culture is illegal and has no registration 
within the Kurdistan Region. Meanwhile, NRT continued to advertise for the No Campaign 
channel and broadcast a number of their campaign advertisements. On 27 August 2017 NRT 
received a warning from the KRI’s Ministry of Culture and Youth warning them that they were 
advertising for an illegal TV channel. Given the fact that the owner of both the NRT and the No 
Campaign channel is the same person, NRT took no notice. As a result, NRT’s local broadcasts 
were banned by the KRI authorities. According to the Frequency Regulation passed by the 
Ministry of Culture and Youth, Regulation 1, 2014, Article 5, section 2, local broadcasts of the 
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NRT channel were stopped for one week.  
In addition to local party ownership and interference, there are claims that there is also regional 
interference in the KRI media. This is again related to their owners and their close relationship 
with regional powers and neighbouring countries. The KDP has developed a closer relationship 
with Turkey in recent years. On the other hand, the PUK and Change Movement have developed 
their relations with Iran. Whether this accusation  is right or wrong, the claims about 68
interference of regional powers are also connected to the regional relationships of the parties’ 
owners. 
In the KRI there is no government-owned media channel. This might seem to be an indicator of 
guaranteeing media independence. However, this gap is replaced by political party ownership 
which is a challenge to the independence and impartiality of the press.  
In general, the ownership of the media in the KRI is related to funds and subsidies. The majority 
of funds provided for the media come from political parties who wish to establish a media that 
serves their agenda. Neither the government nor the private sector has been able to fund and 
subsidize the media in a sustainable manner. In addition, the media and press in the KRI are also 
unable to stand alone financially, mainly because of the weak media market, mis-management 
and lack of experience in the industry.  
The law in the KRI has granted enough freedom to citizens so that individuals do not face legal 
complications regarding the establishment and ownership of the media. Regulations do not 
  The access of the author to inside information from these two channels confirms the interference 68
of Turkey and Iran. In the case of NRT, Iranian teams are repeatedly seen inside the channel and their role 
is significant in decision making. For Rudaw, the interference is indirect and mainly via phone. For 
example, on 24 April 2017, when there were Turkish airstrikes on Sinjar, taking the lives of five 
Kurdistan Peshmergas. Rudaw Turkish Service, at first reported that ‘five Peshmargas were martyred’. 
Then after receiving a call, that was changed to: ‘five Peshmergas were killed’. After that a local phone 
call made them change it again to ‘martyred’. See: http://www.rudaw.net/turkish/kurdistan/2605201710?
keyword=peŞmerge%20Şehit 
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restrict owners to owning only one media outlet or newspaper. However, private ownership in 
the KRI is mainly indirect ownership by political parties.  
6.7 Journalism as a second job 
Thirty-six per cent of respondents declared that they had another job when they were working as 
journalists. Fifty per cent of journalists declared that they had another job and being a journalist 
was not their main or only job. The low income and salaries of journalists obliges them to work 
part time. Moreover, 36% of the politicians contacted for this survey declared that they were 
members of political parties at the same time. Being an active member of a party in the KRI is 
usually considered as a job and members are paid regular salaries. Approximately 150,000 paid 
members are working with the KDP. These members are mainly employed in different offices of 
the KDP administration, starting from the office of the party president to the base of the 
governorate leadership and low level committees.  
6.8 Politicised media in the KRI 
Thirty-six per cent ‘strongly agree’ and 36% ‘agree’ that the media in Kurdistan is a political 
project and it serves the political agenda of its owners. This means that more than 70% of 
politicians who were contacted for this survey feel that the media is a politicized project. 22% 
‘disagree’ and 1% ‘strongly disagrees’ that the media is a political project in Kurdistan. 
Regarding the involvement of the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate in the KRI press the 
respondents were asked two questions. Firstly, the Syndicate supportive towards the press and 
journalists or not? Secondly, what did the politicians feel about the political influence and control 
of the Journalists Syndicate? The Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate is introduced as being the legal 
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entity that makes sure the freedom of the press is guaranteed and that journalists’ rights are 
protected . However, according to Asus Hardi, the idea of the Journalists Syndicate is to have 69
the journalists under the control of parties: 
I am not a member of that syndicate and I believe it is a product of a totalitarian 
mentality. This is inherited from Saddam and the Baath’s time. During the Baath time 
in Iraq, there was only one union or syndicate for each sector of civil society. These 
syndicates were directly tied with the party organization system. The idea was 
initially to have the whole society under their political control. The Journalists 
Syndicate is the same method of control. 
(Appendix 3, Interview #1)  
However, the function of the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate is quite different as described by 
the Secretary-General of the Syndicate: 
 ‘The Syndicate is a volunteer organization for all those whose work is to practise 
journalism as a profession’  
(Appendix 3, Interview #2). 
Similarly to the journalists, politicians were also asked whether they have felt pressure in their 
work as journalists. This question was answered by those politicians who have worked as 
journalists before being elected as MPs. The results show that they experienced less pressure 
while working as journalists. Only 14% declare that they were under pressure to write on specific 
issues, compared to 24% among the journalists who feel under pressure to write on a certain 
issue.  
Fifty-two per cent of respondents ‘disagree’ that the syndicate is supportive and another 3% 
‘strongly disagree’. Fourteen per cent ‘agree’ and 1% ‘strongly agree’ that this syndicate is a 
  Law No. 4, 1998, Law of Journalists Syndicate of Kurdistan-Iraq: http://perleman.org/files/69
articles/150915101400.pdf
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support for journalists. When asked whether the Syndicate is another way of politically 
controlling the press and media, 15% ‘strongly agree’ and 26% ‘agree’. Forty per cent ‘disagree’ 
and 10% ‘strongly disagree’ that the Syndicate is another way of politically controlling the 
media.  
The opinion of the respondents in answering the question regarding the ownership of the media 
is another significant finding. 
6. 9. The role of the Journalism Law in the KRI 
One of the significant findings of this questionnaire is the perception of lawmakers about the 
Law of Journalism, because of their own position in drafting, re-drafting and proposing new laws 
in favour of the development of journalism in the KRI. Nevertheless, their overall perception of 
the law is highly positive. When asked whether the Journalism Law has played a positive role in 
media developments, 78% ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’, while 19% ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly 
disagree’ that it has a positive role in the development of the media. 
When the opposite was asked 1% ‘strongly agree’ other 38% ‘agree’ that it did not play a 
positive role in media developments in the KRI. When asked their opinion as Members of 
Parliament regarding the freedom of the KRI press, only 3% ‘strongly agree’ that freedom of the 
press is enjoyed in the KRI. In addition, 29% ‘agree’ that freedom of the press is enjoyed in the 
KRI. The disagreement on this question is higher with 56% and 8% who ‘strongly disagree’ with 
the statement that freedom of the press is enjoyed in the KRI. 
Journalists in Kurdistan complain about the lack of implementation of the laws. Asus Hardi, 
Chief Editor of Awene newspaper stated: 
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The law has good sides, but it is not fully implemented and there are still courts in 
the KRI that do not abide by this law. For example, the law considers any attack 
on journalists as an attack on government officials during their service but what 
we see is the attack on journalists on a daily basis and as if nothing happened.  
(Appendix 3, Interview #1) 
This means that the law itself is a document which supports the freedom of journalists and the 
press, but the problem is its implementation. The limitations and pressure that the journalists 
experience are not necessarily the results of the limitations of the law, but are caused by the lack 
of its implementation. This is not merely happening concerning journalism law - there are many 
cases where the laws are good but where their implementation is bad. It is mainly related to the 
executive branch of government and the responsibility they hold to implement the law. 
Moreover, there is no implementation committee, branch or body that is specifically responsible 
for implementing particular laws.  
6.10 The press and nationalist values 
Politicians were asked whether they feel primarily a politician or nationalist, or both or neither? 
Sixty-four per cent responded that they are first nationalists and 33% declared that they are both. 
Only 1% responded ‘I am neither’. 
In another question, politicians were asked whether the ‘media is responsible to spread 
nationalistic values’. 49% of the respondents strongly agree and other 33% agree that media is 
responsible to spread nationalistic values. Only 12% ‘disagree’ and 3% ‘strongly disagree’ when 
asked their opinion on this statement. 
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When asked their opinion regarding whether nationalist values should be taken into 
consideration by the media in the KRI, 29% ‘strongly agree’ and 61% ‘agree’. Only 3% 
‘disagree’ and 5% ‘strongly disagree’. There is thus a high expectation from the media by 
politicians to take national values into consideration. However, this is a rather complicated issue. 
On the one hand, there is no law or regulation that makes the media responsible to defend and 
spread national values. On the other hand, these values are not clearly defined and they might 
differ from one person to another. However, the right to self-determination is known as the main 
nationalist value and feeling of the Kurds ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Cojer, 1996: 
40). On 7 June 2017, Masoud Barzani, President of the KRI held a meeting with the KRI 
political parties where they set a date for a referendum on Kurdistan Independence, namely 25 
September 2017 . On 8 June 2017, President Barzani issued a presidential order  authorising 70 71
the Independent Commission of Elections to make the necessary preparations to hold a 
referendum on Kurdistan Independence on 25 September 2017. This decision precipitated both 
local and international reactions. Fuad Hussein, Chief of Staff of Kurdistan’s President stated, 
The Kurds have the right to self-determination as a right endorsed by the United Nations, and as 
a people who have their land, language, culture, history and identity’ (Hussein, 2017). However, 
the decision was not welcomed by Iraqi officials in Baghdad. 
The independence referendum took place in the KRI on 25 September 2017. The turnout and the 
results were, as expected, high for an independent Kurdistan. The role played by the media 
before and after the referendum was very significant. The majority of the journalists and media 
  President Masoud Barzani in a tweet on 7 June 2017 posted, ‘I am pleased to announce that the 70
date for the independence referendum has been set for Monday, 25 September 2017’. Link to the tweet: 
https://twitter.com/masoud_barzani/status/872496589868290049 
  KRI Presidential Order Number 106 , 2017, see: http://www.kdp.info/a/d.aspx?l=13&a=101036 , 71
Retrieved on June 12, 2017.
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channels ‘went with the flow’ and became the mouthpiece of supporters of the referendum. In 
addition, the political leadership in the KRI had set the agenda for the media and the way they 
must engage in the referendum process: it was their nationalist duty. There were three different 
official statements issued by the High Referendum Council, the Ministry of Culture and Youth, 
and the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate. The High Referendum Council released a statement  on 72
1 October 2017, which consisted of seven main decrees. The sixth decree stated: 
[ Sixth: The meeting, in addition to thanking the media for playing a good role 
during the referendum, stressed that the role of the local media outlets should be to 
serve patriotic interests and that the meetings’ attendants all agreed that within the 
framework of the law a limit should be put on any media that is directed to work 
against the interests of the country and its people. ] 
The High Referendum Council by this statement puts the media before both its obligations and 
limitations. The obligations are for the media to serve the patriotic interest, and the limitations 
include the pressure on the media channels which do not support the referendum. These 
limitations might also include the media and press which decide to stay neutral because this 
neutrality, according to the referendum council, is not a good role and would not serve patriotic 
interests. 
The statement released by the Ministry of Culture was even harsher. This statement also stresses 
the nationalist duty of the media and that the media must fulfil its duty to promote nationalist 
values.  
[ It is obvious that the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is passing through a sensitive 
moment. Our duty is to protect the country and the unitarity of the components of 
Kurdistan people. We all, and especially the media, must deal with this situation with 
 The full text of the statement is available at: http://www.rudaw.net/mobile/english/kurdistan/01102017472
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a deep sense of nationalist duty. Otherwise the ministry will deal with those media 
acting against the nationalist values by means of laws and regulations. ]  73
The Ministry of Culture and Youth is one of the main government institutions that deals with the 
press and media. Local broadcasting regulations and licensing, publication and press regulations 
are still controlled by this ministry. Their statement is also clearly focused on the need for the 
media and press to put ‘nationalist responsibility’ ahead of their agenda.  
The third statement is by the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate which also suggests that the media 
in the KRI abide by their duty to protect nationalist values and serve the country in this direction. 
Further, the Syndicate condemned the act of banning a number of Kurdish media channels in 
Iran, Turkey and by the Iraqi government .  74
The belief in protecting nationalist values is not merely vital to the politicians in the KRI - the 
journalists and their representatives share the same position. Azad Hamadamin, the Secretary-
General of the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate also believes that one of the main functions of the 
Syndicate is to protect national security:  
The law considers the Syndicate as the official body of journalists and deals 
with only those journalists who are members of the Syndicate. Our goals are to 
defend the basic principles of this nation, protect national security, protect 
democratic values, and freedom of speech.(Appendix 3, Interview #2) 
 This is a translated part of the statement by the ministry of culture and youth, the full statement is found 73
at: http://www.kdp.info/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=13&a=104153
 The full text of the statement is retrieved from: http://www.kdp.info/a/d.aspx?74
s=040000&l=13&a=103738
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The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information  were adopted on October 1, 1995. This document focuses on the importance of 75
freedom of expression and the press especially regarding state restrictions. Such restrictions 
include the justifications presented mainly by the state to label a press or media channel as acting 
against national security: 
[… Any restriction on expression or information that a government seeks to justify on grounds 
of national security must have the genuine purpose and demonstrable effect of protecting a 
legitimate national security interest.] 
The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Principle 1.2 
Journalists in the KRI declare that they do receive such restrictions, mainly from politicians and 
the political parties. As there is no clear definition of the nationalist values presented by the 
politicians, the journalists believe that anything that opposes the views of politicians or a 
particular party can be labelled by them as a threat to nationalist values. Asus Hardi, the chief 
editor of Awena, believes that nationalist values are related to the degree of an individual’s 
loyalty to the politicians:  
[… Not having an agreement or mutual understanding on the definition of nationalist 
values is our biggest problem. We have a totalitarian mentality that rules in this place. This 
 The full text of the principles is available at: https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/75
joburgprinciples.pdf 
Principle 2: Legitimate National Security Interest 
(a) A restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not legitimate unless its 
genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to protect a country's existence or its territorial integrity 
against the use or threat of force, or its capacity to respond to the use or threat of force, whether 
from an external source, such as a military threat, or an internal source, such as incitement to 
violent overthrow of the government. 
(b) In particular, a restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not 
legitimate if its genuine purpose or demonstrable effect is to protect interests unrelated to national 
security, including, for example, to protect a government from embarrassment or exposure of 
wrongdoing, or to conceal information about the functioning of its public institutions, or to 
entrench a particular ideology, or to suppress industrial unrest.
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mentality has prioritised the political party over the Nation. This means that when you 
don't speak the way the party desires, then you are labelled as being against the national 
values. At the same time, when you speak in favour of the political party, then you are a 
fine protector of nationalist values. The ideological basis of most of our political parties is 
a totalitarian one. The parties believe that they are the unique protectors of nationalist 
values, therefore, anyone who is against them is automatically against the nationalist 
values. That is when a journalist or anyone who criticises a political party is even labelled 
as betraying the national cause. ] 
According to Hardi, any media which works as a propaganda machine of a party is labelled as a 
protector of nationalist values, while the ones which criticise the ruling party can be portrayed as 
violators of nationalist values. As the findings of this thesis prove that majority of the media in 
the KRI are owned, linked to, and controlled by the political parties, therefore if anything is 
called a violation of nationalist values committed by media, it is in practice committed by the 
political parties. As a result, what is being violated is not necessarily nationalist values but rather 
party political values that differ from one party to another. 
6.11 Democracy in the KRI 
The last question put to politicians concerned their opinion about democracy in the KRI. They 
were asked to rate democracy from a scale 1 to 10, where 1 stands for ‘very bad’ and 10 stands 
for ‘very good’. The most optimum response was 5 which stands in the middle with 31%. 
Overall, more than 70% of respondents rated democracy 5-8.  
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The KRI has gone through considerable political and economic development since the uprising 
in 1991. The function of the region as a de-facto autonomy made it different from other parts of 
Iraq where the Baath Regime ruled. This continued until the US-led intervention and the removal 
of the Baath from power in 2003. During this time, as Thomas L. Friedman (2007) explained it, 
the Kurdistan Region was expected to be ‘a work in progress’. He suggested that ‘Kurdistan’s 
democracy is a work in progress and it still needs a lot of work if it is going to deliver for all the 
Kurdish people the kind of governance they need and deserve’. Freedom of expression, free 
media, rights of individuals, women rights, freedom of assembly, coexistence and minority 
rights, freedom of religion and beliefs, and the establishment of democratic institutions were 
among the main principles of ruling in the KRG. All the mentioned and a number of other 
principles are legislated and adopted as laws in the KRI. However, having such laws and rules in 
place is one thing: their proper implementation is another. Internal conflicts, clientelism and 
nepotism, tribal norms and beliefs, weak, fractious government, and inequality before the laws 
are among the main reasons for the poor implementation of the laws in the KRI.  
Two years after the establishment of the KRI the two main parties, the KDP and PUK, entered 
into a civil war. This led to the division of the region into two administrations or two 
governments: one in Erbil and the other in Sulaimani. This continues up to the time of writing. 
Although the Parliament remained impartial and continued to legislate for both governments, the 
implementation and interpretation of laws was often different between Erbil and Sulaimani. After 
four years, in 1998, a ceasefire went into effect between the KDP and PUK. After that, attempts 
to unify the two administrations continued. After the overthrow of the Baath regime in Iraq the 
two main parties took part in the Iraqi interim and transitional governments, and they contributed 
to the drafting of the Iraqi constitution. In 2005 they took part as one unified list as the 
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Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan and won 75 seats out of a total 275 seats of the Iraqi 
National Assembly. Traditionally, the two parties are headed by families, the Barzani family 
leading the KDP and the Talebani family heads the PUK. Similarly, key positions in both the 
central and regional government, are also distributed among family members. As a result, Jalal 
Talebani, Secretary-General of the PUK was nominated for the position of Iraqi President and he 
was elected by the National Assembly. The position of Iraqi President was allocated to the 
Kurdistan Alliance as part of the consensus of forming the government. In the same year, for the 
Kurdistan parliamentary elections the two parties took part as the Democratic Patriotic Alliance 
of Kurdistan. Besides the two parties, the alliance consisted of seven other parties. This was the 
largest electoral alliance ever experience in the KRI. The alliance won 104 seats out of 111 seats 
in the Kurdistan Parliament. Barzani was elected as President of Kurdistan by parliamentary vote 
and his nephew Necirvan Barzani was nominated by Parliament to form the government cabinet.  
In an article written for The Salt Lake Tribune, Mathew D. LaPlante, justifies Bush’s 
‘democratization’ in Iraq by citing the example of the Kurdistan Region. He stated that the 
‘mostly autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government has many of the democratic characteristics 
Bush coveted for all Iraq when he ordered the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime’ (LaPlante, 2010). He also claims that the KRI ‘is a functioning democracy in the heart of 
the Middle East. It is a secular government in a majority Muslim nation. And it is an anti-terror 
ally in a region plagued by religious extremism.’ 
Overall, despite the internal problems and ups and downs, the KRI became a safe haven for 
many Kurdish people especially from neighboring countries such as Turkey, Iran and Syria. They 
came for different reasons including work opportunities, investment, and above all receiving 
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education in their mother tongue. Politicians from other parts who were escaping the suppression 
of regimes against Kurdish movements found refuge in the KRI. 
As well as the Kurdish population of those countries, Turks, Arabs and Persians also started to 
invest in the KRI. In addition, music concerts were held in the KRI for the Iranian diaspora 
singers and musicians who were not allowed to hold concerts in Iran. Such concerts attracted the 
attention of Iranian tourists and the KRI became a new tourist destination for them. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the interdependence between the press and politics in the KRI has been the main 
feature. Media and politics continue to depend on each other and each of them fulfil their mutual 
goals. The differentiation line between politics and journalism is another challenge. People with 
a political background from inside political parties work for their party media and they may 
continue their political job as well. Politicians expect the press in the KRI to be aware and 
responsible regarding the use of nationalist values to help shape public opinion towards such 
values and beliefs. This is controlled relatively easily in the KRI given that the majority of press 
is owned by political parties and that the majority of parties have taken nationalist values as their 
basic principles.  
Our expectation that the press in the KRI is mainly controlled and owned by the political parties 
was confirmed by the majority of politicians contacted for this study. In addition, the majority of 
respondents believe that the media is politicised and is a political project of the parties. This 
finding is significant, especially coming from politicians who are familiar with party systems and 
of whom some have already worked with party media.  
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The press-related laws in the KRI have played an important role in the development of the field. 
Nevertheless, the laws still need to be amended to further secure the rights and freedom of 
journalists. Pressure and attacks on journalists continue in the KRI and the current laws do not 
necessarily protect them. In some cases, the courts deal with journalists according to the criminal 
law. Meanwhile, freedom of the press continues to be a ‘grey’ issue for both politicians and 
journalists. Freedom, impartiality, and independence of the press face complex problems 
especially when the majority of politicians expect the press to abide by nationalist values. There 
is a strong belief among politicians that the media should be responsible for spreading national 
values. This could lead to a situation in the future where politicians could attempt to justify 
restricting press freedom, citing the of nationalist values. This is unlikely, given that nationalist 
feelings are rather high among the politicians and the majority of them see themselves as 
primarily nationalist.  
Nationalist values and their protection is undoubtedly being used by politicians to put pressure 
on journalists and the press in the KRI. The parties in power to some extent are able to label any 
press report that opposes their politics, as a violation of nationalist values. At the same time, 
nationalist values differ from one party to another. As the majority of the media in the KRI are 
entirely owned by the parties, the strategy of Party A can be labelled by Party B as violating 
nationalist values, and vice versa. 
Finally, democracy is believed to be enjoyed in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Laws and 
legislation adopted in the region carry the characteristics of democracy but in their 
implementation they face a variety of problems. In brief, the development of democracy in the 
KRI could be said to be under pressure from multiple factors such as internal conflicts, 
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clientelism, nepotism and tribal norms and beliefs.  
Table 11: Perceptions of politicians regarding press and politics in the KRI 
Table 12: Perceptions of politicians regarding press and politics in the KRI 
Question Yes No No Answer 
Have you worked as a 
journalist before becoming 
an MP?
44% (25) 56% (32) 0
Did you have a second job 
while being a journalist? 37% (21) 7% (4) 56% (32)
15. The newspaper you 
worked with belonged to 
the same party that you 
were a member of?
35% (20) 5,3% (3) 59,7% (34)
16. Have you ever wished 
to write about a topic and 
you were afraid to do so 
b e c a u s e o f p o l i t i c a l 
pressure?
18% (10) 23% (13) 59% (34)
17. In your work as a 
journalist have you put 
under pressure to write 
about a specific topic?
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CONCLUSION: POLITICAL PRESS AND POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN THE KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ  
The general conclusions and discussion and the thesis results are presented in this section.  
A weak media market, poor professionalism of journalists, high political parallelism and the 
weak role of the state were the main expectations and propositions of this research, to examine 
media systems and the interaction between media and politics in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.  
Given that there was insufficient research, previous studies or collected data on political systems 
in the KRI and less attention was paid to the interplay between press and politics, this research 
aimed at contributing towards a better understanding of the case. As discussed in Chapter One, 
the research area is novel and few studies have been conducted analysing the trajectory of 
politics and media in the KRI. This study aimed to identify and explain the understanding of the 
dynamics of media systems in the KRI and to participate in the theoretical discussion of media 
and politics.  
This thesis is an attempt to address the knowledge gap regarding media and politics by a 
triangulation of qualitative and quantitative research methods. Two surveys among a number of 
politicians and journalists and a number of in depth interviews conducted with politicians, media 
and political decision makers form a large part of the empirical evidence for this research. The 
journalists’ responses to the questionnaires and interviews gave a rich and insightful view on the 
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following issues: ownership and political affiliation of the newspapers, political affiliation of 
journalists, the pressures and the mechanisms to restrict the media and freedom of speech. Then 
the politicians responded regarding issues such as their perception of the ownership and control 
of the media by politics, party and ideology hegemony, the censorship that they experienced, 
their opinions about their role as legislators and their opinions of the current press law. Both 
politicians and journalists responded to questions regarding democracy and nationalism. In 
answering these questions the research makes a contribution to the understanding of the 
relationship between press and politics in the KRI. 
Chapter One of this thesis outlined the methodology. The theoretical framework, the research 
design and the methodology employed are detailed in this chapter. The methodology included the 
use of a single case study. Four analytical dimensions: Media market, Political parallelism, 
Journalistic professionalism and the Role of the state developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 
2012) are employed as a research model in this work. These dimensions were used in order to 
define the existing media system in in the KRI. Then the dimensions were broken down into 
measurable indicators for which it was possible to collect data and make conclusions based on 
empirical evidence. Fieldwork in the KRI, qualitative data and analysis of legislation, official 
documents, and other available archive resources, one-to-one semi-structured interviews, a 
survey, and observation were used to complete the research. This research in a mainly descriptive 
and exploratory way studies the case of the KRI and the complex development of its press and 
politics. 
To provide a historical and political bacSground, Chapter Two reviewed the contemporary 
political development of the KRI. This chapter presented the general characteristics of the case 
!  201
study and general accounts regarding the political system of the region during approximately one 
century of political development since the creation of Iraq in the 1920s up to 1991. Secondly, the 
the Kurdish experience after the Gulf War in 1991 up to the US-led intervention in 2003. In this 
period the establishment of a de-facto Kurdish government, Kurdistan Regional Government and 
also the internal war was explained. Thirdly, the period after Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 up 
to 2013 was discussed. In this period the role of the Kurds both in the establishment of a post-
Saddam, post-Baath-regime Iraq, and in the strengthening of a decentralised Kurdistan Region, 
were explained.  
Chapter Three developed a historical background to review developments in the Kurdish press in 
parallel with political developments in the KRI. The chapter is divided into three periods. The 
first period as Rebellion Press is introduced, between 1961 and 1991. This period describes the 
beginnings of the press as a means of communication for the Kurdish Liberation movement. The 
period starts with the Kurdish revolution in 1961 and lasts until the uprising in 1991. The second 
period is explained as Partisan Press (1991-2003). It explains the rise of media after the Kurdish 
uprising and the establishment of a de facto autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, the 
work of the press as the mouthpiece of political parties, and its role in the internal war. Then in 
the third period the Press of Autonomy is explained. The autonomous decentralized powers of 
the KRI gave a space to adopt press related pieces of legislation which were discussed in this 
chapter. 
In Chapter Four, the four dimensions of the press were analysed. The chapter gave an in- depth 
analysis of the four dimensions by comparing them to the press and politics in the KRI. Chapter 
Five and Chapter Six separately report the perspectives of journalists and politicians on the 
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interplay between politics and the press. In the Chapter Five the findings of the questionnaire of 
the journalists’ survey were presented and analysed. Similarly, in Chapter Six, the findings of the 
politicians’ survey are presented and analysed. These chapters explored the viewpoints of 
journalists and politicians concerning the current situation and also analysed their perspectives 
on the future of politics and press in the region.  
The four dimensions of media in the KRI 
Dimension 1: Media Market 
The market for the press in the KRI is weak. Finding a market is the least priority for the 
majority of the press in the KRI. Some of them have started to give newspapers away and even 
distribute them free of charge. The dependency of media on the political ownership and the funds 
provided by the party has made them independent of the market. This means that the majority of 
the KRI press does not chase economic independence. However, most of the press in the KRI 
claim to be independent, even the ones that are directly connected and tied to the parties. It is 
extremely common among the media in Kurdistan to call themselves independent while the 
owners, who are mainly political, cut their budget. In addition, there are no distribution or 
circulation agencies in the region and they would not be able to survive. The attempts to 
formulate distribution agencies have failed numerous times. The differences in dialect also 
affects the market of the published press. Kurmanji-published newspapers do not find a market in 
Sorani-speaking areas and vice versa. In the end, it could be argued that the rise and flourishing 
of the media market in the KRI will be dependent on the independence and impartiality of the 
media with no political ownership and control. 
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Dimension 2: Political parallelism 
The press and media have always been a part of politics and its developments have gone side by 
side with political developments in the region. The press has been present at different times but 
has sometimes played quite different roles. It played a resistance role and also a revolutionary 
messages communication role during the mountain resistance and with the Kurdish Liberation 
Movement. This type of press, basically founded as a revolutionary and even secret press, 
continued until it entered the cities. Obviously, the transformation to a type of city media did not 
happen overnight, and the process has continued until today. When the press and media 
descended from the mountains it was as an indissoluble part of politics and mainly as a partisan 
mouthpiece of the parties during the de facto autonomy after 1992. This has not changed much 
and all parties continue to own the press and impose their power on any publication or media 
attempts to be slightly independent. Only the technology and quality of the press has developed 
over time: the politicization is still in place.  
The political movements in the KRI are considered to be the main establishers of the media. 
Moreover, the parties are the main manipulators of the media, using it merely and mainly in 
favour of their political agenda. This can be seen throughout different stages of political 
movements in the KRI. As discussed in chapters three, four and five, in all the different periods, 
media developments were dependent on political developments. Meanwhile, the media plays 
only one role, which is to be loyal and to adhere to the owner’s political party. 
Although journalists and editors have a responsibility towards their readers, circulation and 
quality of journalism, most journalists in the KRI feel more responsible towards their owners 
who are political parties and their leaders. This ownership is both direct and indirect and has a 
remarkable impact on the development of the press. Therefore, it is not difficult to see that the 
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political party control of the press obliges the latter to publish what concerns party politics rather 
than having regard for the professional practice of journalism and its duty towards an informed 
citizenry. This elevates political parallelism to a high level in the KRI press and media.  
In the KRI, political parties are paralysed without their media establishments. There are cases of 
political parties where if you take their media away from them, they have no means whatever to 
present their political programme. This clearly indicates that the press and media has played a 
crucial role in political marketing, especially in the engagement and persuasion of the voters. The 
politics of these parties are ‘hot’ and broadcast on their satellite dishes to the public. Obviously, 
this serves their interests and represents their politics in influencing the hearts and minds of the 
people. It shows the importance of the media and press in the creation of political agendas and 
the way they are shaped in the KRI. As a result, the KRI political parties continue to give a 
higher priority to their media and invest considerable funds to improve their media capacity.  
Ultimately, given that almost all the media is directly or indirectly owned and controlled by 
political parties, it has to be concluded that there is no independent press in the KRI. Some press 
and media channels are fully dependent and some others are under the influence of the political 
parties. One cannot escape the conclusion that the media in the KRI is fully politicised.  
Dimension 3: Professionalism of journalists 
Journalistic professionalism and practices are also related to politics in the KRI. Given that the 
establishment and the institution of the press and media in the region is heavily dependent on the 
political parties, the personnel and practitioners in this field are also fully politicised.  
Political party members and those who had sufficient literacy to read the news and write the 
news, started to work in the media at the time of the revolution. They were replaced by more 
educated young cadres after uprising started, from 1991. The level of professionalism increased 
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in the aftermath of the 2003 regime-change in Iraq. This was due to the international attention on 
Iraq and the funds that were specified for media development in the country. Thus, many 
journalists had the opportunity to develop and educate themselves and learn professional norms. 
In addition, journalism and media schools were opened at the universities and education 
institutions where the practice of journalism was slowly starting to enter into a professional 
phase. Establishment of journalism departments at the universities in the KRI where journalism 
and media education is provided on a professional level is undoubtedly a positive move. 
However, education by itself is not necessarily sufficient to produce professional journalism. It 
takes practice and education actimg together to develop the field. Above all, there are a number 
of social as well as political pressures that do not allow creation of an atmosphere where 
professional journalism can be fully practised. The high level of involvement of journalists in 
politics and the fact that the majority of them are members of political parties and are, at the 
same time, loyal to societal or tribal norms, limits their actual practice of impartial and 
independent journalism. As we discovered, the majority of journalists in the KRI are party-
affiliated. They mainly tend to work for the same press as the party of which they are members. 
Therefore, we can conclude that their freedom, at different levels, is limited. Criticism of actions 
of the political party of the newspaper that you work for is a serious risk. Moreover, editors and 
press decision-makers also put limits on journalists and prevent them from touching upon certain 
issues, especially those concerned with the party’s weaknesses. 
Not only that, the journalists tend to automatically censor themselves in the KRI. This is mainly 
because the security of journalists is not guaranteed - the party could react harshly towards them. 
Journalists in the KRI are attacked, threatened, put under pressure during their daily work. The 
KRI remains a dangerous zone for the practice of journalism. The continuing wars, terrorism, 
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internal conflicts and political tensions as well as tribal norms are among the serious threats that 
put the lives of journalists in serious danger. 
Dimension 4: Role of the State 
Laws and regulations have not fully been able to help develop the practice of journalism for the 
better. However, legislation on the media and journalism in the region has made some 
contribution to the creation of a better practice of journalism. In general, there is a need to amend 
the press-related laws and legislation in the KRI, but at the same time they can be considered as 
the foundation stones of media development. Meanwhile, existing laws are not implemented 
properly. At the same time, despite the important role played by the legislation and the laws in 
developing the press in KRI, they are still not able to secure or guarantee the rights and freedom 
of journalists. The KRI has unlimited access to the internet, unlike other countries in the region 
where online media access is limited. As a result, the internet and new media in the KRI has 
played an important role in the political parties’ media promotion and production. The online 
community is growing fast and it is very influential, especially among the youth. This drives the 
politicians’ attention and brings them actively on to twitter, Facebook, and other social networks.  
There are other ways of the media being controlled by political parties, and through the parties 
by their representatives in government. One of these methods is to tempt journalists with 
subsidies and gifts, such as pieces of land. This was practised in the KRI in the last decade and 
the Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate (KJS) prioritised journalists in the distribution of such gifts 
from the government. As a result, those who were not members of the KJS, i.e. those who were 
not party members, lost out. In general, the state regulations with regard to the licensing and 
freedoms of establishment are not the main challenge. Instead, as described, it is the lack of 
implementation of the press and media related laws that is the main challenge to the development 
of media regulation in the KRI. 
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The parties in power expect the media to protect nationalist values and to promote them. 
Sometime the state puts pressure on the journalists and the media in this regard. However, those 
values are not only undefined but differ from one party to another and at different times. The 
media in KRI has no clear definition of the nationalist values, even when they are accused of 
violating them! Some, but not all, journalists believe that any media that praises the ruling party 
or parties is a fine protector of nationalist values and those that criticise the parties should be 
labelled as violators of those values.  
Some policy implications of this study   
From a normative point of view, the findings of this thesis offer a number of possible policy 
recommendations which could help sustain a healthier relationship between the press and politics 
in the KRI. The following points are among the main concluding suggestions from this thesis: 
• The press in the KRI should be motivated to step towards economic independence. This 
would lead to their political independence which at the same time would help to foster 
the establishment of a free and independent press. 
• Laws need to be amended. The amendments must be carefully provisioned by both the 
press practitioners and also the lawmakers in order to serve the press and journalists 
independence. 
• Legislation needs to be adopted concerning the limitation of party control and ownership 
of the media.  
• New laws and legislation need to be adopted to secure the protection of journalists and to 
reduce the risks they face from political pressure. 
• Journalists need to be trained and schools of journalism and media need to be developed 
in order to support the development of the highest standards throughout the press and 
media in the KRI.  
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• Media and press channels need to be able to support journalists financially in a decent 
and sufficient way, in order to avoid them considering journalism as a second job.  
Suggestions for further studies: 
• Analysis of press related laws in the KRI and the way they are implemented? If not fully 
implemented, why? 
• Political tensions and rivalry between the KRI political parties which encourage 
instability and conflict 
• Media and press markets in the KRI and the feasibility of the development of the media 
market 
• The internal media structure of political parties in the KRI 
• Direct and indirect ownership of media by political parties in the KRI 
• The influence of online media on the traditional press and on journalists in the KRI 
• The media and its role in peace-making and peace-building in the KRI 
• The role of media in conflict escalation in the KRI: the case of the internal war 
• The media at war: responsibilities of the media during armed conflict 
• The role of the media in political campaigns in the KRI 
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